Narrative:

Aircraft was initially released with a fuel quantity gauge inoperative for the right tank. The original write-up noted 'imbal developed with right wing approximately 1000-1200 pounds lower than left tank.' maintenance deferred the right fuel quantity indicating system. On arrival at the aircraft; I requested that the right tank be dripped to confirm the arrival fuel. Fueling report noted that the right tank quantity; pre-service; was 3055 pounds compared to left tank at 4600 pounds; a difference of nearly 1600 pounds. I expressed concern to maintenance that the deferral wrongly faulted the indicating system whereas the problem was a leak or uncommanded xfer. The aircraft had flown for 3 days with the gauge deferred and pilots thinking they had fuel they clearly did not. The aircraft had arrived from ZZZ and the crew reported block-in fuel of 9200 ft when they actually had only 7655 pounds. The line mechanics agreed with my concern. The aircraft had 'lots of history' and was scheduled for an extensive check of the system upon arrival at ZZZ1. The maintenance supervisor called to the scene was uncooperative in trying to diagnose the problem and unreceptive to my concerns. After a tiring discussion with him; I had no choice but to exercise my authority/authorized and refuse the aircraft. I have never experienced such an attitude by a maintenance supervisor in my 22 yrs at air carrier X. Clearly the safety culture is being eroded. We were eventually moved to a different aircraft. My other concerns are changes in the refusal procedure that make it more difficult for refusal information to be made available to subsequent crews. My concerns did not lead to a change in the deferral or any additional details being added to the log history (other than a cursory entry by dispatch). I was forced to send a company email to the outgoing captain to alert him of the problems with the aircraft. I no longer have the ability to enter a full narrative of my concerns in the official record. In this situation; with an incorrect deferral; and a very uncooperative maintenance supervisor; it is now nearly impossible to pass vital information to subsequent crews. This change in procedure needs to be investigated at the earliest possible time. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated the right dripstick reading he requested demonstrated the right tank fuel quantity gauge was in fact reading correctly; not 1600# pounds less as the MEL deferral stated. The initial log write-up noted a fuel imbalance had developed between the left and right tanks. Reporter stated since the right tank dripstick reading and quantity gauge were in agreement; the deferral for the right quantity gauge was not correct. The real issue was an uncommanded fuel transfer or fuel leak in flight; of approximately 1600# pounds. Maintenance supervisor refused to correct the MEL deferral; even though his line mechanics were telling him the incorrect deferral would make flight crews believe they have 1600# pounds more fuel than what the quantity gauge read. The next outbound crew refused the same aircraft for the same reason. Reporter stated if a dripstick reading had been performed initially; the uncommanded fuel transfer or leak would have been realized and would not have been deferrable. Reporter stated his carrier has disabled pilot's ability to enter aircraft history or narrative in their company's computer to inform outbound pilots of why an aircraft was refused. Even the language in their flight operations manual has been changed that states pilots comments are individual and should not be considered as the status of the aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PILOT REPORTS A B757-200 R TANK FUEL QUANTITY GAUGE WAS DEFERRED AS INOP AND READING 1600# LBS LESS THAN LEFT TANK. R TANK DRIPSTICK SHOWED GAUGE WAS CORRECT. UNCOMMANDED FUEL TRANSFER OR LEAK WAS OCCURRING. MAINT SUPERVISOR REFUSED TO CHANGE DEFERRAL.

Narrative: ACFT WAS INITIALLY RELEASED WITH A FUEL QUANTITY GAUGE INOP FOR THE R TANK. THE ORIGINAL WRITE-UP NOTED 'IMBAL DEVELOPED WITH R WING APPROX 1000-1200 LBS LOWER THAN L TANK.' MAINT DEFERRED THE R FUEL QUANTITY INDICATING SYS. ON ARR AT THE ACFT; I REQUESTED THAT THE R TANK BE DRIPPED TO CONFIRM THE ARR FUEL. FUELING RPT NOTED THAT THE R TANK QUANTITY; PRE-SVC; WAS 3055 LBS COMPARED TO L TANK AT 4600 LBS; A DIFFERENCE OF NEARLY 1600 LBS. I EXPRESSED CONCERN TO MAINT THAT THE DEFERRAL WRONGLY FAULTED THE INDICATING SYS WHEREAS THE PROB WAS A LEAK OR UNCOMMANDED XFER. THE ACFT HAD FLOWN FOR 3 DAYS WITH THE GAUGE DEFERRED AND PLTS THINKING THEY HAD FUEL THEY CLRLY DID NOT. THE ACFT HAD ARRIVED FROM ZZZ AND THE CREW RPTED BLOCK-IN FUEL OF 9200 FT WHEN THEY ACTUALLY HAD ONLY 7655 LBS. THE LINE MECHS AGREED WITH MY CONCERN. THE ACFT HAD 'LOTS OF HISTORY' AND WAS SCHEDULED FOR AN EXTENSIVE CHK OF THE SYS UPON ARR AT ZZZ1. THE MAINT SUPVR CALLED TO THE SCENE WAS UNCOOPERATIVE IN TRYING TO DIAGNOSE THE PROB AND UNRECEPTIVE TO MY CONCERNS. AFTER A TIRING DISCUSSION WITH HIM; I HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO EXERCISE MY AUTH AND REFUSE THE ACFT. I HAVE NEVER EXPERIENCED SUCH AN ATTITUDE BY A MAINT SUPVR IN MY 22 YRS AT ACR X. CLRLY THE SAFETY CULTURE IS BEING ERODED. WE WERE EVENTUALLY MOVED TO A DIFFERENT ACFT. MY OTHER CONCERNS ARE CHANGES IN THE REFUSAL PROC THAT MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR REFUSAL INFO TO BE MADE AVAILABLE TO SUBSEQUENT CREWS. MY CONCERNS DID NOT LEAD TO A CHANGE IN THE DEFERRAL OR ANY ADDITIONAL DETAILS BEING ADDED TO THE LOG HISTORY (OTHER THAN A CURSORY ENTRY BY DISPATCH). I WAS FORCED TO SEND A COMPANY EMAIL TO THE OUTGOING CAPT TO ALERT HIM OF THE PROBS WITH THE ACFT. I NO LONGER HAVE THE ABILITY TO ENTER A FULL NARRATIVE OF MY CONCERNS IN THE OFFICIAL RECORD. IN THIS SITUATION; WITH AN INCORRECT DEFERRAL; AND A VERY UNCOOPERATIVE MAINT SUPVR; IT IS NOW NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE TO PASS VITAL INFO TO SUBSEQUENT CREWS. THIS CHANGE IN PROC NEEDS TO BE INVESTIGATED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED THE R DRIPSTICK READING HE REQUESTED DEMONSTRATED THE RIGHT TANK FUEL QUANTITY GAUGE WAS IN FACT READING CORRECTLY; NOT 1600# LBS LESS AS THE MEL DEFERRAL STATED. THE INITIAL LOG WRITE-UP NOTED A FUEL IMBALANCE HAD DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE LEFT AND RIGHT TANKS. REPORTER STATED SINCE THE RIGHT TANK DRIPSTICK READING AND QUANTITY GAUGE WERE IN AGREEMENT; THE DEFERRAL FOR THE R QUANTITY GAUGE WAS NOT CORRECT. THE REAL ISSUE WAS AN UNCOMMANDED FUEL TRANSFER OR FUEL LEAK IN FLIGHT; OF APPROX 1600# LBS. MAINT SUPERVISOR REFUSED TO CORRECT THE MEL DEFERRAL; EVEN THOUGH HIS LINE MECHANICS WERE TELLING HIM THE INCORRECT DEFERRAL WOULD MAKE FLIGHT CREWS BELIEVE THEY HAVE 1600# LBS MORE FUEL THAN WHAT THE QUANTITY GAUGE READ. THE NEXT OUTBOUND CREW REFUSED THE SAME ACFT FOR THE SAME REASON. REPORTER STATED IF A DRIPSTICK READING HAD BEEN PERFORMED INITIALLY; THE UNCOMMANDED FUEL TRANSFER OR LEAK WOULD HAVE BEEN REALIZED AND WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DEFERRABLE. REPORTER STATED HIS CARRIER HAS DISABLED PILOT'S ABILITY TO ENTER ACFT HISTORY OR NARRATIVE IN THEIR COMPANY'S COMPUTER TO INFORM OUTBOUND PILOTS OF WHY AN ACFT WAS REFUSED. EVEN THE LANGUAGE IN THEIR FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL HAS BEEN CHANGED THAT STATES PILOTS COMMENTS ARE INDIVIDUAL AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS THE STATUS OF THE ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.