Narrative:

Conditions were VMC and runway xx was in use with ATIS reporting winds calm. Successfully executed simulated short field takeoff with 50 ft obstacle at taxiway C and simulated short field landing (depart taxiway C) with 50 ft obstacle on access road prior to threshold. Next activity after full-stop and taxi back to runway xx was simulated soft field takeoff with 50 ft obstacle at taxiway C. Put in approach flaps and confirmed rotation and climb speeds prior to entering runway. Positioned and held per tower instruction. Once cleared for takeoff; increased throttle to full while holding yoke back fully and adding right rudder. Aircraft yawed left when nosewheel lifted so input additional right rudder. Aircraft continued to turn left requiring increasing amounts of right rudder to stay on runway and turn aircraft back toward centerline. Mains lifted off runway surface so reduced back pressure on yoke. Observed right wing dropping and attempted to correct through yoke and rudder inputs. After continued unsuccessful efforts to stabilize; instructor called 'my plane' and took controls. Confirmed 'your plane' and released controls. In process of recovery; landing and rollout; the aircraft departed the runway surface for the grass area to the left of the runway and impacted a taxiway sign. Stopped aircraft on taxiway; observed damage to left flap and decided not to retract flaps. Radioed tower confirming that we did not require assistance and intention to taxi to hangar. Taxied to hangar after receiving clearance. Returned to hangar and observed damage to: left wingtip; left flap and wing surface at flap attach point and left horizontal stabilizer. Unfortunately; my CFI is out of town; but I am planning on additional debriefing after his return. Based on that debrief; I plan to develop and execute additional training that will directly address idented factors (specifically how to respond to and where possible avoid in the future). Although further debriefing is needed; here are my initial thoughts as to cause: I believe misunderstanding of instructions being provided and corresponding control inputs compounded by a mistaken assumption that if the instructor was not intervening; things were ok were the primary factors in the destabilization of the aircraft and subsequent off-runway landing. Observations/take-aways from the experience: 1) spend more time talking through the specific actions and expectations with the instructor prior to actually executing them. This will help reduce communication disconnects; foster greater understanding and minimize risks. 2) don't become complacent because you are with an instructor and fly/make decisions as you would normally (ie; as sole pilot). 3) don't focus so much on the specific assignment that you neglect basic airman skills and judgement.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WHILE PERFORMING A SIMULATED SOFT FIELD TKOF; INSTRUCTOR PLT AND RECURRENT TRAINEE OF BE36 LOSE CONTROL IMMEDIATELY AFTER LIFTOFF AND MAKE UNCONTROLLED TOUCHDOWN AND RWY EXCURSION DURING RECOVERY EFFORT.

Narrative: CONDITIONS WERE VMC AND RWY XX WAS IN USE WITH ATIS RPTING WINDS CALM. SUCCESSFULLY EXECUTED SIMULATED SHORT FIELD TKOF WITH 50 FT OBSTACLE AT TXWY C AND SIMULATED SHORT FIELD LNDG (DEPART TXWY C) WITH 50 FT OBSTACLE ON ACCESS ROAD PRIOR TO THRESHOLD. NEXT ACTIVITY AFTER FULL-STOP AND TAXI BACK TO RWY XX WAS SIMULATED SOFT FIELD TKOF WITH 50 FT OBSTACLE AT TXWY C. PUT IN APCH FLAPS AND CONFIRMED ROTATION AND CLB SPDS PRIOR TO ENTERING RWY. POSITIONED AND HELD PER TWR INSTRUCTION. ONCE CLRED FOR TKOF; INCREASED THROTTLE TO FULL WHILE HOLDING YOKE BACK FULLY AND ADDING R RUDDER. ACFT YAWED L WHEN NOSEWHEEL LIFTED SO INPUT ADDITIONAL R RUDDER. ACFT CONTINUED TO TURN L REQUIRING INCREASING AMOUNTS OF R RUDDER TO STAY ON RWY AND TURN ACFT BACK TOWARD CTRLINE. MAINS LIFTED OFF RWY SURFACE SO REDUCED BACK PRESSURE ON YOKE. OBSERVED R WING DROPPING AND ATTEMPTED TO CORRECT THROUGH YOKE AND RUDDER INPUTS. AFTER CONTINUED UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO STABILIZE; INSTRUCTOR CALLED 'MY PLANE' AND TOOK CTLS. CONFIRMED 'YOUR PLANE' AND RELEASED CTLS. IN PROCESS OF RECOVERY; LNDG AND ROLLOUT; THE ACFT DEPARTED THE RWY SURFACE FOR THE GRASS AREA TO THE L OF THE RWY AND IMPACTED A TXWY SIGN. STOPPED ACFT ON TXWY; OBSERVED DAMAGE TO L FLAP AND DECIDED NOT TO RETRACT FLAPS. RADIOED TWR CONFIRMING THAT WE DID NOT REQUIRE ASSISTANCE AND INTENTION TO TAXI TO HANGAR. TAXIED TO HANGAR AFTER RECEIVING CLRNC. RETURNED TO HANGAR AND OBSERVED DAMAGE TO: L WINGTIP; L FLAP AND WING SURFACE AT FLAP ATTACH POINT AND L HORIZ STABILIZER. UNFORTUNATELY; MY CFI IS OUT OF TOWN; BUT I AM PLANNING ON ADDITIONAL DEBRIEFING AFTER HIS RETURN. BASED ON THAT DEBRIEF; I PLAN TO DEVELOP AND EXECUTE ADDITIONAL TRAINING THAT WILL DIRECTLY ADDRESS IDENTED FACTORS (SPECIFICALLY HOW TO RESPOND TO AND WHERE POSSIBLE AVOID IN THE FUTURE). ALTHOUGH FURTHER DEBRIEFING IS NEEDED; HERE ARE MY INITIAL THOUGHTS AS TO CAUSE: I BELIEVE MISUNDERSTANDING OF INSTRUCTIONS BEING PROVIDED AND CORRESPONDING CTL INPUTS COMPOUNDED BY A MISTAKEN ASSUMPTION THAT IF THE INSTRUCTOR WAS NOT INTERVENING; THINGS WERE OK WERE THE PRIMARY FACTORS IN THE DESTABILIZATION OF THE ACFT AND SUBSEQUENT OFF-RWY LNDG. OBSERVATIONS/TAKE-AWAYS FROM THE EXPERIENCE: 1) SPEND MORE TIME TALKING THROUGH THE SPECIFIC ACTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS WITH THE INSTRUCTOR PRIOR TO ACTUALLY EXECUTING THEM. THIS WILL HELP REDUCE COM DISCONNECTS; FOSTER GREATER UNDERSTANDING AND MINIMIZE RISKS. 2) DON'T BECOME COMPLACENT BECAUSE YOU ARE WITH AN INSTRUCTOR AND FLY/MAKE DECISIONS AS YOU WOULD NORMALLY (IE; AS SOLE PLT). 3) DON'T FOCUS SO MUCH ON THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENT THAT YOU NEGLECT BASIC AIRMAN SKILLS AND JUDGEMENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.