Narrative:

At approximately XA10Z I was in the rest seat and smelled a strong acrid burning smell. As I was leaving the rest seat to investigate; the purser came up to me and said the flight attendant's smelled the same and had observed smoke in the business section. I immediately returned to the cockpit and began a divert to ZZZZ; about 260 miles away. The augmenting pilot went to the cabin to investigate and coordinate while the co-pilot and I coordinated the divert with ATC. We received a cabin report that the smoke dissipated briefly and then began again. We accomplished the divert into ZZZZ. Maintenance identified the problem as an overheated recirculation fan. They depowered the fan and pulled the circuit breakers; and after an inspection of the aircraft released the flight to continue to ZZZ. We proceeded to ZZZ and I returned to the rest facility after reaching cruise altitude. I was awakened by the purser about XF00Z and advised that there was again smoke and a burning smell in the cabin. I smelled the smoke as well and returned to the cockpit immediately. Again the augmenting pilot went to the cabin to analyze the situation. At that time we received an EICAS message about east&east smoke detector. We declared an emergency and asked for expedited clearance to the nearest suitable airport. We were advised that ZZZZ1 was 50 NM south of our position. We proceeded immediately to ZZZZ1 and landed.callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated that the cause for the first smoke/fume diversion was validated by an air carrier mechanic as being the recirculation fan. Because the electronic checklist was deferred and inoperative; the crew did not have any additional information about the east&east compartment smoke detector alert message. However; the captain; even without additional information from the electronic checklist; did not want to continue the flight with a second smoke/fume event. The crew has not heard from the air carrier maintenance about the cause of the east&east smoke detector alert.supplemental information from acn 800751: this report is being submitted as the result of captain's emergency authority being used on two separate occasions on the flight in question. Flight attendant's called cockpit just after coast-in fix and reported a smell of smoke near the business galley. We had them notify the captain; who was on break. He came to the cockpit and I; as relief pilot; went to the cabin with the crash axe and a pbe. When I arrived the flight attendant south had turned off all galley power and I had the purser turn off all the entertainment and seat power. I could smell a burning odor from approximately four rows in front to four rows behind the business galley. The smell was obvious but dissipating and there was no visible smoke. The purser and I searched all overhead bins; closets; galley carts; ovens; cubby holes etc; but found no source for the smoke. I called the captain and reported my findings. He requested I monitor the situation the cabin for the time being and advised me we had declared an emergency and were diverting to ZZZZ. As we were in the divert the smell returned and dissipated several times over the next 40 minutes at about 10 minute intervals. At no time did I see visible smoke although several flight attendant's reported seeing a very light haze of smoke at the outset. Although I didn't learn of it until I returned to the cockpit; there was also a 'recirc fan' status message that occurred somewhere near the beginning of the situation. We had the flight attendant south perform a cabin advisory but not a full cabin prep and landed in ZZZZ. On the ground in ZZZZ we were lucky and found a B777 trained mechanic who; with help from the onboard maintenance computer; relatively quickly diagnosed our problem as an inoperative recirculation fan. Based on the evidence we saw we were satisfied that the problem had been resolved satisfactorily. We had the fan deferred; took care of the required maintenance paperwork and launched for ZZZ. Approximately one hour into the flight the fltattendant 'south called the cockpit with the same complaint of a smell of smoke. Again they woke the captain who had returned to his break. Again; the captain came to the cockpit and I went to the cabin to troubleshoot. About this time an electrical and electronic bay smoke detector (I am not sure of the exact wording of the message) status (not EICAS) message popped up in the cockpit. The captain decided to divert; this time to ZZZZ1; which was about fifty miles off the left. We did the high dive and were met by crash fire rescue equipment crews who assessed the exterior with an infrared camera while we assessed the interior. The flight attendant south informed us the smoke smell was getting worse as we descended through about 14000 ft and was worst near door 3R. Again there was no visible smoke that I was aware of; only the odor of something burning. Several passengers in the cabin confirmed that the smell was similar to burnt insulation. From there it was an exercise in logistical issues that exist in any international diversion recovery. We had to arrange for a gate; figure out what the company wanted done with the passengers; deal with the crash fire rescue equipment crews; deal with the local authorities; work with the handler; and determine how; where; and when we were going to get the passengers to customs; among other things. By coincidence a B777 was being ferried to ZZZ and was diverted into ZZZZ1 as a replacement. After some consideration the only thing of any significance that we missed was getting landing weights from dispatch for either ZZZZ or ZZZZ1. We knew we were well under maximum landing weight with 11000 ft plus of runway at both airports; both of which were at; or near; sea level. Weather conditions were good at both diversion stations and terrain clearance; while considered; was not determined to be much of an issue in the event of a go-around. From the point of view of dealing with potentially serious issues of smoke/fire on an airplane; things went very smoothly. The flight attendant crew was very professional and the purser had an excellent handle on her crew and the passengers. As the relief pilot; I took on the role of communications conduit between cockpit; purser; and passengers and almost all the PA announcements flowed through me which worked very well. The purser did a good job of keeping us in the cabin loop and I of keeping her in the cockpit loop. The passengers remained calm even after being subjected to two emergency diverts within several hours. I think another factor in making this a successful day was the level of competence in the cockpit. All of us had multiple years on the airplane and both first officer's had previous captain experience both in and out of our company. We all did what needed to be done from our respective crew positions with a minimum of direction. The flying first officer became the PF and flew the aircraft with the oversight of the captain. As the relief first officer I did whatever was necessary including coordinating with the cabin; checking NOTAMS; keeping an eye on the PF; and communicating with dispatch through multiple satcom calls and patches to maintenance. As I write this the day after the event one issue of concern comes to mind. The recovery of the diversion into ZZZZ1 entailed a ferry flight that diverted into ZZZZ1 to pick up the passengers and crew of the diverted flight. The crew desk was not clear with us as to which pilot crew was to fly the leg from ZZZZ1 to ZZZ. We; as the smoke diversion crew; told the crew desk we were willing and able to continue on to get the flight to ZZZ. As it turned out the crew that brought in the ferry flight eventually flew the last leg into ZZZ. That was mostly decided through a discussion between the two crews present in ZZZZ1. In retrospect I think the duty manager should not have even given us (the smoke diversion crew) the option of flying on to ZZZ. We had been on duty some 18+ hours at that point; been through two emergency diversions; dealt with significant emotional issues in the divert; and dealt with multiple operational issues in both ZZZZ and ZZZZ1 that were taxing physically and emotionally. As we were dead-heading ZZZZ1 to ZZZ I could not keep my eyes open and I could almost feel the physical release of tension and resulting sinking spell as the adrenalin wore off from the day's activities. I probably could have generated the energy necessary to operate the flight to ZZZ but at a somewhat reduced capacity. The captain commented to me that he recognized similar symptoms in himself as we headed for ZZZ. I should have recognized that we were probably not fit for duty after we arrived in ZZZZ1. But I also think that the duty manager; being removed from our situation and with more general experience in the implications of major divert activity; should have recommended or prevented us from even thinking about flying the last leg home regardless of his; ours; or the company's desire to 'get it done' and not leave the passengers stranded overnight in ZZZZ1.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN INT'L B777 DIVERTED TWO TIMES ON THE SAME FLT FOR ELECTRICAL FUMES DUE TO A RECIRC FAN OVERHEAT AND AN UNKNOWN SOURCE OF SMOKE IN THE E&E COMPARTMENT.

Narrative: AT APPROX XA10Z I WAS IN THE REST SEAT AND SMELLED A STRONG ACRID BURNING SMELL. AS I WAS LEAVING THE REST SEAT TO INVESTIGATE; THE PURSER CAME UP TO ME AND SAID THE FLT ATTENDANT'S SMELLED THE SAME AND HAD OBSERVED SMOKE IN THE BUSINESS SECTION. I IMMEDIATELY RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT AND BEGAN A DIVERT TO ZZZZ; ABOUT 260 MILES AWAY. THE AUGMENTING PILOT WENT TO THE CABIN TO INVESTIGATE AND COORDINATE WHILE THE CO-PILOT AND I COORDINATED THE DIVERT WITH ATC. WE RECEIVED A CABIN REPORT THAT THE SMOKE DISSIPATED BRIEFLY AND THEN BEGAN AGAIN. WE ACCOMPLISHED THE DIVERT INTO ZZZZ. MAINT IDENTIFIED THE PROBLEM AS AN OVERHEATED RECIRCULATION FAN. THEY DEPOWERED THE FAN AND PULLED THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS; AND AFTER AN INSPECTION OF THE ACFT RELEASED THE FLIGHT TO CONTINUE TO ZZZ. WE PROCEEDED TO ZZZ AND I RETURNED TO THE REST FACILITY AFTER REACHING CRUISE ALTITUDE. I WAS AWAKENED BY THE PURSER ABOUT XF00Z AND ADVISED THAT THERE WAS AGAIN SMOKE AND A BURNING SMELL IN THE CABIN. I SMELLED THE SMOKE AS WELL AND RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT IMMEDIATELY. AGAIN THE AUGMENTING PILOT WENT TO THE CABIN TO ANALYZE THE SITUATION. AT THAT TIME WE RECEIVED AN EICAS MSG ABOUT E&E SMOKE DETECTOR. WE DECLARED AN EMERGENCY AND ASKED FOR EXPEDITED CLEARANCE TO THE NEAREST SUITABLE AIRPORT. WE WERE ADVISED THAT ZZZZ1 WAS 50 NM SOUTH OF OUR POSITION. WE PROCEEDED IMMEDIATELY TO ZZZZ1 AND LANDED.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE REPORTER STATED THAT THE CAUSE FOR THE FIRST SMOKE/FUME DIVERSION WAS VALIDATED BY AN ACR MECHANIC AS BEING THE RECIRCULATION FAN. BECAUSE THE ELECTRONIC CHECKLIST WAS DEFERRED AND INOP; THE CREW DID NOT HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE E&E COMPARTMENT SMOKE DETECTOR ALERT MSG. HOWEVER; THE CAPT; EVEN WITHOUT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM THE ELECTRONIC CHECKLIST; DID NOT WANT TO CONTINUE THE FLT WITH A SECOND SMOKE/FUME EVENT. THE CREW HAS NOT HEARD FROM THE ACR MAINTENANCE ABOUT THE CAUSE OF THE E&E SMOKE DETECTOR ALERT.SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 800751: THIS RPT IS BEING SUBMITTED AS THE RESULT OF CAPT'S EMERGENCY AUTHORITY BEING USED ON TWO SEPARATE OCCASIONS ON THE FLIGHT IN QUESTION. FLT ATTENDANT'S CALLED COCKPIT JUST AFTER COAST-IN FIX AND REPORTED A SMELL OF SMOKE NEAR THE BUSINESS GALLEY. WE HAD THEM NOTIFY THE CAPT; WHO WAS ON BREAK. HE CAME TO THE COCKPIT AND I; AS RELIEF PILOT; WENT TO THE CABIN WITH THE CRASH AXE AND A PBE. WHEN I ARRIVED THE FLT ATTENDANT S HAD TURNED OFF ALL GALLEY POWER AND I HAD THE PURSER TURN OFF ALL THE ENTERTAINMENT AND SEAT POWER. I COULD SMELL A BURNING ODOR FROM APPROXIMATELY FOUR ROWS IN FRONT TO FOUR ROWS BEHIND THE BUSINESS GALLEY. THE SMELL WAS OBVIOUS BUT DISSIPATING AND THERE WAS NO VISIBLE SMOKE. THE PURSER AND I SEARCHED ALL OVERHEAD BINS; CLOSETS; GALLEY CARTS; OVENS; CUBBY HOLES ETC; BUT FOUND NO SOURCE FOR THE SMOKE. I CALLED THE CAPT AND REPORTED MY FINDINGS. HE REQUESTED I MONITOR THE SITUATION THE CABIN FOR THE TIME BEING AND ADVISED ME WE HAD DECLARED AN EMERGENCY AND WERE DIVERTING TO ZZZZ. AS WE WERE IN THE DIVERT THE SMELL RETURNED AND DISSIPATED SEVERAL TIMES OVER THE NEXT 40 MINUTES AT ABOUT 10 MINUTE INTERVALS. AT NO TIME DID I SEE VISIBLE SMOKE ALTHOUGH SEVERAL FLT ATTENDANT'S REPORTED SEEING A VERY LIGHT HAZE OF SMOKE AT THE OUTSET. ALTHOUGH I DIDN'T LEARN OF IT UNTIL I RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT; THERE WAS ALSO A 'RECIRC FAN' STATUS MESSAGE THAT OCCURRED SOMEWHERE NEAR THE BEGINNING OF THE SITUATION. WE HAD THE FLT ATTENDANT S PERFORM A CABIN ADVISORY BUT NOT A FULL CABIN PREP AND LANDED IN ZZZZ. ON THE GROUND IN ZZZZ WE WERE LUCKY AND FOUND A B777 TRAINED MECHANIC WHO; WITH HELP FROM THE ONBOARD MAINTENANCE COMPUTER; RELATIVELY QUICKLY DIAGNOSED OUR PROBLEM AS AN INOPERATIVE RECIRCULATION FAN. BASED ON THE EVIDENCE WE SAW WE WERE SATISFIED THAT THE PROBLEM HAD BEEN RESOLVED SATISFACTORILY. WE HAD THE FAN DEFERRED; TOOK CARE OF THE REQUIRED MAINTENANCE PAPERWORK AND LAUNCHED FOR ZZZ. APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR INTO THE FLIGHT THE FLTATTENDANT 'S CALLED THE COCKPIT WITH THE SAME COMPLAINT OF A SMELL OF SMOKE. AGAIN THEY WOKE THE CAPT WHO HAD RETURNED TO HIS BREAK. AGAIN; THE CAPT CAME TO THE COCKPIT AND I WENT TO THE CABIN TO TROUBLESHOOT. ABOUT THIS TIME AN ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC BAY SMOKE DETECTOR (I AM NOT SURE OF THE EXACT WORDING OF THE MESSAGE) STATUS (NOT EICAS) MESSAGE POPPED UP IN THE COCKPIT. THE CAPT DECIDED TO DIVERT; THIS TIME TO ZZZZ1; WHICH WAS ABOUT FIFTY MILES OFF THE LEFT. WE DID THE HIGH DIVE AND WERE MET BY CFR CREWS WHO ASSESSED THE EXTERIOR WITH AN INFRARED CAMERA WHILE WE ASSESSED THE INTERIOR. THE FLT ATTENDANT S INFORMED US THE SMOKE SMELL WAS GETTING WORSE AS WE DESCENDED THROUGH ABOUT 14000 FT AND WAS WORST NEAR DOOR 3R. AGAIN THERE WAS NO VISIBLE SMOKE THAT I WAS AWARE OF; ONLY THE ODOR OF SOMETHING BURNING. SEVERAL PASSENGERS IN THE CABIN CONFIRMED THAT THE SMELL WAS SIMILAR TO BURNT INSULATION. FROM THERE IT WAS AN EXERCISE IN LOGISTICAL ISSUES THAT EXIST IN ANY INTERNATIONAL DIVERSION RECOVERY. WE HAD TO ARRANGE FOR A GATE; FIGURE OUT WHAT THE COMPANY WANTED DONE WITH THE PASSENGERS; DEAL WITH THE CFR CREWS; DEAL WITH THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES; WORK WITH THE HANDLER; AND DETERMINE HOW; WHERE; AND WHEN WE WERE GOING TO GET THE PASSENGERS TO CUSTOMS; AMONG OTHER THINGS. BY COINCIDENCE A B777 WAS BEING FERRIED TO ZZZ AND WAS DIVERTED INTO ZZZZ1 AS A REPLACEMENT. AFTER SOME CONSIDERATION THE ONLY THING OF ANY SIGNIFICANCE THAT WE MISSED WAS GETTING LANDING WEIGHTS FROM DISPATCH FOR EITHER ZZZZ OR ZZZZ1. WE KNEW WE WERE WELL UNDER MAXIMUM LANDING WEIGHT WITH 11000 FT PLUS OF RUNWAY AT BOTH AIRPORTS; BOTH OF WHICH WERE AT; OR NEAR; SEA LEVEL. WEATHER CONDITIONS WERE GOOD AT BOTH DIVERSION STATIONS AND TERRAIN CLEARANCE; WHILE CONSIDERED; WAS NOT DETERMINED TO BE MUCH OF AN ISSUE IN THE EVENT OF A GO-AROUND. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF DEALING WITH POTENTIALLY SERIOUS ISSUES OF SMOKE/FIRE ON AN AIRPLANE; THINGS WENT VERY SMOOTHLY. THE FLT ATTENDANT CREW WAS VERY PROFESSIONAL AND THE PURSER HAD AN EXCELLENT HANDLE ON HER CREW AND THE PASSENGERS. AS THE RELIEF PILOT; I TOOK ON THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATIONS CONDUIT BETWEEN COCKPIT; PURSER; AND PASSENGERS AND ALMOST ALL THE PA ANNOUNCEMENTS FLOWED THROUGH ME WHICH WORKED VERY WELL. THE PURSER DID A GOOD JOB OF KEEPING US IN THE CABIN LOOP AND I OF KEEPING HER IN THE COCKPIT LOOP. THE PASSENGERS REMAINED CALM EVEN AFTER BEING SUBJECTED TO TWO EMERGENCY DIVERTS WITHIN SEVERAL HOURS. I THINK ANOTHER FACTOR IN MAKING THIS A SUCCESSFUL DAY WAS THE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE IN THE COCKPIT. ALL OF US HAD MULTIPLE YEARS ON THE AIRPLANE AND BOTH FO'S HAD PREVIOUS CAPT EXPERIENCE BOTH IN AND OUT OF OUR COMPANY. WE ALL DID WHAT NEEDED TO BE DONE FROM OUR RESPECTIVE CREW POSITIONS WITH A MINIMUM OF DIRECTION. THE FLYING FO BECAME THE PF AND FLEW THE ACFT WITH THE OVERSIGHT OF THE CAPT. AS THE RELIEF FO I DID WHATEVER WAS NECESSARY INCLUDING COORDINATING WITH THE CABIN; CHECKING NOTAMS; KEEPING AN EYE ON THE PF; AND COMMUNICATING WITH DISPATCH THROUGH MULTIPLE SATCOM CALLS AND PATCHES TO MAINTENANCE. AS I WRITE THIS THE DAY AFTER THE EVENT ONE ISSUE OF CONCERN COMES TO MIND. THE RECOVERY OF THE DIVERSION INTO ZZZZ1 ENTAILED A FERRY FLIGHT THAT DIVERTED INTO ZZZZ1 TO PICK UP THE PASSENGERS AND CREW OF THE DIVERTED FLIGHT. THE CREW DESK WAS NOT CLEAR WITH US AS TO WHICH PILOT CREW WAS TO FLY THE LEG FROM ZZZZ1 TO ZZZ. WE; AS THE SMOKE DIVERSION CREW; TOLD THE CREW DESK WE WERE WILLING AND ABLE TO CONTINUE ON TO GET THE FLIGHT TO ZZZ. AS IT TURNED OUT THE CREW THAT BROUGHT IN THE FERRY FLIGHT EVENTUALLY FLEW THE LAST LEG INTO ZZZ. THAT WAS MOSTLY DECIDED THROUGH A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE TWO CREWS PRESENT IN ZZZZ1. IN RETROSPECT I THINK THE DUTY MGR SHOULD NOT HAVE EVEN GIVEN US (THE SMOKE DIVERSION CREW) THE OPTION OF FLYING ON TO ZZZ. WE HAD BEEN ON DUTY SOME 18+ HOURS AT THAT POINT; BEEN THROUGH TWO EMERGENCY DIVERSIONS; DEALT WITH SIGNIFICANT EMOTIONAL ISSUES IN THE DIVERT; AND DEALT WITH MULTIPLE OPERATIONAL ISSUES IN BOTH ZZZZ AND ZZZZ1 THAT WERE TAXING PHYSICALLY AND EMOTIONALLY. AS WE WERE DEAD-HEADING ZZZZ1 TO ZZZ I COULD NOT KEEP MY EYES OPEN AND I COULD ALMOST FEEL THE PHYSICAL RELEASE OF TENSION AND RESULTING SINKING SPELL AS THE ADRENALIN WORE OFF FROM THE DAY'S ACTIVITIES. I PROBABLY COULD HAVE GENERATED THE ENERGY NECESSARY TO OPERATE THE FLIGHT TO ZZZ BUT AT A SOMEWHAT REDUCED CAPACITY. THE CAPT COMMENTED TO ME THAT HE RECOGNIZED SIMILAR SYMPTOMS IN HIMSELF AS WE HEADED FOR ZZZ. I SHOULD HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT WE WERE PROBABLY NOT FIT FOR DUTY AFTER WE ARRIVED IN ZZZZ1. BUT I ALSO THINK THAT THE DUTY MGR; BEING REMOVED FROM OUR SITUATION AND WITH MORE GENERAL EXPERIENCE IN THE IMPLICATIONS OF MAJOR DIVERT ACTIVITY; SHOULD HAVE RECOMMENDED OR PREVENTED US FROM EVEN THINKING ABOUT FLYING THE LAST LEG HOME REGARDLESS OF HIS; OURS; OR THE COMPANY'S DESIRE TO 'GET IT DONE' AND NOT LEAVE THE PASSENGERS STRANDED OVERNIGHT IN ZZZZ1.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.