Narrative:

The following happened on approach to cle. The first officer had about 100 hours in the A320 and the captain had over 5000 hours in type; about 1500 as captain in A320. The first officer was PF; captain was monitoring. Prior to this event we had flown 4 legs (2 each) in the aircraft together in the previous 2 days. As the first officer was new to the aircraft; he asked for me to share any information about the airplane that might be helpful. I am always happy to help out in this way; but hesitant to be perceived as a check airman; which I am not. Most of our conversation about the airplane focused on the subtleties of the automation on the A320. We did discuss some of the common pitfalls that come up commonly on a visual approach. After printing out ATIS and setting up for a flaps 3 degree landing to runway 6L at cle we contacted approach control who informed us of a runway change to runway 24L. Note that we were originally expecting to land on the north runway but were changed to the south runway from the other directions. I printed out a new ATIS and the PF (first officer) put the new runway in the mcdu. Subsequently discussion revealed that at this point we were both visualizing landing on the same piece of pavement as before; namely runway 24R. Approach instructed us to cross hemez at 10000 ft and to delete the speed restr. The first officer elected to cross hemez at 300 KTS. Which concerned me as hemez is 31 NM of cle. As we approached the airport; we seemed to be getting vectored for a downwind to runway 24L (we're still thinking runway 25R) so I chose to say nothing about the speed at that time. As we were nearing cle we were well above profile for a straight shot to the OM; however; it appeared we were being set up for a downwind to make room for traffic from the south. So; everything looked fine; until we were given a heading to about a 10 mi final. At that point we were definitely high; but able to get on profile had we extended the gear at that point and possibly used some speed brakes. Again; I didn't choose to interfere; as we were in a reasonable position to make the runway with a stable approach inside of the FAF. Unfortunately; the first officer; being unfamiliar with the A320; was more loaded up than I had realized and (remember we both have the wrong runway in mind) I was concerned about flying into the non transgression zone and verbalized my concern. As we lined up on the runway; I decided it was time for me to get involved. I let the first officer know I was going to select an airspeed about 10 KTS above vls in order to keep the engines at idle. The first officer then realized how high we were and called for landing gear down. He then called for flaps 2 and 3 degrees and we made our way down on the GS around 5 or 6 mi out but were still doing about 170 KIAS. I suggested and he agreed to flaps full. At 1000 ft AGL we were on speed and GS and had finished up the landing checklist. There was just the problem -- we were lined up with the wrong runway. The first officer was confused because the flight director was directing a turn to the left which he hesitated to ask me about because he thought it was just another airbus anomaly. I was momentarily distraction by the flaps 3 degree indication on the landing memo; which made sense; but I pointed it out to the first officer. Just after the 500 ft stable call I had the sense something wasn't quite right. I even glanced at the runway in the mcdu but didn't think. I just looked. It was just then that the tower called us and said it looked like we were lined up on runway 24R. I looked down at the mcdu again and saw runway 24L! I immediately called for a go around which we successfully; although not necessarily smoothly executed. We flew a left downwind to runway 24L. Although the vector onto final put us through the final approach course; we landed and taxied to the gate without further incident. Neither the captain or first officer thought carefully about (visualized) the new runway. Both pilots were distraction dealing with aircraft automation and the steep approach. Let me be blunt; first and foremost is the need for the monitoring pilot to prioritize his -- her monitoring. It was far more important for me to verify the correct runway when we were cleared to land than it was to question the flaps 3 indication onthe landing memo. Secondly; the airbus training program trains us to fly instrument and visual approachs which are begun with the airplane on profile in a stable state. In the actual ATC environment under VMC conditions; we are; more often than not; vectored high and fast onto a visual approach. In fact; operating the A320 under these conditions is a different problem entirely from the calm training environment and I believe our pilots leave the training program ill prepared for visual approachs in the real world. Unless the autoplt and automation are completely disconnected (which takes 5 steps in and of itself) managing a visual approach on this aircraft requires a number of actions and techniques which are not taught extensively in the airbus program. Autothrust off; autoplt off; flight directors off; manage the speed or dial it down just above vls; and select trk fpa.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 FLT CREW LINES UP WITH RWY 24R AT CLE AFTER BEING VECTORED AND CLEARED TO LAND 24L. TOWER QUERIES THE FLT CREW AT 500 FEET AND FLT CREW EXECUTES GAR.

Narrative: THE FOLLOWING HAPPENED ON APCH TO CLE. THE FO HAD ABOUT 100 HRS IN THE A320 AND THE CAPT HAD OVER 5000 HRS IN TYPE; ABOUT 1500 AS CAPT IN A320. THE FO WAS PF; CAPT WAS MONITORING. PRIOR TO THIS EVENT WE HAD FLOWN 4 LEGS (2 EACH) IN THE ACFT TOGETHER IN THE PREVIOUS 2 DAYS. AS THE FO WAS NEW TO THE ACFT; HE ASKED FOR ME TO SHARE ANY INFO ABOUT THE AIRPLANE THAT MIGHT BE HELPFUL. I AM ALWAYS HAPPY TO HELP OUT IN THIS WAY; BUT HESITANT TO BE PERCEIVED AS A CHK AIRMAN; WHICH I AM NOT. MOST OF OUR CONVERSATION ABOUT THE AIRPLANE FOCUSED ON THE SUBTLETIES OF THE AUTOMATION ON THE A320. WE DID DISCUSS SOME OF THE COMMON PITFALLS THAT COME UP COMMONLY ON A VISUAL APCH. AFTER PRINTING OUT ATIS AND SETTING UP FOR A FLAPS 3 DEG LNDG TO RWY 6L AT CLE WE CONTACTED APCH CTL WHO INFORMED US OF A RWY CHANGE TO RWY 24L. NOTE THAT WE WERE ORIGINALLY EXPECTING TO LAND ON THE N RWY BUT WERE CHANGED TO THE S RWY FROM THE OTHER DIRECTIONS. I PRINTED OUT A NEW ATIS AND THE PF (FO) PUT THE NEW RWY IN THE MCDU. SUBSEQUENTLY DISCUSSION REVEALED THAT AT THIS POINT WE WERE BOTH VISUALIZING LNDG ON THE SAME PIECE OF PAVEMENT AS BEFORE; NAMELY RWY 24R. APCH INSTRUCTED US TO CROSS HEMEZ AT 10000 FT AND TO DELETE THE SPD RESTR. THE FO ELECTED TO CROSS HEMEZ AT 300 KTS. WHICH CONCERNED ME AS HEMEZ IS 31 NM OF CLE. AS WE APCHED THE ARPT; WE SEEMED TO BE GETTING VECTORED FOR A DOWNWIND TO RWY 24L (WE'RE STILL THINKING RWY 25R) SO I CHOSE TO SAY NOTHING ABOUT THE SPD AT THAT TIME. AS WE WERE NEARING CLE WE WERE WELL ABOVE PROFILE FOR A STRAIGHT SHOT TO THE OM; HOWEVER; IT APPEARED WE WERE BEING SET UP FOR A DOWNWIND TO MAKE ROOM FOR TFC FROM THE S. SO; EVERYTHING LOOKED FINE; UNTIL WE WERE GIVEN A HDG TO ABOUT A 10 MI FINAL. AT THAT POINT WE WERE DEFINITELY HIGH; BUT ABLE TO GET ON PROFILE HAD WE EXTENDED THE GEAR AT THAT POINT AND POSSIBLY USED SOME SPD BRAKES. AGAIN; I DIDN'T CHOOSE TO INTERFERE; AS WE WERE IN A REASONABLE POS TO MAKE THE RWY WITH A STABLE APCH INSIDE OF THE FAF. UNFORTUNATELY; THE FO; BEING UNFAMILIAR WITH THE A320; WAS MORE LOADED UP THAN I HAD REALIZED AND (REMEMBER WE BOTH HAVE THE WRONG RWY IN MIND) I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT FLYING INTO THE NON TRANSGRESSION ZONE AND VERBALIZED MY CONCERN. AS WE LINED UP ON THE RWY; I DECIDED IT WAS TIME FOR ME TO GET INVOLVED. I LET THE FO KNOW I WAS GOING TO SELECT AN AIRSPD ABOUT 10 KTS ABOVE VLS IN ORDER TO KEEP THE ENGS AT IDLE. THE FO THEN REALIZED HOW HIGH WE WERE AND CALLED FOR LNDG GEAR DOWN. HE THEN CALLED FOR FLAPS 2 AND 3 DEGS AND WE MADE OUR WAY DOWN ON THE GS AROUND 5 OR 6 MI OUT BUT WERE STILL DOING ABOUT 170 KIAS. I SUGGESTED AND HE AGREED TO FLAPS FULL. AT 1000 FT AGL WE WERE ON SPD AND GS AND HAD FINISHED UP THE LNDG CHKLIST. THERE WAS JUST THE PROB -- WE WERE LINED UP WITH THE WRONG RWY. THE FO WAS CONFUSED BECAUSE THE FLT DIRECTOR WAS DIRECTING A TURN TO THE L WHICH HE HESITATED TO ASK ME ABOUT BECAUSE HE THOUGHT IT WAS JUST ANOTHER AIRBUS ANOMALY. I WAS MOMENTARILY DISTR BY THE FLAPS 3 DEG INDICATION ON THE LNDG MEMO; WHICH MADE SENSE; BUT I POINTED IT OUT TO THE FO. JUST AFTER THE 500 FT STABLE CALL I HAD THE SENSE SOMETHING WASN'T QUITE RIGHT. I EVEN GLANCED AT THE RWY IN THE MCDU BUT DIDN'T THINK. I JUST LOOKED. IT WAS JUST THEN THAT THE TWR CALLED US AND SAID IT LOOKED LIKE WE WERE LINED UP ON RWY 24R. I LOOKED DOWN AT THE MCDU AGAIN AND SAW RWY 24L! I IMMEDIATELY CALLED FOR A GAR WHICH WE SUCCESSFULLY; ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY SMOOTHLY EXECUTED. WE FLEW A L DOWNWIND TO RWY 24L. ALTHOUGH THE VECTOR ONTO FINAL PUT US THROUGH THE FINAL APCH COURSE; WE LANDED AND TAXIED TO THE GATE WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. NEITHER THE CAPT OR FO THOUGHT CAREFULLY ABOUT (VISUALIZED) THE NEW RWY. BOTH PLTS WERE DISTR DEALING WITH ACFT AUTOMATION AND THE STEEP APCH. LET ME BE BLUNT; FIRST AND FOREMOST IS THE NEED FOR THE MONITORING PLT TO PRIORITIZE HIS -- HER MONITORING. IT WAS FAR MORE IMPORTANT FOR ME TO VERIFY THE CORRECT RWY WHEN WE WERE CLRED TO LAND THAN IT WAS TO QUESTION THE FLAPS 3 INDICATION ONTHE LNDG MEMO. SECONDLY; THE AIRBUS TRAINING PROGRAM TRAINS US TO FLY INST AND VISUAL APCHS WHICH ARE BEGUN WITH THE AIRPLANE ON PROFILE IN A STABLE STATE. IN THE ACTUAL ATC ENVIRONMENT UNDER VMC CONDITIONS; WE ARE; MORE OFTEN THAN NOT; VECTORED HIGH AND FAST ONTO A VISUAL APCH. IN FACT; OPERATING THE A320 UNDER THESE CONDITIONS IS A DIFFERENT PROB ENTIRELY FROM THE CALM TRAINING ENVIRONMENT AND I BELIEVE OUR PLTS LEAVE THE TRAINING PROGRAM ILL PREPARED FOR VISUAL APCHS IN THE REAL WORLD. UNLESS THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOMATION ARE COMPLETELY DISCONNECTED (WHICH TAKES 5 STEPS IN AND OF ITSELF) MANAGING A VISUAL APCH ON THIS ACFT REQUIRES A NUMBER OF ACTIONS AND TECHNIQUES WHICH ARE NOT TAUGHT EXTENSIVELY IN THE AIRBUS PROGRAM. AUTOTHRUST OFF; AUTOPLT OFF; FLT DIRECTORS OFF; MANAGE THE SPD OR DIAL IT DOWN JUST ABOVE VLS; AND SELECT TRK FPA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.