Narrative:

Taxied to runway 29R with ground control. Upon reaching the hold short line; changed to local control frequency. Local control (same controller) issued instructions to position and hold. A C172 was visible to the right side approximately 1/3 of the way down the runway and appeared to be clear; waiting for taxi instructions. Local control issued takeoff clearance; and believing the C172 to be clear; we advanced power and began our takeoff roll. As we drew closer to the cessna and his position relative to the hold short line came into view; it became clear to me (first officer; pilot monitoring) that it was stopped with the whole aircraft on the runway side of the line. I pointed out the cessna's position to the captain (PF). Since the cessna was well beyond our wing span; facing away from us and not moving; he elected to continue the takeoff as this appeared to be the safest course of action. I stated my support for his decision. We were busy cleaning up the aircraft and configuring the flight director immediately after takeoff so I did not tell local control about the cessna's position until we received the handoff to departure control approximately 15 seconds after liftoff. In the meantime; local control issued a takeoff clearance to an air carrier Y flight behind us. I then told local control that the cessna was on the runway; but the controller seemed confused and asked me 'which cessna; the one at alpha 14?' I checked my airport page (this took perhaps 5 seconds); then confirmed that this was the correct position. An air carrier Z airlines crew; holding short of the runway; said that they had mentioned it to ground control as they taxied via taxiway a; past the cessna; on their way to the runway. Local control then queried the cessna about his position and its pilot admitted that he had been stopped on the wrong side of the hold short line but that he was now clear of the runway. I don't know if he was clear prior to the air carrier Y aircraft passing the A-14 intersection. Clearly; the cause of this incident was the cessna pilot's failure to properly exit the runway past the hold short line; but it could have been prevented had the controller maintained better surveillance of the airfield. He should have visually scanned the runway prior to issuing a takeoff clearance and noted the position of the cessna. I feel that a strong contributing factor was the inadequate staffing of the tus ATCT at the time. A single controller was operating the ground control and local control positions. He was handling multiple air carrier taxi requests on ground control while simultaneously controling the runways and airspace on local control. He missed an advisory from the air carrier Z crew on ground control that the cessna was on the runway; and neither us nor the air carrier Y crew heard it because we had already switched to local control. Due to our relatively low sight-line to the cessna and the distance from the threshold to the A-14 intersection; we were unable to see that the cessna was on the runway until we were well into our takeoff roll; so we accepted a takeoff clearance that should have been refused; as did air carrier Y. I possibly could have prevented a near miss for air carrier Y had I spoken up immediately; but we were at rotation speed very shortly after making the decision to continue and my focus was directed to making callouts for gear/flap retraction and responding to the captain's requests for flight director mode confign. It didn't occur to me that another aircraft was in jeopardy until I heard local control issue air carrier Y's takeoff clearance. I should have been more aware of the potential for a repeated loss of separation; since I knew that air carrier Y had taxied right behind us. Upon reflection; our confign could have waited for a few seconds while I notified local control of the cessna's position.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ FIRST OFFICER REPORTS TAKE OFF FROM TUS WITH C172 HOLDING DOWN FIELD ON THE RUNWAY SIDE OF THE HOLD SHORT LINE. SINGLE CONTROLLER FOR BOTH GROUND CONTROL AND LOCAL CONTROL.

Narrative: TAXIED TO RWY 29R WITH GND CTL. UPON REACHING THE HOLD SHORT LINE; CHANGED TO LCL CTL FREQ. LCL CTL (SAME CTLR) ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO POS AND HOLD. A C172 WAS VISIBLE TO THE R SIDE APPROX 1/3 OF THE WAY DOWN THE RWY AND APPEARED TO BE CLR; WAITING FOR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS. LCL CTL ISSUED TKOF CLRNC; AND BELIEVING THE C172 TO BE CLR; WE ADVANCED PWR AND BEGAN OUR TKOF ROLL. AS WE DREW CLOSER TO THE CESSNA AND HIS POSITION RELATIVE TO THE HOLD SHORT LINE CAME INTO VIEW; IT BECAME CLR TO ME (FO; PLT MONITORING) THAT IT WAS STOPPED WITH THE WHOLE ACFT ON THE RWY SIDE OF THE LINE. I POINTED OUT THE CESSNA'S POS TO THE CAPT (PF). SINCE THE CESSNA WAS WELL BEYOND OUR WING SPAN; FACING AWAY FROM US AND NOT MOVING; HE ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE TKOF AS THIS APPEARED TO BE THE SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION. I STATED MY SUPPORT FOR HIS DECISION. WE WERE BUSY CLEANING UP THE ACFT AND CONFIGURING THE FLT DIRECTOR IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF SO I DID NOT TELL LCL CTL ABOUT THE CESSNA'S POSITION UNTIL WE RECEIVED THE HDOF TO DEP CTL APPROX 15 SECONDS AFTER LIFTOFF. IN THE MEANTIME; LCL CTL ISSUED A TKOF CLRNC TO AN ACR Y FLT BEHIND US. I THEN TOLD LCL CTL THAT THE CESSNA WAS ON THE RWY; BUT THE CTLR SEEMED CONFUSED AND ASKED ME 'WHICH CESSNA; THE ONE AT ALPHA 14?' I CHKED MY ARPT PAGE (THIS TOOK PERHAPS 5 SECONDS); THEN CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS THE CORRECT POS. AN ACR Z AIRLINES CREW; HOLDING SHORT OF THE RWY; SAID THAT THEY HAD MENTIONED IT TO GND CTL AS THEY TAXIED VIA TXWY A; PAST THE CESSNA; ON THEIR WAY TO THE RWY. LCL CTL THEN QUERIED THE CESSNA ABOUT HIS POS AND ITS PLT ADMITTED THAT HE HAD BEEN STOPPED ON THE WRONG SIDE OF THE HOLD SHORT LINE BUT THAT HE WAS NOW CLR OF THE RWY. I DON'T KNOW IF HE WAS CLR PRIOR TO THE ACR Y ACFT PASSING THE A-14 INTXN. CLEARLY; THE CAUSE OF THIS INCIDENT WAS THE CESSNA PLT'S FAILURE TO PROPERLY EXIT THE RWY PAST THE HOLD SHORT LINE; BUT IT COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED HAD THE CTLR MAINTAINED BETTER SURVEILLANCE OF THE AIRFIELD. HE SHOULD HAVE VISUALLY SCANNED THE RWY PRIOR TO ISSUING A TKOF CLRNC AND NOTED THE POS OF THE CESSNA. I FEEL THAT A STRONG CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE INADEQUATE STAFFING OF THE TUS ATCT AT THE TIME. A SINGLE CTLR WAS OPERATING THE GND CTL AND LCL CTL POSITIONS. HE WAS HANDLING MULTIPLE ACR TAXI REQUESTS ON GND CTL WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY CTLING THE RWYS AND AIRSPACE ON LCL CTL. HE MISSED AN ADVISORY FROM THE ACR Z CREW ON GND CTL THAT THE CESSNA WAS ON THE RWY; AND NEITHER US NOR THE ACR Y CREW HEARD IT BECAUSE WE HAD ALREADY SWITCHED TO LCL CTL. DUE TO OUR RELATIVELY LOW SIGHT-LINE TO THE CESSNA AND THE DISTANCE FROM THE THRESHOLD TO THE A-14 INTXN; WE WERE UNABLE TO SEE THAT THE CESSNA WAS ON THE RWY UNTIL WE WERE WELL INTO OUR TKOF ROLL; SO WE ACCEPTED A TKOF CLRNC THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN REFUSED; AS DID ACR Y. I POSSIBLY COULD HAVE PREVENTED A NEAR MISS FOR ACR Y HAD I SPOKEN UP IMMEDIATELY; BUT WE WERE AT ROTATION SPD VERY SHORTLY AFTER MAKING THE DECISION TO CONTINUE AND MY FOCUS WAS DIRECTED TO MAKING CALLOUTS FOR GEAR/FLAP RETRACTION AND RESPONDING TO THE CAPT'S REQUESTS FOR FLT DIRECTOR MODE CONFIGN. IT DIDN'T OCCUR TO ME THAT ANOTHER ACFT WAS IN JEOPARDY UNTIL I HEARD LCL CTL ISSUE ACR Y'S TKOF CLRNC. I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE AWARE OF THE POTENTIAL FOR A REPEATED LOSS OF SEPARATION; SINCE I KNEW THAT ACR Y HAD TAXIED RIGHT BEHIND US. UPON REFLECTION; OUR CONFIGN COULD HAVE WAITED FOR A FEW SECONDS WHILE I NOTIFIED LCL CTL OF THE CESSNA'S POS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.