Narrative:

On an evening in july; en route from ZZZ to ZZZ1; at approximately XA06 local time; approximately 40 mi southeast of dsm at 25000 ft with the wing and cowl anti-ice on; and both packs in operation; we received a reduction in air noise; accompanied by a right bleed duct warning message. About the time we were running the checklist; we receive an emergency call from the flight attendants stating there was smoke in the cabin. The captain declared an emergency with ATC for smoke in the cabin; and that we needed to divert to ZZZ2. The emergency checklist we ran was located on page xyz of the CRJ900 pom. Due to a typo in the checklist; the checklist didn't go as smoothly as it should have. The checklist told us to have the isol switch closed. However; in a note right below; due to a typo; the checklist lead us to believe that we had to move the isol switch back to open; in a sense making the checklist ineffective for our situation. Once the checklist was complete; I was in contact with the flight attendants about the situation. They said the smoke was concentrated in the last few rows; but was dissipating. At this point; all our concentration was on the diversion; and getting the plane on the ground as soon as possible. The ZZZ2 controllers vectored us to join the localizer for runway 31. The winds at the time were 330 degrees at 12 KTS. Unfortunately; there was a big rain shaft right over the FAF; which had attributes of windshear. We elected to maneuver around the shaft and rejoin the final from a modified base turn. We did not want to receive any windshear; in the already emergency state. As the aircraft landed and rolled out; emergency trucks followed us down the runway. As we turned off; the captain asked if the emergency personnel could see any visible damage; fire; smoke; etc; which they concluded that there was nothing visibly wrong on the exterior of the aircraft. At this point captain was speaking with the flight attendants about the smoke; which had all dissipated at this time. The crew made the decision that it was safe to not evacuate/evacuation; and taxi to the gate. Emergency equipment and personnel followed us to the gate; and were standing by in case any passenger had any ill effects due to the event. Suggestions: not for the event overall; because that is a maintenance issue; but for the emergency checklist located on page xyz the CRJ900 pom. There is a typo in the note section which reads; 'it is necessary to operate a pack from the opposite engine bleed; select the isol to open.' it should read; 'if it is necessary to operate a pack from the opposite engine bleed; select the isol open.' in the heat of the moment; you only see one it and read it as if this is what has to be done; not as an option depending on the situation. My suggestion would be to correct the mistake.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ900 'R BLEED DUCT' WARNING ANNUNCIATED AT THE SAME TIME THE CABIN FILLED WITH SMOKE. AN EMER WAS DECLARED FOLLOWED BY A LNDG AT A NEARBY ARPT.

Narrative: ON AN EVENING IN JULY; ENRTE FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ1; AT APPROX XA06 LCL TIME; APPROX 40 MI SE OF DSM AT 25000 FT WITH THE WING AND COWL ANTI-ICE ON; AND BOTH PACKS IN OP; WE RECEIVED A REDUCTION IN AIR NOISE; ACCOMPANIED BY A R BLEED DUCT WARNING MESSAGE. ABOUT THE TIME WE WERE RUNNING THE CHKLIST; WE RECEIVE AN EMER CALL FROM THE FLT ATTENDANTS STATING THERE WAS SMOKE IN THE CABIN. THE CAPT DECLARED AN EMER WITH ATC FOR SMOKE IN THE CABIN; AND THAT WE NEEDED TO DIVERT TO ZZZ2. THE EMER CHKLIST WE RAN WAS LOCATED ON PAGE XYZ OF THE CRJ900 POM. DUE TO A TYPO IN THE CHKLIST; THE CHKLIST DIDN'T GO AS SMOOTHLY AS IT SHOULD HAVE. THE CHKLIST TOLD US TO HAVE THE ISOL SWITCH CLOSED. HOWEVER; IN A NOTE RIGHT BELOW; DUE TO A TYPO; THE CHKLIST LEAD US TO BELIEVE THAT WE HAD TO MOVE THE ISOL SWITCH BACK TO OPEN; IN A SENSE MAKING THE CHKLIST INEFFECTIVE FOR OUR SIT. ONCE THE CHKLIST WAS COMPLETE; I WAS IN CONTACT WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS ABOUT THE SIT. THEY SAID THE SMOKE WAS CONCENTRATED IN THE LAST FEW ROWS; BUT WAS DISSIPATING. AT THIS POINT; ALL OUR CONCENTRATION WAS ON THE DIVERSION; AND GETTING THE PLANE ON THE GND ASAP. THE ZZZ2 CTLRS VECTORED US TO JOIN THE LOC FOR RWY 31. THE WINDS AT THE TIME WERE 330 DEGS AT 12 KTS. UNFORTUNATELY; THERE WAS A BIG RAIN SHAFT RIGHT OVER THE FAF; WHICH HAD ATTRIBUTES OF WINDSHEAR. WE ELECTED TO MANEUVER AROUND THE SHAFT AND REJOIN THE FINAL FROM A MODIFIED BASE TURN. WE DID NOT WANT TO RECEIVE ANY WINDSHEAR; IN THE ALREADY EMER STATE. AS THE ACFT LANDED AND ROLLED OUT; EMER TRUCKS FOLLOWED US DOWN THE RWY. AS WE TURNED OFF; THE CAPT ASKED IF THE EMER PERSONNEL COULD SEE ANY VISIBLE DAMAGE; FIRE; SMOKE; ETC; WHICH THEY CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS NOTHING VISIBLY WRONG ON THE EXTERIOR OF THE ACFT. AT THIS POINT CAPT WAS SPEAKING WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS ABOUT THE SMOKE; WHICH HAD ALL DISSIPATED AT THIS TIME. THE CREW MADE THE DECISION THAT IT WAS SAFE TO NOT EVAC; AND TAXI TO THE GATE. EMER EQUIP AND PERSONNEL FOLLOWED US TO THE GATE; AND WERE STANDING BY IN CASE ANY PAX HAD ANY ILL EFFECTS DUE TO THE EVENT. SUGGESTIONS: NOT FOR THE EVENT OVERALL; BECAUSE THAT IS A MAINT ISSUE; BUT FOR THE EMER CHKLIST LOCATED ON PAGE XYZ THE CRJ900 POM. THERE IS A TYPO IN THE NOTE SECTION WHICH READS; 'IT IS NECESSARY TO OPERATE A PACK FROM THE OPPOSITE ENG BLEED; SELECT THE ISOL TO OPEN.' IT SHOULD READ; 'IF IT IS NECESSARY TO OPERATE A PACK FROM THE OPPOSITE ENG BLEED; SELECT THE ISOL OPEN.' IN THE HEAT OF THE MOMENT; YOU ONLY SEE ONE IT AND READ IT AS IF THIS IS WHAT HAS TO BE DONE; NOT AS AN OPTION DEPENDING ON THE SIT. MY SUGGESTION WOULD BE TO CORRECT THE MISTAKE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.