Narrative:

I was working a mid-shift on jun/xa/08 to jun/xb/08. My area is currently staffed with only 2 controllers from XC00 am to XH00 am. There was a line of WX building near omaha; northeast; north and south that began impacting the traffic flow earlier in the evening. The line of thunderstorms continued to build throughout the night. I relieved the other controller from position about XE30 am. At that time the monitor alert (efficient sector loading) numbers were indicating yellow. Within 30 mins the monitor alert showed red indicating traffic exceeded the sector monitor alert settings. The other controller took a short break and returned to work the sector with me as the traffic built. By about XF00 am the line had developed forcing all the traffic transiting east to west and west to east just north of the end of the line about 40 mi north of sioux city; ia. At the peak of traffic I was working 25 aircraft (most of whom were deviating for WX); with many more displayed on my scope. An extreme traffic load continued for over 30 mins; with high workload resulting from all the deviating aircraft. The monitor alert for the sector was 15. Additionally during this same time period I was responsible for 2 approach control airspaces (sioux city; ia; and lincoln; northeast). This sort of traffic load would never be permitted during daytime operations; certainly not without having several sectors open with several controllers working them. However; apparently it is acceptable to the FAA to have controllers with disrupted circadian rhythms working traffic levels they would never be allowed to work during normal hours without direct supervision. Additionally; many orders in the 7210.3V (facility operation and administration) were violated or ignored by FAA management and the operations manager in charge (omic). Specifically 7210.3V; section 7 (monitor alert parameter) and section 6 (watch supervision-terminal/en route) were both violated in numerous ways. The monitor alert order specifies that the monitor alert value is a dynamic value and should be adjusted downwards in the case of reduced sector efficiencies (such as during WX events). It also dictates that monitor alerts must be responded to which doesn't appear to have occurred. The supervisor/omic took no action to mitigate or otherwise address the traffic loading which reached unsafe levels. In fact he seemed unaware of the situation until well after the traffic had hit peak levels. Also; the arbitrary reduction in our staffing on the mid-shift from 3 controllers to 2 (for staffing shortages) left us with little recourse to divide the traffic between sectors/controllers. WX; deviating aircraft; and the violation of FAA orders resulted in sector traffic loads reaching dangerous levels.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZMP CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING STAFFING LEVELS ON MID SHIFTS; QUESTIONING SUPVR LACK OF ACTION REGARDING TFC VOLUME.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING A MID-SHIFT ON JUN/XA/08 TO JUN/XB/08. MY AREA IS CURRENTLY STAFFED WITH ONLY 2 CTLRS FROM XC00 AM TO XH00 AM. THERE WAS A LINE OF WX BUILDING NEAR OMAHA; NE; N AND S THAT BEGAN IMPACTING THE TFC FLOW EARLIER IN THE EVENING. THE LINE OF TSTMS CONTINUED TO BUILD THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT. I RELIEVED THE OTHER CTLR FROM POS ABOUT XE30 AM. AT THAT TIME THE MONITOR ALERT (EFFICIENT SECTOR LOADING) NUMBERS WERE INDICATING YELLOW. WITHIN 30 MINS THE MONITOR ALERT SHOWED RED INDICATING TFC EXCEEDED THE SECTOR MONITOR ALERT SETTINGS. THE OTHER CTLR TOOK A SHORT BREAK AND RETURNED TO WORK THE SECTOR WITH ME AS THE TFC BUILT. BY ABOUT XF00 AM THE LINE HAD DEVELOPED FORCING ALL THE TFC TRANSITING E TO W AND W TO E JUST N OF THE END OF THE LINE ABOUT 40 MI N OF SIOUX CITY; IA. AT THE PEAK OF TFC I WAS WORKING 25 ACFT (MOST OF WHOM WERE DEVIATING FOR WX); WITH MANY MORE DISPLAYED ON MY SCOPE. AN EXTREME TFC LOAD CONTINUED FOR OVER 30 MINS; WITH HIGH WORKLOAD RESULTING FROM ALL THE DEVIATING ACFT. THE MONITOR ALERT FOR THE SECTOR WAS 15. ADDITIONALLY DURING THIS SAME TIME PERIOD I WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR 2 APCH CTL AIRSPACES (SIOUX CITY; IA; AND LINCOLN; NE). THIS SORT OF TFC LOAD WOULD NEVER BE PERMITTED DURING DAYTIME OPS; CERTAINLY NOT WITHOUT HAVING SEVERAL SECTORS OPEN WITH SEVERAL CTLRS WORKING THEM. HOWEVER; APPARENTLY IT IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE FAA TO HAVE CTLRS WITH DISRUPTED CIRCADIAN RHYTHMS WORKING TFC LEVELS THEY WOULD NEVER BE ALLOWED TO WORK DURING NORMAL HRS WITHOUT DIRECT SUPERVISION. ADDITIONALLY; MANY ORDERS IN THE 7210.3V (FACILITY OP AND ADMINISTRATION) WERE VIOLATED OR IGNORED BY FAA MGMNT AND THE OPS MGR IN CHARGE (OMIC). SPECIFICALLY 7210.3V; SECTION 7 (MONITOR ALERT PARAMETER) AND SECTION 6 (WATCH SUPERVISION-TERMINAL/ENRTE) WERE BOTH VIOLATED IN NUMEROUS WAYS. THE MONITOR ALERT ORDER SPECIFIES THAT THE MONITOR ALERT VALUE IS A DYNAMIC VALUE AND SHOULD BE ADJUSTED DOWNWARDS IN THE CASE OF REDUCED SECTOR EFFICIENCIES (SUCH AS DURING WX EVENTS). IT ALSO DICTATES THAT MONITOR ALERTS MUST BE RESPONDED TO WHICH DOESN'T APPEAR TO HAVE OCCURRED. THE SUPVR/OMIC TOOK NO ACTION TO MITIGATE OR OTHERWISE ADDRESS THE TFC LOADING WHICH REACHED UNSAFE LEVELS. IN FACT HE SEEMED UNAWARE OF THE SITUATION UNTIL WELL AFTER THE TFC HAD HIT PEAK LEVELS. ALSO; THE ARBITRARY REDUCTION IN OUR STAFFING ON THE MID-SHIFT FROM 3 CTLRS TO 2 (FOR STAFFING SHORTAGES) LEFT US WITH LITTLE RECOURSE TO DIVIDE THE TFC BTWN SECTORS/CTLRS. WX; DEVIATING ACFT; AND THE VIOLATION OF FAA ORDERS RESULTED IN SECTOR TFC LOADS REACHING DANGEROUS LEVELS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.