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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 796628 |
Time | |
Date | 200807 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : jfk.airport |
State Reference | NY |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B757-200 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 5000 flight time type : 700 |
ASRS Report | 796628 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : less severe non adherence : company policies non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Aircraft Cabin Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Narrative:
After flight attendant closes the flight deck door; I perform normal door security checks with the added step of physically and mechanically ensuring that the flight deck door is secured and will not open. I listened and heard flight attendant check for door closure and security by his pulling on the door. I then got up and pushed on flight deck door to ensure and manually check for lock function. With all indications normal (red toggle switch closed; no fail light) door pushed open. Rechk was performed and door lock failed with all normal indications. Maintenance notified and door lock deferred with use of deadbolt. I am very concerned that it seems I am one of the few flight officers performing this preflight check. The flight attendant check is difficult because they must pull the door to check security. The flight attendant check only occurs 50% of the time with many not knowing that it is required. Policy and procedures must be changed and enhanced to require the check be made on the pilot side of the door. This was an example of a failure of the current policy and a complete loss of flight deck door security with no electronic indication of lock failure. This is serious and SOP must be reviewed.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B757-200 FO DISCOVERS COCKPIT DOOR LOCKING MECHANISM FAILED TO PREVENT DOOR FROM OPENING. IS CONCERNED A REQUIRED SECURITY CHECK PRIOR TO EACH FLT IS NOT BEING PERFORMED BY CABIN ATTENDANTS.
Narrative: AFTER FLT ATTENDANT CLOSES THE FLT DECK DOOR; I PERFORM NORMAL DOOR SECURITY CHKS WITH THE ADDED STEP OF PHYSICALLY AND MECHANICALLY ENSURING THAT THE FLT DECK DOOR IS SECURED AND WILL NOT OPEN. I LISTENED AND HEARD FLT ATTENDANT CHK FOR DOOR CLOSURE AND SECURITY BY HIS PULLING ON THE DOOR. I THEN GOT UP AND PUSHED ON FLT DECK DOOR TO ENSURE AND MANUALLY CHK FOR LOCK FUNCTION. WITH ALL INDICATIONS NORMAL (RED TOGGLE SWITCH CLOSED; NO FAIL LIGHT) DOOR PUSHED OPEN. RECHK WAS PERFORMED AND DOOR LOCK FAILED WITH ALL NORMAL INDICATIONS. MAINT NOTIFIED AND DOOR LOCK DEFERRED WITH USE OF DEADBOLT. I AM VERY CONCERNED THAT IT SEEMS I AM ONE OF THE FEW FLT OFFICERS PERFORMING THIS PREFLT CHK. THE FLT ATTENDANT CHK IS DIFFICULT BECAUSE THEY MUST PULL THE DOOR TO CHK SECURITY. THE FLT ATTENDANT CHK ONLY OCCURS 50% OF THE TIME WITH MANY NOT KNOWING THAT IT IS REQUIRED. POLICY AND PROCS MUST BE CHANGED AND ENHANCED TO REQUIRE THE CHK BE MADE ON THE PLT SIDE OF THE DOOR. THIS WAS AN EXAMPLE OF A FAILURE OF THE CURRENT POLICY AND A COMPLETE LOSS OF FLT DECK DOOR SECURITY WITH NO ELECTRONIC INDICATION OF LOCK FAILURE. THIS IS SERIOUS AND SOP MUST BE REVIEWED.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.