Narrative:

I was informed by operations that the ZZZ flight was returning back to the gate due to a spoileron fault message. I got to the aircraft; and attempted to perform breaker reset of the spoiler system. After that did not work I called maintenance control and informed them of my problem; I then attempted to defer the r-hand inboard spoiler PCU; but per the MEL. The secu on this aircraft did not match the part numbers in the MEL; so I could not defer the problem. I called maintenance control to request that we do an aircraft swap which they did. The crew and passenger boarded aircraft X. The pilot indicated that it was too hot to have an inoperative (deferred APU). He also agreed to take a further delay for us to fix the APU. Technician Y brought over a new PCU from the hangar; hangar mechanic technician Z and technician xx also came over to help out and ease the workload and to assist on getting aircraft X APU back in service. Technician xx and technician Z took the APU load control check valve off of aircraft Y for use on aircraft X. Once that issue was taken care of; we all went back to the aircraft Y and proceeded to remove the defective PCU. After removing the defective PCU technician xx and I proceeded installing of the hydraulic lines; cannon plugs; and lower mount bolt for the PCU. I was also occupied with the rigging of the eccentric bushing and reinstalling the hydraulic line clamps. Technician Z installed the upper rod end of the PCU. Once the PCU and panels were installed; cotter pinned; safety wiring done and inspected; we performed operations check and rigging of the PCU. We performed several operations checks and adjustments to get the PCU in rig per the amm. The markings that were made before the removal of the eccentric bolt and anti-rotation washers came off making the rigging difficult. Technician Y was also supervising the problem due to the PCU rigging. Once the operations checks were done and the rigging good; no further defects were noted at the time. Less people working on this job and more communication during the installation of the PCU. If one person in the group cannot stay for the entire job then the portion of the job he did needs to be better communicated before leaving. Supplemental information from acn 801192: I was informed that there was a report filed on aircraft Y in which I signed the rii block on the paperwork in which a spoileron PCU was removed and replaced on aug/xa/08. To the best of my knowledge all work was performed in accordance with crj amm and all parts were installed in accordance with such said manual. To the best of my knowledge this is what I remember what happened. On aug/xb/08 aircraft Y's flight was canceled due to a faulty spoiler PCU. The guys got the new PCU in and we did the leak check and clearance check; during this time technician Z had left to go home. Once the checks were good I left and went to the maintenance office to update maintenance control; during the time I was at the office the new check valve got here and technician Z installed it. When I came back out I operations checked the check valve and did a check of the cotter pins and safety wire install. Everything I could tell at the time looked good so I told technician Y and technician Z to panel up and I went back to the office to do the rest of the paperwork. I went back to the plane; dropped the logbook off and came back to the hangar. I think the main factor was being interrupted while working on aircraft Y to go and work on aircraft X. Another factor was both planes were already late; the crew; the passenger; and the gate personnel were all angry and just wanted the plane to go. To sum everything up; if anyone is to blame for this it's myself. I was the lead technician; the senior mechanic; and the inspector. We had too many hands involved in trying to get both planes out as quickly as possible. It was my duty to make sure everything was done right and if a part was not installed it's my responsibility. I will make sure that if myself or any of my mechanics are working on something and are asked to go and work something else that everyone knows what everyone else is doing. Also maintenance control and everyone else involved needs to understand the importance of leaving one aircraft to work on another aircraft and how easy mistakes can occur.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A MECHANIC AND A LEAD MECHANIC ALSO WORKING AS AN INSPECTOR; ARE INFORMED A CRJ 200 ACFT RETURNED TO GATE AND FLIGHT CANCELED AFTER A RIGHT SPOILERON FAULT MESSAGE.

Narrative: I WAS INFORMED BY OPS THAT THE ZZZ FLT WAS RETURNING BACK TO THE GATE DUE TO A SPOILERON FAULT MESSAGE. I GOT TO THE ACFT; AND ATTEMPTED TO PERFORM BREAKER RESET OF THE SPOILER SYS. AFTER THAT DID NOT WORK I CALLED MAINT CTL AND INFORMED THEM OF MY PROB; I THEN ATTEMPTED TO DEFER THE R-HAND INBOARD SPOILER PCU; BUT PER THE MEL. THE SECU ON THIS ACFT DID NOT MATCH THE PART NUMBERS IN THE MEL; SO I COULD NOT DEFER THE PROB. I CALLED MAINT CTL TO REQUEST THAT WE DO AN ACFT SWAP WHICH THEY DID. THE CREW AND PAX BOARDED ACFT X. THE PLT INDICATED THAT IT WAS TOO HOT TO HAVE AN INOP (DEFERRED APU). HE ALSO AGREED TO TAKE A FURTHER DELAY FOR US TO FIX THE APU. TECHNICIAN Y BROUGHT OVER A NEW PCU FROM THE HANGAR; HANGAR MECH TECHNICIAN Z AND TECHNICIAN XX ALSO CAME OVER TO HELP OUT AND EASE THE WORKLOAD AND TO ASSIST ON GETTING ACFT X APU BACK IN SVC. TECHNICIAN XX AND TECHNICIAN Z TOOK THE APU LOAD CTL CHK VALVE OFF OF ACFT Y FOR USE ON ACFT X. ONCE THAT ISSUE WAS TAKEN CARE OF; WE ALL WENT BACK TO THE ACFT Y AND PROCEEDED TO REMOVE THE DEFECTIVE PCU. AFTER REMOVING THE DEFECTIVE PCU TECHNICIAN XX AND I PROCEEDED INSTALLING OF THE HYD LINES; CANNON PLUGS; AND LOWER MOUNT BOLT FOR THE PCU. I WAS ALSO OCCUPIED WITH THE RIGGING OF THE ECCENTRIC BUSHING AND REINSTALLING THE HYD LINE CLAMPS. TECHNICIAN Z INSTALLED THE UPPER ROD END OF THE PCU. ONCE THE PCU AND PANELS WERE INSTALLED; COTTER PINNED; SAFETY WIRING DONE AND INSPECTED; WE PERFORMED OPS CHK AND RIGGING OF THE PCU. WE PERFORMED SEVERAL OPS CHKS AND ADJUSTMENTS TO GET THE PCU IN RIG PER THE AMM. THE MARKINGS THAT WERE MADE BEFORE THE REMOVAL OF THE ECCENTRIC BOLT AND ANTI-ROTATION WASHERS CAME OFF MAKING THE RIGGING DIFFICULT. TECHNICIAN Y WAS ALSO SUPERVISING THE PROB DUE TO THE PCU RIGGING. ONCE THE OPS CHKS WERE DONE AND THE RIGGING GOOD; NO FURTHER DEFECTS WERE NOTED AT THE TIME. LESS PEOPLE WORKING ON THIS JOB AND MORE COM DURING THE INSTALLATION OF THE PCU. IF ONE PERSON IN THE GROUP CANNOT STAY FOR THE ENTIRE JOB THEN THE PORTION OF THE JOB HE DID NEEDS TO BE BETTER COMMUNICATED BEFORE LEAVING. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 801192: I WAS INFORMED THAT THERE WAS A RPT FILED ON ACFT Y IN WHICH I SIGNED THE RII BLOCK ON THE PAPERWORK IN WHICH A SPOILERON PCU WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED ON AUG/XA/08. TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE ALL WORK WAS PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CRJ AMM AND ALL PARTS WERE INSTALLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUCH SAID MANUAL. TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE THIS IS WHAT I REMEMBER WHAT HAPPENED. ON AUG/XB/08 ACFT Y'S FLT WAS CANCELED DUE TO A FAULTY SPOILER PCU. THE GUYS GOT THE NEW PCU IN AND WE DID THE LEAK CHK AND CLRNC CHK; DURING THIS TIME TECHNICIAN Z HAD LEFT TO GO HOME. ONCE THE CHKS WERE GOOD I LEFT AND WENT TO THE MAINT OFFICE TO UPDATE MAINT CTL; DURING THE TIME I WAS AT THE OFFICE THE NEW CHK VALVE GOT HERE AND TECHNICIAN Z INSTALLED IT. WHEN I CAME BACK OUT I OPS CHKED THE CHK VALVE AND DID A CHK OF THE COTTER PINS AND SAFETY WIRE INSTALL. EVERYTHING I COULD TELL AT THE TIME LOOKED GOOD SO I TOLD TECHNICIAN Y AND TECHNICIAN Z TO PANEL UP AND I WENT BACK TO THE OFFICE TO DO THE REST OF THE PAPERWORK. I WENT BACK TO THE PLANE; DROPPED THE LOGBOOK OFF AND CAME BACK TO THE HANGAR. I THINK THE MAIN FACTOR WAS BEING INTERRUPTED WHILE WORKING ON ACFT Y TO GO AND WORK ON ACFT X. ANOTHER FACTOR WAS BOTH PLANES WERE ALREADY LATE; THE CREW; THE PAX; AND THE GATE PERSONNEL WERE ALL ANGRY AND JUST WANTED THE PLANE TO GO. TO SUM EVERYTHING UP; IF ANYONE IS TO BLAME FOR THIS IT'S MYSELF. I WAS THE LEAD TECHNICIAN; THE SENIOR MECH; AND THE INSPECTOR. WE HAD TOO MANY HANDS INVOLVED IN TRYING TO GET BOTH PLANES OUT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. IT WAS MY DUTY TO MAKE SURE EVERYTHING WAS DONE RIGHT AND IF A PART WAS NOT INSTALLED IT'S MY RESPONSIBILITY. I WILL MAKE SURE THAT IF MYSELF OR ANY OF MY MECHS ARE WORKING ON SOMETHING AND ARE ASKED TO GO AND WORK SOMETHING ELSE THAT EVERYONE KNOWS WHAT EVERYONE ELSE IS DOING. ALSO MAINT CTL AND EVERYONE ELSE INVOLVED NEEDS TO UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF LEAVING ONE ACFT TO WORK ON ANOTHER ACFT AND HOW EASY MISTAKES CAN OCCUR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.