Narrative:

Slc was in a south flow configuration with level 1 to level 6 weather throughout S56 airspace creating a lot of weather deviations. Heavy rain; moderate turbulence and in-cloud lightning was reported by several aircraft throughout the evening. As I worked slc arrivals on stockton; I over heard the jordan controller; who was working straight-out departures from slc; tell the flm that his departures were deviating to the southwest (towards oncoming arrivals who were descending to 110; towards precipitous terrain with MVA's up to 127 and climbing to 100); prior to checking-in on frequency; below the MVA (60) with no coordination from slc tower. I believe the DC10 was the 4th or 5th departure that deviated. During these deviations I heard the flm tell the jordan controller to advise the aircraft to; 'maintain their own terrain and obstruction clearance'. It was obvious to me that the jordan controller did not believe this was a safe solution to the problem and placed his slc 'straight out' departures on call-for-release/ hold-for-release. It was after the jordan controller did this that the S56 flm and slc flm coordinated a different heading off the airport so aircraft on this routing could avoid this situation. I also overheard a controller suggest this while the jordan controller and flm began initial discussions on the matter. The number of aircraft that were allowed to depart on a known unsafe route and the amount of time it took to create a safe solution was alarming and I don't think a controller can or should tell an IFR aircraft who departed a controlled airport to maintain their own terrain and obstruction clearance after they have departed; especially if you don't ask the aircraft if they have the terrain in sight prior to telling them. There was a large amount of uncertainty and confusion during this not-so complex situation and its obvious to me that there was a lack of leadership.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: S56 Controller voiced concern regarding an unsafe condition when SLC departures were deviating for weather and entering MVA areas below the required altitude; the reporter questioning the actions of management decisions.

Narrative: SLC was in a South Flow configuration with level 1 to level 6 weather throughout S56 airspace creating a lot of weather deviations. Heavy rain; moderate turbulence and in-cloud lightning was reported by several aircraft throughout the evening. As I worked SLC arrivals on Stockton; I over heard the Jordan Controller; who was working straight-out departures from SLC; tell the FLM that his departures were deviating to the southwest (towards oncoming arrivals who were descending to 110; towards precipitous terrain with MVA's up to 127 and climbing to 100); prior to checking-in on frequency; below the MVA (60) with no coordination from SLC Tower. I believe the DC10 was the 4th or 5th departure that deviated. During these deviations I heard the FLM tell the Jordan Controller to advise the aircraft to; 'maintain their own terrain and obstruction clearance'. It was obvious to me that the Jordan Controller did not believe this was a safe solution to the problem and placed his SLC 'straight out' departures on call-for-release/ hold-for-release. It was after the Jordan Controller did this that the S56 FLM and SLC FLM coordinated a different heading off the airport so aircraft on this routing could avoid this situation. I also overheard a controller suggest this while the Jordan Controller and FLM began initial discussions on the matter. The number of aircraft that were allowed to depart on a known unsafe route and the amount of time it took to create a safe solution was alarming and I don't think a Controller can or should tell an IFR aircraft who departed a controlled airport to maintain their own terrain and obstruction clearance after they have departed; especially if you don't ask the aircraft if they have the terrain in sight prior to telling them. There was a large amount of uncertainty and confusion during this not-so complex situation and its obvious to me that there was a lack of leadership.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.