Narrative:

I was nearing the end of an uneventful IFR flight from ZZZ to skx. A standard briefing had been obtained prior to the flight. Other than an airmet for turbulence; no significant adverse conditions were noted. The flight conditions at skx were solid VFR and forecast to remain that way throughout the morning with the normal cumulus buildup in the afternoon hours. The WX at ZZZ was MVFR. The WX en route indicated scattered areas of light to moderate precipitation. There was no indication of any significant precipitation at taos. The projected freezing levels were generally above 15000 ft MSL with a high temperature predicted in the mid-seventies. I had made the flight dozens of times in both directions; so the route over the mountains was very familiar as were the options in case of inclement WX. Had there been any suggestion that there might be frozen precipitation in the taos area; the flight would have been postponed. I was approaching the mountain range separating cimarron from taos. The xm WX information in the cockpit indicated isolated patches of light precipitation both south and north of taos; but no precipitation in the immediate taos area. The taos ASOS indicated conditions as VFR. There was; however; build-up over the mountains with tops of approximately FL190. Aircraft X is a 1988 turbocharged mooney M20K certified to FL280; so getting safely over a cloud layer at FL190 is perfectly feasible. The airplane has original equipment oxygen and both occupants were using it in accordance with regulation. The airplane is fully IFR capable current. Expecting significant up- and downdrafts for a brief period directly over the mountains; I requested and got a clearance for a block from 17000 ft to FL190 with the provision that I should stay away from FL180. I accepted the block assignment; adjusted my altimeter to the setting given by the controller to another aircraft in the vicinity; verified the setting using text metars from both taos and another nearby airport (I believe las vegas); disconnected the autoplt and; close to the east side accepted a handoff to a second albuquerque controller. This handoff was successfully completed after a couple of failed attempts; but only with assistance from the first albuquerque controller. Because of the delay; I made contact with the second albuquerque controller very close to the mountains. I was climbing to FL190 to get over the tops of what appeared to be a relatively thick (but; in my opinion; not lenticular) buildup over the mountains. Evaluating WX from various sources reinforced the idea that the WX on the west side still looked reasonably benign. My plan was to climb safely over the WX (about FL195); drop down through the cloud layer(south) at taos and; if necessary; fly 1 of the 2 approachs into the airport. At the time; taos regional was reporting ceilings of over 1500 ft and visibility over 3 mi; so a visual approach would probably be possible once I'd descended through the cloud base. The frozen precipitation traces were still well to the south of the taos airport showing relatively slow movement to the north. After some broken communication with the second controller; the frequency cleared enough for me to understand that the controller considered me to be at FL195 and was sternly demanding that I return to FL190. The problem was; my altimeter showed I was just shy of FL190; not FL195 as reported by the controller; and any descent would put me in the clouds. Following a brief discussion; I began a descent into the clouds to comply. As I descended into the clouds; I checked my instruments; found them working normally; reported same to the controller; but was told to continue descending. When I entered the clouds; I reported that I was now in IMC indicating an altitude several hundred ft lower than the controller was reporting. I was also in severe turbulence with trace precipitation beginning to show on my windshield. Rather than continue my discussion of altitude with the controller; I asked him what he thought my altitude was; set my altimeter to that figure and continued into the clouds somewhat lower than I'd planned. The fact of the matter was that I was familiar with the area and neither altitude would place me close to the MEA for the area (15000 ft MSL). As long as the controller wantedto have me in hard IMC in the mountains; I needed to spend my time flying the airplane since the clouds were severely convective and the outside air temperatures were beginning to drop. Noting this; as I entered the clouds; I flipped on the pitot and propeller heat; backed the throttle off to something close to va and continued to hand fly the airplane in zero visibility and extreme turbulence. The turbulence in the clouds was extremely severe. All of my attention was required to keep the airplane straight and as level as possible. After the altitude discussion; the controller dropped me a couple of thousand ft at a time as I proceeded toward taos. With each lower level; the up- and downdrafts became more severe; the shear was more extreme and; at about 15000 ft; the precipitation started sticking to the airplane. When I reported this accretion; the controller demanded that I return to my assigned altitude; apparently ignoring the fact that I'd just reported I was in icing conditions and that I was flying in cells that could push me up or down several hundred ft in a few seconds. Nevertheless; I did my best to comply. At some point; despite the fact that I'd indicated I was in hard IMC repeatedly; the controller asked if I 'had taos in sight;' to which I replied again that aircraft was in hard IMC. The controller then asked what approach I'd like. I indicated the mav (GPS) 4 approach which I'd loaded and activated in my garmin 430W before entering the mountains. I asked for vectors to intercept the approach since I was hand flying the airplane and working hard to keep it in the air. I believe we were either still at 15000 ft or had been instructed to descend to 12000 ft; all in absolute IMC; violent up- and downdrafts; windshear combined with severe icing when the controller; sounding pretty disgusted; told me to stay at my assigned altitude. I indicated I was trying to comply; but the conditions were difficult. Shortly thereafter; when we were at about 12000 ft in terrible conditions; flying straight into the worst of the WX on a southerly vector to the IAF; the gear warning horn suddenly activated. I immediately began checking the system looking for the problem. The controller called again; asking for my altitude. I diverted my attention to the altimeter briefly and said '19 --- 1900 ---' when he answered '11900?' to which I responded something like 'that's it;' while I continued trying to find the reason the gear horn was sounding. I believe it was about then that the controller informed me that I was supposed to be at 12000 ft and asked me to advise when I was ready to copy a telephone number. I replied that I was unable; but would call when on the ground. After a few more seconds of scanning; I noted that the airspeed indicator was pegged at 0; which explained the gear horn. At some point; I must have accidentally bumped the rocker switch controling pitot heat turning it off. I turned it back on and it worked quickly to clear the pitot and stop the gear warning horn. A few mins after that; still in zero visibility; severe turbulence and frozen precipitation; I announced I was turning inbound on the LNAV (GPS) 4 approach. I intersected the LNAV GS and in no time at all was below the clouds; out of the precipitation and into warm enough WX that the ice began to fall off the airplane. I canceled my IFR clearance in the air; continued the approach to circling minimums and landed runway 22 without incident. Within mins of my arrival at the FBO; I received a telephone call asking about the situation. I answered the questions as completely as I could. What happened? It is my impression that the controller in question had no idea what I was actually doing in the little; single engine airplane I was flying to maintain straight and more-or-less level flight in the extreme conditions. I had been watching WX in the cockpit carefully throughout the flight. Icing had not been indicated at any time prior to entering the mountains. Then; just as I approached the mountains; the traces west of the mountains began to show isolated patches of frozen precipitation above an otherwise clear field. I could have diverted south; except the WX at taos was coming in from the south. In addition; similar WX seemed to be filling from the north. Therefore; the decision was made to get high; over the WX and go direct over the mountains as cleared. It wasn't until I was forced to descend into the clouds that extreme difficulties were encountered. I attempted to inform the controller of this situation; but received no assistance. Had I been allowed to descend below or climb above the clouds; the only issue would have been turbulence. By keeping me in the clouds; the controller exposed aircraft to very dangerous conditions that I was forced to deal with in the most reasonable manner available. The conditions were unexpected; unpredicted and very difficult to fly in. The winds were very strong; variable in direction and they made the use of the autoplt unsafe. I had no option but to slow to va and manually maintain direction; altitude; attitude and pitch; all of which were changing instantaneously. If I could have canceled my IFR clearance before being established inbound on an approach; I would have. Unfortunately; I had been denied the 'over the top' solution before I entered the clouds and; once in solid IMC; I was unable to descend through the overcast and maintain VFR and unwilling to declare an emergency and descend on my own. This resulted in a needless venture into the most vicious part of a very dangerous WX system. In the cockpit; it seemed as if the controller simply refused to understand what 'sir; I'm in ice' might mean to a pilot flying a high performance piston single. My other alternative; which I could have exercised; was to declare an emergency. When there was about 1/4 inch of ice on the windshield; I very nearly did that. However; at that point; I was only a few mi from the IAF and felt that I could intercept the GS and descend into taos safely. I'm glad I was correct in that assessment. What remains a complete mystery is the discrepancy between my altimeter altitude and the altitude the controller was seeing. I'd been in the air with ATC for over 2 1/2 hours without discrepancy. Suddenly; I felt I was being taken to task for an anomaly I could see no ready explanation for. I was being told to descend over mountains into a thick cloud layer which I felt reasonably certain was above freezing but which I knew contained severe convective activity. I feel my response was measured and; given the circumstances; reasonable. After more than 1 request and no alternatives offered from the controller; I asked the controller what he thought my altitude was; set my altimeter to that altitude and descended to my assigned altitude. Since his demands stopped; I thought my actions had resulted in compliance. I felt this was reasonably safe because by neither determination of altitude was I close to MEA for the area. When I contacted the second controller; my plan was to get and stay high to get over the clouds. Once I was in the WX; however; I was forced to focus on flying the airplane with little time for anything else. The controller offered no assistance beyond the ordinary. In this case; the 'ordinary' put me and my passenger in a very difficult situation which I was very grateful to be able to resolve without incident. I can't explain the discrepancy between the controller's indicated altitude and mine except to say that the altimeter setting for the area was about 29.4; while the standard above FL180 is 29.92 (pressure altitude). Since I was (temporarily) above FL180; one possible explanation is that the controller was using pressure altitude above FL180. I don't know; but it might explain the discrepancy. Since I had no intention of being in alpha airspace except for a few mins (about 10); it didn't occur to me to reset my altimeter to 29.92 at FL190 and reset it to (about) 29.4 below FL180. In any case; had the controller given me an altimeter setting to use; I'd have complied. In fact; that's what he did when he gave me what he perceived to be my altitude. If he wanted me to go back to 29.4 as I descended; then it would have been helpful for him to inform me. Frankly; the controller's obsession with my altitude which proved to be as much as 100 ft off when at 12000 ft probably kept us from noting

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TURBOCHARGED M20 PLT FEELS ATC FAILED TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE ASSISTANCE AND DEMANDED TOO MUCH FLYING PRECISION WHEN THE ACFT ENCOUNTERED UNEXPECTED WEATHER AND TURBULENCE ABOVE AND BELOW THE TRANSITION LEVEL.

Narrative: I WAS NEARING THE END OF AN UNEVENTFUL IFR FLT FROM ZZZ TO SKX. A STANDARD BRIEFING HAD BEEN OBTAINED PRIOR TO THE FLT. OTHER THAN AN AIRMET FOR TURB; NO SIGNIFICANT ADVERSE CONDITIONS WERE NOTED. THE FLT CONDITIONS AT SKX WERE SOLID VFR AND FORECAST TO REMAIN THAT WAY THROUGHOUT THE MORNING WITH THE NORMAL CUMULUS BUILDUP IN THE AFTERNOON HRS. THE WX AT ZZZ WAS MVFR. THE WX ENRTE INDICATED SCATTERED AREAS OF LIGHT TO MODERATE PRECIP. THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF ANY SIGNIFICANT PRECIP AT TAOS. THE PROJECTED FREEZING LEVELS WERE GENERALLY ABOVE 15000 FT MSL WITH A HIGH TEMP PREDICTED IN THE MID-SEVENTIES. I HAD MADE THE FLT DOZENS OF TIMES IN BOTH DIRECTIONS; SO THE RTE OVER THE MOUNTAINS WAS VERY FAMILIAR AS WERE THE OPTIONS IN CASE OF INCLEMENT WX. HAD THERE BEEN ANY SUGGESTION THAT THERE MIGHT BE FROZEN PRECIP IN THE TAOS AREA; THE FLT WOULD HAVE BEEN POSTPONED. I WAS APCHING THE MOUNTAIN RANGE SEPARATING CIMARRON FROM TAOS. THE XM WX INFO IN THE COCKPIT INDICATED ISOLATED PATCHES OF LIGHT PRECIP BOTH S AND N OF TAOS; BUT NO PRECIP IN THE IMMEDIATE TAOS AREA. THE TAOS ASOS INDICATED CONDITIONS AS VFR. THERE WAS; HOWEVER; BUILD-UP OVER THE MOUNTAINS WITH TOPS OF APPROX FL190. ACFT X IS A 1988 TURBOCHARGED MOONEY M20K CERTIFIED TO FL280; SO GETTING SAFELY OVER A CLOUD LAYER AT FL190 IS PERFECTLY FEASIBLE. THE AIRPLANE HAS ORIGINAL EQUIP OXYGEN AND BOTH OCCUPANTS WERE USING IT IN ACCORDANCE WITH REG. THE AIRPLANE IS FULLY IFR CAPABLE CURRENT. EXPECTING SIGNIFICANT UP- AND DOWNDRAFTS FOR A BRIEF PERIOD DIRECTLY OVER THE MOUNTAINS; I REQUESTED AND GOT A CLRNC FOR A BLOCK FROM 17000 FT TO FL190 WITH THE PROVISION THAT I SHOULD STAY AWAY FROM FL180. I ACCEPTED THE BLOCK ASSIGNMENT; ADJUSTED MY ALTIMETER TO THE SETTING GIVEN BY THE CTLR TO ANOTHER ACFT IN THE VICINITY; VERIFIED THE SETTING USING TEXT METARS FROM BOTH TAOS AND ANOTHER NEARBY ARPT (I BELIEVE LAS VEGAS); DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND; CLOSE TO THE E SIDE ACCEPTED A HDOF TO A SECOND ALBUQUERQUE CTLR. THIS HDOF WAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED AFTER A COUPLE OF FAILED ATTEMPTS; BUT ONLY WITH ASSISTANCE FROM THE FIRST ALBUQUERQUE CTLR. BECAUSE OF THE DELAY; I MADE CONTACT WITH THE SECOND ALBUQUERQUE CTLR VERY CLOSE TO THE MOUNTAINS. I WAS CLBING TO FL190 TO GET OVER THE TOPS OF WHAT APPEARED TO BE A RELATIVELY THICK (BUT; IN MY OPINION; NOT LENTICULAR) BUILDUP OVER THE MOUNTAINS. EVALUATING WX FROM VARIOUS SOURCES REINFORCED THE IDEA THAT THE WX ON THE W SIDE STILL LOOKED REASONABLY BENIGN. MY PLAN WAS TO CLB SAFELY OVER THE WX (ABOUT FL195); DROP DOWN THROUGH THE CLOUD LAYER(S) AT TAOS AND; IF NECESSARY; FLY 1 OF THE 2 APCHS INTO THE ARPT. AT THE TIME; TAOS REGIONAL WAS RPTING CEILINGS OF OVER 1500 FT AND VISIBILITY OVER 3 MI; SO A VISUAL APCH WOULD PROBABLY BE POSSIBLE ONCE I'D DSNDED THROUGH THE CLOUD BASE. THE FROZEN PRECIP TRACES WERE STILL WELL TO THE S OF THE TAOS ARPT SHOWING RELATIVELY SLOW MOVEMENT TO THE N. AFTER SOME BROKEN COM WITH THE SECOND CTLR; THE FREQ CLRED ENOUGH FOR ME TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE CTLR CONSIDERED ME TO BE AT FL195 AND WAS STERNLY DEMANDING THAT I RETURN TO FL190. THE PROB WAS; MY ALTIMETER SHOWED I WAS JUST SHY OF FL190; NOT FL195 AS RPTED BY THE CTLR; AND ANY DSCNT WOULD PUT ME IN THE CLOUDS. FOLLOWING A BRIEF DISCUSSION; I BEGAN A DSCNT INTO THE CLOUDS TO COMPLY. AS I DSNDED INTO THE CLOUDS; I CHKED MY INSTS; FOUND THEM WORKING NORMALLY; RPTED SAME TO THE CTLR; BUT WAS TOLD TO CONTINUE DSNDING. WHEN I ENTERED THE CLOUDS; I RPTED THAT I WAS NOW IN IMC INDICATING AN ALT SEVERAL HUNDRED FT LOWER THAN THE CTLR WAS RPTING. I WAS ALSO IN SEVERE TURB WITH TRACE PRECIP BEGINNING TO SHOW ON MY WINDSHIELD. RATHER THAN CONTINUE MY DISCUSSION OF ALT WITH THE CTLR; I ASKED HIM WHAT HE THOUGHT MY ALT WAS; SET MY ALTIMETER TO THAT FIGURE AND CONTINUED INTO THE CLOUDS SOMEWHAT LOWER THAN I'D PLANNED. THE FACT OF THE MATTER WAS THAT I WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE AREA AND NEITHER ALT WOULD PLACE ME CLOSE TO THE MEA FOR THE AREA (15000 FT MSL). AS LONG AS THE CTLR WANTEDTO HAVE ME IN HARD IMC IN THE MOUNTAINS; I NEEDED TO SPEND MY TIME FLYING THE AIRPLANE SINCE THE CLOUDS WERE SEVERELY CONVECTIVE AND THE OUTSIDE AIR TEMPS WERE BEGINNING TO DROP. NOTING THIS; AS I ENTERED THE CLOUDS; I FLIPPED ON THE PITOT AND PROP HEAT; BACKED THE THROTTLE OFF TO SOMETHING CLOSE TO VA AND CONTINUED TO HAND FLY THE AIRPLANE IN ZERO VISIBILITY AND EXTREME TURB. THE TURB IN THE CLOUDS WAS EXTREMELY SEVERE. ALL OF MY ATTN WAS REQUIRED TO KEEP THE AIRPLANE STRAIGHT AND AS LEVEL AS POSSIBLE. AFTER THE ALT DISCUSSION; THE CTLR DROPPED ME A COUPLE OF THOUSAND FT AT A TIME AS I PROCEEDED TOWARD TAOS. WITH EACH LOWER LEVEL; THE UP- AND DOWNDRAFTS BECAME MORE SEVERE; THE SHEAR WAS MORE EXTREME AND; AT ABOUT 15000 FT; THE PRECIP STARTED STICKING TO THE AIRPLANE. WHEN I RPTED THIS ACCRETION; THE CTLR DEMANDED THAT I RETURN TO MY ASSIGNED ALT; APPARENTLY IGNORING THE FACT THAT I'D JUST RPTED I WAS IN ICING CONDITIONS AND THAT I WAS FLYING IN CELLS THAT COULD PUSH ME UP OR DOWN SEVERAL HUNDRED FT IN A FEW SECONDS. NEVERTHELESS; I DID MY BEST TO COMPLY. AT SOME POINT; DESPITE THE FACT THAT I'D INDICATED I WAS IN HARD IMC REPEATEDLY; THE CTLR ASKED IF I 'HAD TAOS IN SIGHT;' TO WHICH I REPLIED AGAIN THAT ACFT WAS IN HARD IMC. THE CTLR THEN ASKED WHAT APCH I'D LIKE. I INDICATED THE MAV (GPS) 4 APCH WHICH I'D LOADED AND ACTIVATED IN MY GARMIN 430W BEFORE ENTERING THE MOUNTAINS. I ASKED FOR VECTORS TO INTERCEPT THE APCH SINCE I WAS HAND FLYING THE AIRPLANE AND WORKING HARD TO KEEP IT IN THE AIR. I BELIEVE WE WERE EITHER STILL AT 15000 FT OR HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DSND TO 12000 FT; ALL IN ABSOLUTE IMC; VIOLENT UP- AND DOWNDRAFTS; WINDSHEAR COMBINED WITH SEVERE ICING WHEN THE CTLR; SOUNDING PRETTY DISGUSTED; TOLD ME TO STAY AT MY ASSIGNED ALT. I INDICATED I WAS TRYING TO COMPLY; BUT THE CONDITIONS WERE DIFFICULT. SHORTLY THEREAFTER; WHEN WE WERE AT ABOUT 12000 FT IN TERRIBLE CONDITIONS; FLYING STRAIGHT INTO THE WORST OF THE WX ON A SOUTHERLY VECTOR TO THE IAF; THE GEAR WARNING HORN SUDDENLY ACTIVATED. I IMMEDIATELY BEGAN CHKING THE SYS LOOKING FOR THE PROB. THE CTLR CALLED AGAIN; ASKING FOR MY ALT. I DIVERTED MY ATTN TO THE ALTIMETER BRIEFLY AND SAID '19 --- 1900 ---' WHEN HE ANSWERED '11900?' TO WHICH I RESPONDED SOMETHING LIKE 'THAT'S IT;' WHILE I CONTINUED TRYING TO FIND THE REASON THE GEAR HORN WAS SOUNDING. I BELIEVE IT WAS ABOUT THEN THAT THE CTLR INFORMED ME THAT I WAS SUPPOSED TO BE AT 12000 FT AND ASKED ME TO ADVISE WHEN I WAS READY TO COPY A TELEPHONE NUMBER. I REPLIED THAT I WAS UNABLE; BUT WOULD CALL WHEN ON THE GND. AFTER A FEW MORE SECONDS OF SCANNING; I NOTED THAT THE AIRSPD INDICATOR WAS PEGGED AT 0; WHICH EXPLAINED THE GEAR HORN. AT SOME POINT; I MUST HAVE ACCIDENTALLY BUMPED THE ROCKER SWITCH CTLING PITOT HEAT TURNING IT OFF. I TURNED IT BACK ON AND IT WORKED QUICKLY TO CLR THE PITOT AND STOP THE GEAR WARNING HORN. A FEW MINS AFTER THAT; STILL IN ZERO VISIBILITY; SEVERE TURB AND FROZEN PRECIP; I ANNOUNCED I WAS TURNING INBOUND ON THE LNAV (GPS) 4 APCH. I INTERSECTED THE LNAV GS AND IN NO TIME AT ALL WAS BELOW THE CLOUDS; OUT OF THE PRECIP AND INTO WARM ENOUGH WX THAT THE ICE BEGAN TO FALL OFF THE AIRPLANE. I CANCELED MY IFR CLRNC IN THE AIR; CONTINUED THE APCH TO CIRCLING MINIMUMS AND LANDED RWY 22 WITHOUT INCIDENT. WITHIN MINS OF MY ARR AT THE FBO; I RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL ASKING ABOUT THE SITUATION. I ANSWERED THE QUESTIONS AS COMPLETELY AS I COULD. WHAT HAPPENED? IT IS MY IMPRESSION THAT THE CTLR IN QUESTION HAD NO IDEA WHAT I WAS ACTUALLY DOING IN THE LITTLE; SINGLE ENG AIRPLANE I WAS FLYING TO MAINTAIN STRAIGHT AND MORE-OR-LESS LEVEL FLT IN THE EXTREME CONDITIONS. I HAD BEEN WATCHING WX IN THE COCKPIT CAREFULLY THROUGHOUT THE FLT. ICING HAD NOT BEEN INDICATED AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO ENTERING THE MOUNTAINS. THEN; JUST AS I APCHED THE MOUNTAINS; THE TRACES W OF THE MOUNTAINS BEGAN TO SHOW ISOLATED PATCHES OF FROZEN PRECIP ABOVE AN OTHERWISE CLR FIELD. I COULD HAVE DIVERTED S; EXCEPT THE WX AT TAOS WAS COMING IN FROM THE S. IN ADDITION; SIMILAR WX SEEMED TO BE FILLING FROM THE N. THEREFORE; THE DECISION WAS MADE TO GET HIGH; OVER THE WX AND GO DIRECT OVER THE MOUNTAINS AS CLRED. IT WASN'T UNTIL I WAS FORCED TO DSND INTO THE CLOUDS THAT EXTREME DIFFICULTIES WERE ENCOUNTERED. I ATTEMPTED TO INFORM THE CTLR OF THIS SITUATION; BUT RECEIVED NO ASSISTANCE. HAD I BEEN ALLOWED TO DSND BELOW OR CLB ABOVE THE CLOUDS; THE ONLY ISSUE WOULD HAVE BEEN TURB. BY KEEPING ME IN THE CLOUDS; THE CTLR EXPOSED ACFT TO VERY DANGEROUS CONDITIONS THAT I WAS FORCED TO DEAL WITH IN THE MOST REASONABLE MANNER AVAILABLE. THE CONDITIONS WERE UNEXPECTED; UNPREDICTED AND VERY DIFFICULT TO FLY IN. THE WINDS WERE VERY STRONG; VARIABLE IN DIRECTION AND THEY MADE THE USE OF THE AUTOPLT UNSAFE. I HAD NO OPTION BUT TO SLOW TO VA AND MANUALLY MAINTAIN DIRECTION; ALT; ATTITUDE AND PITCH; ALL OF WHICH WERE CHANGING INSTANTANEOUSLY. IF I COULD HAVE CANCELED MY IFR CLRNC BEFORE BEING ESTABLISHED INBOUND ON AN APCH; I WOULD HAVE. UNFORTUNATELY; I HAD BEEN DENIED THE 'OVER THE TOP' SOLUTION BEFORE I ENTERED THE CLOUDS AND; ONCE IN SOLID IMC; I WAS UNABLE TO DSND THROUGH THE OVCST AND MAINTAIN VFR AND UNWILLING TO DECLARE AN EMER AND DSND ON MY OWN. THIS RESULTED IN A NEEDLESS VENTURE INTO THE MOST VICIOUS PART OF A VERY DANGEROUS WX SYS. IN THE COCKPIT; IT SEEMED AS IF THE CTLR SIMPLY REFUSED TO UNDERSTAND WHAT 'SIR; I'M IN ICE' MIGHT MEAN TO A PLT FLYING A HIGH PERFORMANCE PISTON SINGLE. MY OTHER ALTERNATIVE; WHICH I COULD HAVE EXERCISED; WAS TO DECLARE AN EMER. WHEN THERE WAS ABOUT 1/4 INCH OF ICE ON THE WINDSHIELD; I VERY NEARLY DID THAT. HOWEVER; AT THAT POINT; I WAS ONLY A FEW MI FROM THE IAF AND FELT THAT I COULD INTERCEPT THE GS AND DSND INTO TAOS SAFELY. I'M GLAD I WAS CORRECT IN THAT ASSESSMENT. WHAT REMAINS A COMPLETE MYSTERY IS THE DISCREPANCY BTWN MY ALTIMETER ALT AND THE ALT THE CTLR WAS SEEING. I'D BEEN IN THE AIR WITH ATC FOR OVER 2 1/2 HRS WITHOUT DISCREPANCY. SUDDENLY; I FELT I WAS BEING TAKEN TO TASK FOR AN ANOMALY I COULD SEE NO READY EXPLANATION FOR. I WAS BEING TOLD TO DSND OVER MOUNTAINS INTO A THICK CLOUD LAYER WHICH I FELT REASONABLY CERTAIN WAS ABOVE FREEZING BUT WHICH I KNEW CONTAINED SEVERE CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY. I FEEL MY RESPONSE WAS MEASURED AND; GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES; REASONABLE. AFTER MORE THAN 1 REQUEST AND NO ALTERNATIVES OFFERED FROM THE CTLR; I ASKED THE CTLR WHAT HE THOUGHT MY ALT WAS; SET MY ALTIMETER TO THAT ALT AND DSNDED TO MY ASSIGNED ALT. SINCE HIS DEMANDS STOPPED; I THOUGHT MY ACTIONS HAD RESULTED IN COMPLIANCE. I FELT THIS WAS REASONABLY SAFE BECAUSE BY NEITHER DETERMINATION OF ALT WAS I CLOSE TO MEA FOR THE AREA. WHEN I CONTACTED THE SECOND CTLR; MY PLAN WAS TO GET AND STAY HIGH TO GET OVER THE CLOUDS. ONCE I WAS IN THE WX; HOWEVER; I WAS FORCED TO FOCUS ON FLYING THE AIRPLANE WITH LITTLE TIME FOR ANYTHING ELSE. THE CTLR OFFERED NO ASSISTANCE BEYOND THE ORDINARY. IN THIS CASE; THE 'ORDINARY' PUT ME AND MY PAX IN A VERY DIFFICULT SITUATION WHICH I WAS VERY GRATEFUL TO BE ABLE TO RESOLVE WITHOUT INCIDENT. I CAN'T EXPLAIN THE DISCREPANCY BTWN THE CTLR'S INDICATED ALT AND MINE EXCEPT TO SAY THAT THE ALTIMETER SETTING FOR THE AREA WAS ABOUT 29.4; WHILE THE STANDARD ABOVE FL180 IS 29.92 (PRESSURE ALT). SINCE I WAS (TEMPORARILY) ABOVE FL180; ONE POSSIBLE EXPLANATION IS THAT THE CTLR WAS USING PRESSURE ALT ABOVE FL180. I DON'T KNOW; BUT IT MIGHT EXPLAIN THE DISCREPANCY. SINCE I HAD NO INTENTION OF BEING IN ALPHA AIRSPACE EXCEPT FOR A FEW MINS (ABOUT 10); IT DIDN'T OCCUR TO ME TO RESET MY ALTIMETER TO 29.92 AT FL190 AND RESET IT TO (ABOUT) 29.4 BELOW FL180. IN ANY CASE; HAD THE CTLR GIVEN ME AN ALTIMETER SETTING TO USE; I'D HAVE COMPLIED. IN FACT; THAT'S WHAT HE DID WHEN HE GAVE ME WHAT HE PERCEIVED TO BE MY ALT. IF HE WANTED ME TO GO BACK TO 29.4 AS I DSNDED; THEN IT WOULD HAVE BEEN HELPFUL FOR HIM TO INFORM ME. FRANKLY; THE CTLR'S OBSESSION WITH MY ALT WHICH PROVED TO BE AS MUCH AS 100 FT OFF WHEN AT 12000 FT PROBABLY KEPT US FROM NOTING

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.