Narrative:

I am a self-employed commercial ferry pilot. I am typically hired by new aircraft owners or aircraft brokers to relocate aircraft throughout north america. I arrived at ZZZ early in the afternoon. I had been hired to relocate a newly purchased beechcraft A36 bonanza from ZZZ to ZZZ1. The WX was good with mostly cloudy skies; hot; steady wind from the south; and WX forecasted to deteriorate later in the afternoon. When I arrived my preflight preparation began as usual. I first met with the aircraft broker that was responsible for the sale of the aircraft. As usual; I inquired about any known discrepancies with the aircraft. Broker stated; 'I am not aware of any.' I then requested to review the aircraft logbooks to verify far part 91 aircraft inspection requirements. I determined that the aircraft complied with all part 91 requirements to include: annual inspection; ATC transponder inspection; altimeter inspection; pitot-static check; and ELT batteries replaced. The last known flight of the aircraft was approximately 2 weeks prior. My preflight preparation continued by reviewing the aircraft poh. The review consisted of aircraft system; emergency procedures; and aircraft performance. I determined my range profile and confirmed that the aircraft would be within the prescribed weight and balance limitations. The next phase of the preflight preparation was the flight planning phase. I had planned to file an IFR flight plan. The WX prognosis for tx was marginal for VFR conditions; so I elected to fly a shorter and more conservative route. This decision was to assure adequate fuel onboard in the event that I will need to divert to another airport due to WX. Although this aircraft is equipped with an IFR certified garmin 430 GPS; I elected to file a plan using low altitude victor airways. This will serve as a contingency form of navigation as opposed to relying solely on GPS navigation. The last phase of the preflight preparation was the preflight inspection. I conducted a thorough preflight inspection in accordance with the manufacturer's recommended guidelines. No discrepancies were noted during the inspection and I determined the aircraft was ready for a safe flight. Flight: I obtained my IFR clearance from ZZZ clearance delivery. I began my takeoff roll on runway xx. As the aircraft accelerated I performed a xchk of all engine instruments. All engine instruments were normal. After rotation I began a normal climb for 5000 ft. I engaged the autoplt for a right turn to heading 300 degrees. The autoplt was functioning as expected. I performed my climb checklist and another instrument xchk. However; this xchk revealed that the cylinder temperature and the oil temperature gauge were now inoperative. I contacted departure and they responded that they were not receiving my transponder. I verified that my transponder was selected to 'altitude.' I then recycled the transponder. I inquired with ATC if they were receiving my transponder. ATC responded; 'we are receiving your transponder but with no mode C.' suddenly; the autoplt began an uncommanded turn to the left prior to reaching heading 300 degrees. I reacted by disengaging the autoplt and continued to fly the aircraft manually. In anticipation of intercepting the 320 degree radial into ZZZ VORTAC. I also noticed that my navigation #1 radio had a flag indicating that it was not receiving the ZZZ VORTAC. I verified the frequency; programmed the navigation #2 radio to the ZZZ VORTAC; and attempted to identify the audible VORTAC code. As this was taking place; departure had me turn a heading for a vector over ZZZ1 VORTAC. Within the first 3-4 mins of the flight; I had experienced an autoplt failure; engine instrument failure; transponder failure; and a navigation #1 and navigation #2 failure. Obviously; I suspected some form of electrical malfunction. I began to troubleshoot the problems I was experiencing and contemplated if it would be necessary to return to ZZZ. I elected to continue toward ZZZ2 with the idea that if an emergency landing was necessary; ZZZ2 has emergency equipment located at the airport for assistance. I had not yet declared an emergency as I was still attempting to diagnose the situation. I did not smell any unusual electrical odors in the cabin. I was unable to locate any tripped circuit breakers. I observed my ammeter gauge which appeared tobe functioning normally with no obvious over-voltage problems. I was approximately 1-2 mi from ZZZ2 airport and I was consumed with attempting to remedy or diagnose the problems I had experienced. At this time; I was contacted by ATC. 'Bonanza; say your altitude?' I'm not sure of my thought process; but I thought I had been cleared to climb to 7000 ft instead of 5000 ft. I responded; 'I am climbing through 6300 ft.' the controller noted the discrepancy and reported; 'you were only cleared to 5000 ft. Expedite your descent down to 5000 ft for traffic.' I replied with the misconception that I had been cleared to 7000 ft; and I performed an emergency descent to 5000 ft. After crossing ZZZ2 and determining that my navigation #1 and navigation #2 were inoperative; I coupled the HSI to the garmin 430 GPS. I soon realized yet another discrepancy. The map on the garmin 430 indicated that I was right off course. However; the HSI was centered to indicate that I was on the correct flight path. ATC then gave me vectors to intercept. I made the determination that my only reliable navigation was the garmin 430. I verified by relaying to ATC my apparent problem and I reconfirmed with ATC that I was on course. I was flying on an IFR flight plan in VMC conditions. Therefore; I determined that the aircraft was still airworthy according to far 91.700. I had no other passenger on board; and I still had reliable GPS navigation. Therefore; I determined that I could safely proceed under VMC conditions. I reported the problems that I had experienced with other controllers along my route and advised that I would prefer to stay 'out of the soup;' meaning that I would prefer to remain VMC during the flight. I landed at ZZZ1 under a visual approach without further incident. The lessons learned: I learned more during this flight than any other flight to date. First of all; I acknowledge that the aircraft shall always remain in positive control of the PIC. Regardless of distrs; the PIC is responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft and shall comply with ATC clrncs. I have also learned that if I determine that I am experiencing an imminent emergency; I should not hesitate to declare an emergency with ATC and return for landing. A declared emergency is the only excuse to ever deviate from an ATC directive. In order to comply with federal and personal safety standards; I should never hesitate to return to the airport of departure to further evaluate any aircraft discrepancies. Finally; I have since imposed a new SOP for ferrying aircraft. I will no longer fly a long cross country flight under 'good faith' that the aircraft is in sound flying condition. Prior to any cross country flight; I will first conduct a thorough test flight to assure that all system are functioning normally and the aircraft is in airworthy condition for a safe flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PLT FERRYING A BE36 EXPERIENCED ELECTRICAL COMPONENT FAILURES AFTER TKOF AND HAD AN ALT DEV WHILE TROUBLESHOOTING THE CAUSE.

Narrative: I AM A SELF-EMPLOYED COMMERCIAL FERRY PLT. I AM TYPICALLY HIRED BY NEW ACFT OWNERS OR ACFT BROKERS TO RELOCATE ACFT THROUGHOUT NORTH AMERICA. I ARRIVED AT ZZZ EARLY IN THE AFTERNOON. I HAD BEEN HIRED TO RELOCATE A NEWLY PURCHASED BEECHCRAFT A36 BONANZA FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ1. THE WX WAS GOOD WITH MOSTLY CLOUDY SKIES; HOT; STEADY WIND FROM THE S; AND WX FORECASTED TO DETERIORATE LATER IN THE AFTERNOON. WHEN I ARRIVED MY PREFLT PREPARATION BEGAN AS USUAL. I FIRST MET WITH THE ACFT BROKER THAT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SALE OF THE ACFT. AS USUAL; I INQUIRED ABOUT ANY KNOWN DISCREPANCIES WITH THE ACFT. BROKER STATED; 'I AM NOT AWARE OF ANY.' I THEN REQUESTED TO REVIEW THE ACFT LOGBOOKS TO VERIFY FAR PART 91 ACFT INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS. I DETERMINED THAT THE ACFT COMPLIED WITH ALL PART 91 REQUIREMENTS TO INCLUDE: ANNUAL INSPECTION; ATC XPONDER INSPECTION; ALTIMETER INSPECTION; PITOT-STATIC CHK; AND ELT BATTERIES REPLACED. THE LAST KNOWN FLT OF THE ACFT WAS APPROX 2 WKS PRIOR. MY PREFLT PREPARATION CONTINUED BY REVIEWING THE ACFT POH. THE REVIEW CONSISTED OF ACFT SYS; EMER PROCS; AND ACFT PERFORMANCE. I DETERMINED MY RANGE PROFILE AND CONFIRMED THAT THE ACFT WOULD BE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED WT AND BAL LIMITATIONS. THE NEXT PHASE OF THE PREFLT PREPARATION WAS THE FLT PLANNING PHASE. I HAD PLANNED TO FILE AN IFR FLT PLAN. THE WX PROGNOSIS FOR TX WAS MARGINAL FOR VFR CONDITIONS; SO I ELECTED TO FLY A SHORTER AND MORE CONSERVATIVE RTE. THIS DECISION WAS TO ASSURE ADEQUATE FUEL ONBOARD IN THE EVENT THAT I WILL NEED TO DIVERT TO ANOTHER ARPT DUE TO WX. ALTHOUGH THIS ACFT IS EQUIPPED WITH AN IFR CERTIFIED GARMIN 430 GPS; I ELECTED TO FILE A PLAN USING LOW ALT VICTOR AIRWAYS. THIS WILL SERVE AS A CONTINGENCY FORM OF NAV AS OPPOSED TO RELYING SOLELY ON GPS NAV. THE LAST PHASE OF THE PREFLT PREPARATION WAS THE PREFLT INSPECTION. I CONDUCTED A THOROUGH PREFLT INSPECTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANUFACTURER'S RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES. NO DISCREPANCIES WERE NOTED DURING THE INSPECTION AND I DETERMINED THE ACFT WAS READY FOR A SAFE FLT. FLT: I OBTAINED MY IFR CLRNC FROM ZZZ CLRNC DELIVERY. I BEGAN MY TKOF ROLL ON RWY XX. AS THE ACFT ACCELERATED I PERFORMED A XCHK OF ALL ENG INSTS. ALL ENG INSTS WERE NORMAL. AFTER ROTATION I BEGAN A NORMAL CLB FOR 5000 FT. I ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT FOR A R TURN TO HDG 300 DEGS. THE AUTOPLT WAS FUNCTIONING AS EXPECTED. I PERFORMED MY CLB CHKLIST AND ANOTHER INST XCHK. HOWEVER; THIS XCHK REVEALED THAT THE CYLINDER TEMP AND THE OIL TEMP GAUGE WERE NOW INOP. I CONTACTED DEP AND THEY RESPONDED THAT THEY WERE NOT RECEIVING MY XPONDER. I VERIFIED THAT MY XPONDER WAS SELECTED TO 'ALT.' I THEN RECYCLED THE XPONDER. I INQUIRED WITH ATC IF THEY WERE RECEIVING MY XPONDER. ATC RESPONDED; 'WE ARE RECEIVING YOUR XPONDER BUT WITH NO MODE C.' SUDDENLY; THE AUTOPLT BEGAN AN UNCOMMANDED TURN TO THE L PRIOR TO REACHING HDG 300 DEGS. I REACTED BY DISENGAGING THE AUTOPLT AND CONTINUED TO FLY THE ACFT MANUALLY. IN ANTICIPATION OF INTERCEPTING THE 320 DEG RADIAL INTO ZZZ VORTAC. I ALSO NOTICED THAT MY NAV #1 RADIO HAD A FLAG INDICATING THAT IT WAS NOT RECEIVING THE ZZZ VORTAC. I VERIFIED THE FREQ; PROGRAMMED THE NAV #2 RADIO TO THE ZZZ VORTAC; AND ATTEMPTED TO IDENT THE AUDIBLE VORTAC CODE. AS THIS WAS TAKING PLACE; DEP HAD ME TURN A HDG FOR A VECTOR OVER ZZZ1 VORTAC. WITHIN THE FIRST 3-4 MINS OF THE FLT; I HAD EXPERIENCED AN AUTOPLT FAILURE; ENG INST FAILURE; XPONDER FAILURE; AND A NAV #1 AND NAV #2 FAILURE. OBVIOUSLY; I SUSPECTED SOME FORM OF ELECTRICAL MALFUNCTION. I BEGAN TO TROUBLESHOOT THE PROBS I WAS EXPERIENCING AND CONTEMPLATED IF IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO RETURN TO ZZZ. I ELECTED TO CONTINUE TOWARD ZZZ2 WITH THE IDEA THAT IF AN EMER LNDG WAS NECESSARY; ZZZ2 HAS EMER EQUIP LOCATED AT THE ARPT FOR ASSISTANCE. I HAD NOT YET DECLARED AN EMER AS I WAS STILL ATTEMPTING TO DIAGNOSE THE SITUATION. I DID NOT SMELL ANY UNUSUAL ELECTRICAL ODORS IN THE CABIN. I WAS UNABLE TO LOCATE ANY TRIPPED CIRCUIT BREAKERS. I OBSERVED MY AMMETER GAUGE WHICH APPEARED TOBE FUNCTIONING NORMALLY WITH NO OBVIOUS OVER-VOLTAGE PROBS. I WAS APPROX 1-2 MI FROM ZZZ2 ARPT AND I WAS CONSUMED WITH ATTEMPTING TO REMEDY OR DIAGNOSE THE PROBS I HAD EXPERIENCED. AT THIS TIME; I WAS CONTACTED BY ATC. 'BONANZA; SAY YOUR ALT?' I'M NOT SURE OF MY THOUGHT PROCESS; BUT I THOUGHT I HAD BEEN CLRED TO CLB TO 7000 FT INSTEAD OF 5000 FT. I RESPONDED; 'I AM CLBING THROUGH 6300 FT.' THE CTLR NOTED THE DISCREPANCY AND RPTED; 'YOU WERE ONLY CLRED TO 5000 FT. EXPEDITE YOUR DSCNT DOWN TO 5000 FT FOR TFC.' I REPLIED WITH THE MISCONCEPTION THAT I HAD BEEN CLRED TO 7000 FT; AND I PERFORMED AN EMER DSCNT TO 5000 FT. AFTER XING ZZZ2 AND DETERMINING THAT MY NAV #1 AND NAV #2 WERE INOP; I COUPLED THE HSI TO THE GARMIN 430 GPS. I SOON REALIZED YET ANOTHER DISCREPANCY. THE MAP ON THE GARMIN 430 INDICATED THAT I WAS R OFF COURSE. HOWEVER; THE HSI WAS CTRED TO INDICATE THAT I WAS ON THE CORRECT FLT PATH. ATC THEN GAVE ME VECTORS TO INTERCEPT. I MADE THE DETERMINATION THAT MY ONLY RELIABLE NAV WAS THE GARMIN 430. I VERIFIED BY RELAYING TO ATC MY APPARENT PROB AND I RECONFIRMED WITH ATC THAT I WAS ON COURSE. I WAS FLYING ON AN IFR FLT PLAN IN VMC CONDITIONS. THEREFORE; I DETERMINED THAT THE ACFT WAS STILL AIRWORTHY ACCORDING TO FAR 91.700. I HAD NO OTHER PAX ON BOARD; AND I STILL HAD RELIABLE GPS NAV. THEREFORE; I DETERMINED THAT I COULD SAFELY PROCEED UNDER VMC CONDITIONS. I RPTED THE PROBS THAT I HAD EXPERIENCED WITH OTHER CTLRS ALONG MY RTE AND ADVISED THAT I WOULD PREFER TO STAY 'OUT OF THE SOUP;' MEANING THAT I WOULD PREFER TO REMAIN VMC DURING THE FLT. I LANDED AT ZZZ1 UNDER A VISUAL APCH WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. THE LESSONS LEARNED: I LEARNED MORE DURING THIS FLT THAN ANY OTHER FLT TO DATE. FIRST OF ALL; I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE ACFT SHALL ALWAYS REMAIN IN POSITIVE CTL OF THE PIC. REGARDLESS OF DISTRS; THE PIC IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFE OP OF THE ACFT AND SHALL COMPLY WITH ATC CLRNCS. I HAVE ALSO LEARNED THAT IF I DETERMINE THAT I AM EXPERIENCING AN IMMINENT EMER; I SHOULD NOT HESITATE TO DECLARE AN EMER WITH ATC AND RETURN FOR LNDG. A DECLARED EMER IS THE ONLY EXCUSE TO EVER DEVIATE FROM AN ATC DIRECTIVE. IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH FEDERAL AND PERSONAL SAFETY STANDARDS; I SHOULD NEVER HESITATE TO RETURN TO THE ARPT OF DEP TO FURTHER EVAL ANY ACFT DISCREPANCIES. FINALLY; I HAVE SINCE IMPOSED A NEW SOP FOR FERRYING ACFT. I WILL NO LONGER FLY A LONG XCOUNTRY FLT UNDER 'GOOD FAITH' THAT THE ACFT IS IN SOUND FLYING CONDITION. PRIOR TO ANY XCOUNTRY FLT; I WILL FIRST CONDUCT A THOROUGH TEST FLT TO ASSURE THAT ALL SYS ARE FUNCTIONING NORMALLY AND THE ACFT IS IN AIRWORTHY CONDITION FOR A SAFE FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.