Narrative:

As we began to exit operations to be transported to the remote hangar location where the aircraft was located to begin our preflight; we were contacted by station personnel and informed that crew planning had called with a change to our planned ferry flight to ZZZ. We were informed that we were to ferry the airplane to ZZZ1 and then fly a revenue flight to ZZZ and have a layover in ZZZ of 10 hours 28 mins and then fly on the next day from ZZZ to ZZZ2 and then back to ZZZ. The captain and I immediately became concerned about how long our day would be based on this plan and contacted the crew desk to alert them to our concerns. When I spoke to the crew desk they indicated that there were no duty problems with our day as it was now planned. I indicated to the crew scheduler that we had been told a few nights prior at XA00 during our last conversation with the crew desk; that we were scheduled for an XL00 departure to ZZZ. The scheduler indicated that due to the fact that we had been contacted by them multiple times that morning about the ongoing delays for the ferry flight that we had not reported for duty until XS00 and that an estimated time of arrival in ZZZ past XA45 did not pose a duty time problem. I stated to the scheduler that I was concerned about not having received adequate rest to complete the entire day as now planned. The captain and I calculated that based on the prospective planning for adequate rest that we were to report for duty at XK00 and the fact that we were contacted numerous times from XI54 onward that we would exceed the maximum amount of FAA duty time if we could not arrive in ZZZ by XA45. According to our calculations accounting for a required debrief; we would have to be airborne in ZZZ1 by XX25 in order to not exceed the FAA maximum of 16 hours. We then determined that we were legal from a superseding example standpoint to fly to ZZZ1 but agreed it would be difficult for us to be airborne in ZZZ1 by XX25. Upon completion of the shutdown checklist at XX00 the captain and I determined that it was not feasible to accomplish all of our tasks; sign off the flight plan (because we could not flight plan en route due to inoperative ACARS); retrieve performance data; preflight the aircraft; be fueled; address the service needs of the aircraft; board an entirely full aircraft and become airborne in less than 25 mins. We determined that we must be airborne by XX25 in order to keep our far duty day below 16 hours with a planned block from ZZZ1 to ZZZ of 1 hour 20 mins. The reason for the safety report is that it appears that the crew desk did not understand how we would not be able to look back and find 8 hours of rest based on the reassignment that they attempted to have us complete. Due to the fact that a superseding decision states that rest should be 'progressive' in nature; and that we were repeatedly contacted by the crew desk from XI54 to XF00; that they were placing us in a situation where we did not have 8 hours of rest as defined in our fom. I believe the crew desk has an inadequate understanding of the whitlow decision and its implications.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 FIRST OFFICER REPORTS ROLLING DELAY THAT CAUSES CREW TO DECLINE THE FINAL FLIGHT OF THE DAY DUE TO EXCEEDANCE OF FAA MAXIMUM 16 HOUR DUTY DAY. THE CREW SCHEDULERS DO NOT SEE IT THAT WAY.

Narrative: AS WE BEGAN TO EXIT OPS TO BE TRANSPORTED TO THE REMOTE HANGAR LOCATION WHERE THE ACFT WAS LOCATED TO BEGIN OUR PREFLT; WE WERE CONTACTED BY STATION PERSONNEL AND INFORMED THAT CREW PLANNING HAD CALLED WITH A CHANGE TO OUR PLANNED FERRY FLT TO ZZZ. WE WERE INFORMED THAT WE WERE TO FERRY THE AIRPLANE TO ZZZ1 AND THEN FLY A REVENUE FLT TO ZZZ AND HAVE A LAYOVER IN ZZZ OF 10 HRS 28 MINS AND THEN FLY ON THE NEXT DAY FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ2 AND THEN BACK TO ZZZ. THE CAPT AND I IMMEDIATELY BECAME CONCERNED ABOUT HOW LONG OUR DAY WOULD BE BASED ON THIS PLAN AND CONTACTED THE CREW DESK TO ALERT THEM TO OUR CONCERNS. WHEN I SPOKE TO THE CREW DESK THEY INDICATED THAT THERE WERE NO DUTY PROBS WITH OUR DAY AS IT WAS NOW PLANNED. I INDICATED TO THE CREW SCHEDULER THAT WE HAD BEEN TOLD A FEW NIGHTS PRIOR AT XA00 DURING OUR LAST CONVERSATION WITH THE CREW DESK; THAT WE WERE SCHEDULED FOR AN XL00 DEP TO ZZZ. THE SCHEDULER INDICATED THAT DUE TO THE FACT THAT WE HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY THEM MULTIPLE TIMES THAT MORNING ABOUT THE ONGOING DELAYS FOR THE FERRY FLT THAT WE HAD NOT RPTED FOR DUTY UNTIL XS00 AND THAT AN ESTIMATED TIME OF ARR IN ZZZ PAST XA45 DID NOT POSE A DUTY TIME PROB. I STATED TO THE SCHEDULER THAT I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT NOT HAVING RECEIVED ADEQUATE REST TO COMPLETE THE ENTIRE DAY AS NOW PLANNED. THE CAPT AND I CALCULATED THAT BASED ON THE PROSPECTIVE PLANNING FOR ADEQUATE REST THAT WE WERE TO RPT FOR DUTY AT XK00 AND THE FACT THAT WE WERE CONTACTED NUMEROUS TIMES FROM XI54 ONWARD THAT WE WOULD EXCEED THE MAX AMOUNT OF FAA DUTY TIME IF WE COULD NOT ARRIVE IN ZZZ BY XA45. ACCORDING TO OUR CALCULATIONS ACCOUNTING FOR A REQUIRED DEBRIEF; WE WOULD HAVE TO BE AIRBORNE IN ZZZ1 BY XX25 IN ORDER TO NOT EXCEED THE FAA MAX OF 16 HRS. WE THEN DETERMINED THAT WE WERE LEGAL FROM A SUPERSEDING EXAMPLE STANDPOINT TO FLY TO ZZZ1 BUT AGREED IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR US TO BE AIRBORNE IN ZZZ1 BY XX25. UPON COMPLETION OF THE SHUTDOWN CHKLIST AT XX00 THE CAPT AND I DETERMINED THAT IT WAS NOT FEASIBLE TO ACCOMPLISH ALL OF OUR TASKS; SIGN OFF THE FLT PLAN (BECAUSE WE COULD NOT FLT PLAN ENRTE DUE TO INOP ACARS); RETRIEVE PERFORMANCE DATA; PREFLT THE ACFT; BE FUELED; ADDRESS THE SVC NEEDS OF THE ACFT; BOARD AN ENTIRELY FULL ACFT AND BECOME AIRBORNE IN LESS THAN 25 MINS. WE DETERMINED THAT WE MUST BE AIRBORNE BY XX25 IN ORDER TO KEEP OUR FAR DUTY DAY BELOW 16 HRS WITH A PLANNED BLOCK FROM ZZZ1 TO ZZZ OF 1 HR 20 MINS. THE REASON FOR THE SAFETY RPT IS THAT IT APPEARS THAT THE CREW DESK DID NOT UNDERSTAND HOW WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO LOOK BACK AND FIND 8 HRS OF REST BASED ON THE REASSIGNMENT THAT THEY ATTEMPTED TO HAVE US COMPLETE. DUE TO THE FACT THAT A SUPERSEDING DECISION STATES THAT REST SHOULD BE 'PROGRESSIVE' IN NATURE; AND THAT WE WERE REPEATEDLY CONTACTED BY THE CREW DESK FROM XI54 TO XF00; THAT THEY WERE PLACING US IN A SITUATION WHERE WE DID NOT HAVE 8 HRS OF REST AS DEFINED IN OUR FOM. I BELIEVE THE CREW DESK HAS AN INADEQUATE UNDERSTANDING OF THE WHITLOW DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.