Narrative:

As we taxied off the ramp in lga (at night) our initial clearance was to depart runway 31; heading 340 degrees. We were told to taxi on taxiway B and hold short of gg. As we were approaching gg we were issued the coney climb off runway 13 as the #2 engine was finishing its start cycle. The first officer was heads down while he was typing in the new departure. We were then given instructions to taxi straight ahead on taxiway B to taxiway P and hold short runway 22. First officer read back the instructions correctly. I also repeated the instructions out loud as I always do; so the first officer knows I heard the instructions properly. Subsequently; I became task saturated as I let myself get distraction as I turned off the APU and was glancing at the mcdu on the first officer's side to ensure the departure was being loaded correctly. First officer was new on the aircraft. We completed the after start checklist and started to run new numbers and verify the departure. As we approached the runway; I turned on the strobe and wing light and stated out loud; 'crossing the runway; clear left; hold on the box.' moments later; first officer stated; 'stop;' as he was still heads down. As I was stopping the aircraft the controller said; 'hold short runway 22.' at that point; the nose of the aircraft was past the hold short line. Subsequently; ATC issued a go around for the aircraft on final approach. What concerns me is that even though I was aware of our position the instruction to hold short got lost in the flurry of activity. Although I take full responsibility for the incursion; there are mitigating circumstances that I feel are worth mentioning. We should have started both engines on the ramp since we knew it would be a short taxi because there was only 1 other aircraft taxiing. We elected to 1 engine taxi and be rushed because a company aircraft was waiting to come into the ramp. While we were in the hot spot; I should have asked the first officer to be heads up and finish the after start checklist prior to accepting a new clearance. Now we were working on multiple tasks at the same time. Adding to the increased workload I was feeling fatigued after having a long day at home and not being fresh as I just returned from a week off. I am very troubled by this event and will certainly take away a valuable learning experience. In the future; I will include as part of my taxi brief that we will maintain heads up in all hot spots while moving or not. I will also reaffirm my commitment to not let internal or external factors affect my tempor in safely operating an aircraft. As in most other runway incursion incidents; I can clearly see how additional taxiway lighting could have helped; such as a red stop bar to get my attention.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DISTRACTED BY NEW CLRNCS; WORKLOAD ASSOCIATED WITH SINGLE ENGINE TAXI AND A CHANGED DEP RWY; A320 FLT CREW FAILS TO HOLD SHORT OF ACTIVE RWY AS CLRED. ACFT ON FINAL MUST GAR.

Narrative: AS WE TAXIED OFF THE RAMP IN LGA (AT NIGHT) OUR INITIAL CLRNC WAS TO DEPART RWY 31; HDG 340 DEGS. WE WERE TOLD TO TAXI ON TXWY B AND HOLD SHORT OF GG. AS WE WERE APCHING GG WE WERE ISSUED THE CONEY CLB OFF RWY 13 AS THE #2 ENG WAS FINISHING ITS START CYCLE. THE FO WAS HEADS DOWN WHILE HE WAS TYPING IN THE NEW DEP. WE WERE THEN GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS TO TAXI STRAIGHT AHEAD ON TXWY B TO TXWY P AND HOLD SHORT RWY 22. FO READ BACK THE INSTRUCTIONS CORRECTLY. I ALSO REPEATED THE INSTRUCTIONS OUT LOUD AS I ALWAYS DO; SO THE FO KNOWS I HEARD THE INSTRUCTIONS PROPERLY. SUBSEQUENTLY; I BECAME TASK SATURATED AS I LET MYSELF GET DISTR AS I TURNED OFF THE APU AND WAS GLANCING AT THE MCDU ON THE FO'S SIDE TO ENSURE THE DEP WAS BEING LOADED CORRECTLY. FO WAS NEW ON THE ACFT. WE COMPLETED THE AFTER START CHKLIST AND STARTED TO RUN NEW NUMBERS AND VERIFY THE DEP. AS WE APCHED THE RWY; I TURNED ON THE STROBE AND WING LIGHT AND STATED OUT LOUD; 'XING THE RWY; CLR L; HOLD ON THE BOX.' MOMENTS LATER; FO STATED; 'STOP;' AS HE WAS STILL HEADS DOWN. AS I WAS STOPPING THE ACFT THE CTLR SAID; 'HOLD SHORT RWY 22.' AT THAT POINT; THE NOSE OF THE ACFT WAS PAST THE HOLD SHORT LINE. SUBSEQUENTLY; ATC ISSUED A GAR FOR THE ACFT ON FINAL APCH. WHAT CONCERNS ME IS THAT EVEN THOUGH I WAS AWARE OF OUR POS THE INSTRUCTION TO HOLD SHORT GOT LOST IN THE FLURRY OF ACTIVITY. ALTHOUGH I TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INCURSION; THERE ARE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES THAT I FEEL ARE WORTH MENTIONING. WE SHOULD HAVE STARTED BOTH ENGS ON THE RAMP SINCE WE KNEW IT WOULD BE A SHORT TAXI BECAUSE THERE WAS ONLY 1 OTHER ACFT TAXIING. WE ELECTED TO 1 ENG TAXI AND BE RUSHED BECAUSE A COMPANY ACFT WAS WAITING TO COME INTO THE RAMP. WHILE WE WERE IN THE HOT SPOT; I SHOULD HAVE ASKED THE FO TO BE HEADS UP AND FINISH THE AFTER START CHKLIST PRIOR TO ACCEPTING A NEW CLRNC. NOW WE WERE WORKING ON MULTIPLE TASKS AT THE SAME TIME. ADDING TO THE INCREASED WORKLOAD I WAS FEELING FATIGUED AFTER HAVING A LONG DAY AT HOME AND NOT BEING FRESH AS I JUST RETURNED FROM A WK OFF. I AM VERY TROUBLED BY THIS EVENT AND WILL CERTAINLY TAKE AWAY A VALUABLE LEARNING EXPERIENCE. IN THE FUTURE; I WILL INCLUDE AS PART OF MY TAXI BRIEF THAT WE WILL MAINTAIN HEADS UP IN ALL HOT SPOTS WHILE MOVING OR NOT. I WILL ALSO REAFFIRM MY COMMITMENT TO NOT LET INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL FACTORS AFFECT MY TEMPOR IN SAFELY OPERATING AN ACFT. AS IN MOST OTHER RWY INCURSION INCIDENTS; I CAN CLRLY SEE HOW ADDITIONAL TXWY LIGHTING COULD HAVE HELPED; SUCH AS A RED STOP BAR TO GET MY ATTN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.