Narrative:

I was instructed to ferry aircraft X. The purpose of this flight was to deliver the aircraft to another crew whose aircraft had experienced a r-hand windshield failure during cruise en route to ZZZ1. We met the previous crew at their aircraft. We were to ferry that aircraft as aircraft Y. While speaking with the captain of the previous flight; we became aware of the fact that contract maintenance at ZZZ1 had determined that the aircraft was not airworthy and had made that clear to air carrier maintenance control. An air carrier maintenance technician from another station was flown in. He told us that the aircraft was now safe to fly if we were comfortable with the forward visibility. The captain and I both stated we were not. We would be ferrying back to ZZZ2 at a lower altitude where more VFR traffic resides on a clear WX afternoon. That risk alone seemed unwise with the cracked windshield obstructing visibility. But more so; we did not know the structural integrity of the r-hand windshield. The fact that contract maintenance refused to release the aircraft; yet air carrier maintenance said yes; raised serious safety-of flight mistrust in our minds. While the captain spoke with maintenance control; chief pilot; scheduling; etc; I informed my scheduler and coordinator that I also felt unsafe operating aircraft Y to ZZZ2 and was released from the flight. Another crew operated the ferry later on. Overhearing the captain's conversation and my own conversations; I felt that the view of air carrier was that of 'denying the flight is wrong; and you're really causing difficulties in our day.' we're professionals. Why is our judgement of safety questioned? Having a compromised windshield shatter onto me was not a risk I was willing to take. This was a difficult decision for me to make personally due to this being my first yr with the company and not wanting to bring attention to myself. There's a point where safety-of-flight and personal safety must not be ignored.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ200 CREW REFUSED TO FLY AN ACFT WITH A SHATTERED RH WINDSHIELD AFTER CONTRACT MAINT WOULD NOT CERTIFY THE ACFT AS AIRWORTHY BUT THE ACR MAINT DID.

Narrative: I WAS INSTRUCTED TO FERRY ACFT X. THE PURPOSE OF THIS FLT WAS TO DELIVER THE ACFT TO ANOTHER CREW WHOSE ACFT HAD EXPERIENCED A R-HAND WINDSHIELD FAILURE DURING CRUISE ENRTE TO ZZZ1. WE MET THE PREVIOUS CREW AT THEIR ACFT. WE WERE TO FERRY THAT ACFT AS ACFT Y. WHILE SPEAKING WITH THE CAPT OF THE PREVIOUS FLT; WE BECAME AWARE OF THE FACT THAT CONTRACT MAINT AT ZZZ1 HAD DETERMINED THAT THE ACFT WAS NOT AIRWORTHY AND HAD MADE THAT CLR TO ACR MAINT CTL. AN ACR MAINT TECHNICIAN FROM ANOTHER STATION WAS FLOWN IN. HE TOLD US THAT THE ACFT WAS NOW SAFE TO FLY IF WE WERE COMFORTABLE WITH THE FORWARD VISIBILITY. THE CAPT AND I BOTH STATED WE WERE NOT. WE WOULD BE FERRYING BACK TO ZZZ2 AT A LOWER ALT WHERE MORE VFR TFC RESIDES ON A CLR WX AFTERNOON. THAT RISK ALONE SEEMED UNWISE WITH THE CRACKED WINDSHIELD OBSTRUCTING VISIBILITY. BUT MORE SO; WE DID NOT KNOW THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE R-HAND WINDSHIELD. THE FACT THAT CONTRACT MAINT REFUSED TO RELEASE THE ACFT; YET ACR MAINT SAID YES; RAISED SERIOUS SAFETY-OF FLT MISTRUST IN OUR MINDS. WHILE THE CAPT SPOKE WITH MAINT CTL; CHIEF PLT; SCHEDULING; ETC; I INFORMED MY SCHEDULER AND COORDINATOR THAT I ALSO FELT UNSAFE OPERATING ACFT Y TO ZZZ2 AND WAS RELEASED FROM THE FLT. ANOTHER CREW OPERATED THE FERRY LATER ON. OVERHEARING THE CAPT'S CONVERSATION AND MY OWN CONVERSATIONS; I FELT THAT THE VIEW OF ACR WAS THAT OF 'DENYING THE FLT IS WRONG; AND YOU'RE REALLY CAUSING DIFFICULTIES IN OUR DAY.' WE'RE PROFESSIONALS. WHY IS OUR JUDGEMENT OF SAFETY QUESTIONED? HAVING A COMPROMISED WINDSHIELD SHATTER ONTO ME WAS NOT A RISK I WAS WILLING TO TAKE. THIS WAS A DIFFICULT DECISION FOR ME TO MAKE PERSONALLY DUE TO THIS BEING MY FIRST YR WITH THE COMPANY AND NOT WANTING TO BRING ATTN TO MYSELF. THERE'S A POINT WHERE SAFETY-OF-FLT AND PERSONAL SAFETY MUST NOT BE IGNORED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.