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Attributes | |
ACN | 815325 |
Time | |
Date | 200810 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | A319 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : preflight |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 12300 flight time type : 450 |
ASRS Report | 815325 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : less severe |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other |
Factors | |
Maintenance | contributing factor : engineering procedure contributing factor : manuals performance deficiency : installation |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Aircraft Chart Or Publication |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Narrative:
During cockpit preflight; I noticed that the halon fire extinguisher discharge nozzle was not secure. I was concerned that the nozzle could possibly hit one of the nearby circuit breakers and pop one without my knowledge. So; I wrote up the discrepancy. After much discussion with line maintenance; they determined that the installation of the cockpit halon fire extinguisher was installed per the manufacturer's design. They signed off the discrepancy as follows; ok per amm and ipc; there are no provisions to secure the hose; this is the manufacturer's design. I have concern that if this is truly the case; that this loose hose could slap the circuit breaker panel behind the first officer's seat. Especially in moderate/severe turbulence. I think further investigation of the above sign off is warranted.callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated the bracket that holds the halon fire bottle in place is mounted behind the first officer's seat; approximately 18 inches up from the floor at the aft bulkhead circuit breaker (C/B) panels. The discharge hose attached to the halon bottle was loose; not secured. Reporter is concerned the loose hose could hit (strike) one of the nearby circuit breakers and pop one during turbulence without his knowledge. Reporter stated he noticed on some of his carrier's other airbus A319's; the bottle mount bracket had a larger band type clamp that allowed the discharge hose to be secured inside of the clamp; which prevented movement of the hose; while others had a spring type hook that was part of the band clamp that held the hose to the clamp. Reporter stated he felt the potential safety issue was not being addressed when he saw the maintenance signoff for the hose write-up as ok per the amm and ipc. He decided to continue raising the safety issue and the fact that there were different bracket configurations for the same type of aircraft. Reporter stated he was told the fire bottle support bracket with the larger clamp securing the discharge hose inside of the latching clamp was an optional type assembly; not a required one. Reporter stated his carrier's maintenance engineering has apparently come up with a common bracket/clamp assembly; that would secure the discharge hose in place. Circuit breaker implementation was being held up by concerns as to whether or not the new improved bracket design had to be done on all their A319's.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: DURING COCKPIT PREFLIGHT; PILOT NOTICES THE PORTABLE HALON FIRE EXTINGUISHER DISCHARGE NOZZLE HOSE WAS NOT SECURED ON AN AIRBUS A319. FIRE BOTTLE IS MOUNTED TO THE AFT BULKHEAD CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL AND LOOSE HOSE COULD POP ONE OF THE BREAKERS DURING TURBULENCE.
Narrative: DURING COCKPIT PREFLIGHT; I NOTICED THAT THE HALON FIRE EXTINGUISHER DISCHARGE NOZZLE WAS NOT SECURE. I WAS CONCERNED THAT THE NOZZLE COULD POSSIBLY HIT ONE OF THE NEARBY CIRCUIT BREAKERS AND POP ONE WITHOUT MY KNOWLEDGE. SO; I WROTE UP THE DISCREPANCY. AFTER MUCH DISCUSSION WITH LINE MAINTENANCE; THEY DETERMINED THAT THE INSTALLATION OF THE COCKPIT HALON FIRE EXTINGUISHER WAS INSTALLED PER THE MANUFACTURER'S DESIGN. THEY SIGNED OFF THE DISCREPANCY AS FOLLOWS; OK PER AMM AND IPC; THERE ARE NO PROVISIONS TO SECURE THE HOSE; THIS IS THE MANUFACTURER'S DESIGN. I HAVE CONCERN THAT IF THIS IS TRULY THE CASE; THAT THIS LOOSE HOSE COULD SLAP THE CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL BEHIND THE FO'S SEAT. ESPECIALLY IN MODERATE/SEVERE TURBULENCE. I THINK FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF THE ABOVE SIGN OFF IS WARRANTED.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED THE BRACKET THAT HOLDS THE HALON FIRE BOTTLE IN PLACE IS MOUNTED BEHIND THE FIRST OFFICER'S SEAT; APPROXIMATELY 18 INCHES UP FROM THE FLOOR AT THE AFT BULKHEAD CIRCUIT BREAKER (C/B) PANELS. THE DISCHARGE HOSE ATTACHED TO THE HALON BOTTLE WAS LOOSE; NOT SECURED. RPTR IS CONCERNED THE LOOSE HOSE COULD HIT (STRIKE) ONE OF THE NEARBY CIRCUIT BREAKERS AND POP ONE DURING TURBULENCE WITHOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE. REPORTER STATED HE NOTICED ON SOME OF HIS CARRIER'S OTHER AIRBUS A319'S; THE BOTTLE MOUNT BRACKET HAD A LARGER BAND TYPE CLAMP THAT ALLOWED THE DISCHARGE HOSE TO BE SECURED INSIDE OF THE CLAMP; WHICH PREVENTED MOVEMENT OF THE HOSE; WHILE OTHERS HAD A SPRING TYPE HOOK THAT WAS PART OF THE BAND CLAMP THAT HELD THE HOSE TO THE CLAMP. REPORTER STATED HE FELT THE POTENTIAL SAFETY ISSUE WAS NOT BEING ADDRESSED WHEN HE SAW THE MAINTENANCE SIGNOFF FOR THE HOSE WRITE-UP AS OK PER THE AMM AND IPC. HE DECIDED TO CONTINUE RAISING THE SAFETY ISSUE AND THE FACT THAT THERE WERE DIFFERENT BRACKET CONFIGURATIONS FOR THE SAME TYPE OF AIRCRAFT. REPORTER STATED HE WAS TOLD THE FIRE BOTTLE SUPPORT BRACKET WITH THE LARGER CLAMP SECURING THE DISCHARGE HOSE INSIDE OF THE LATCHING CLAMP WAS AN OPTIONAL TYPE ASSEMBLY; NOT A REQUIRED ONE. REPORTER STATED HIS CARRIER'S MAINTENANCE ENGINEERING HAS APPARENTLY COME UP WITH A COMMON BRACKET/CLAMP ASSEMBLY; THAT WOULD SECURE THE DISCHARGE HOSE IN PLACE. CIRCUIT BREAKER IMPLEMENTATION WAS BEING HELD UP BY CONCERNS AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE NEW IMPROVED BRACKET DESIGN HAD TO BE DONE ON ALL THEIR A319'S.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.