Narrative:

Flight was scheduled to depart london gatwick en route to miami. ATIS information had noted reports of windshear earlier in the morning. Pushback from stand and engine start and taxiout were normal, after start and taxi checklists accomplished routinely. We held short of the runway approximately 4-5 mins for landing and departing traffic. Tower repeatedly issued winds throughout this approach and landing, and then the departure, and they were consistently 210/20. WX was VFR, no precipitation, no active windshear alert or reports. We were initially clrd on to hold, and before takeoff checklist was completed while taxiing into position. Began takeoff roll on runway 26L approximately takeoff weight 730000 pounds, takeoff EPR 1.45, flaps 20, all engines operating normally at takeoff power. Rolling down the runway, the first officer announced a momentary pause of the airspeed at about 120 KTS and again at about 140 KTS. No flashing 8's (indicating windshear) were observed on the INS during the roll. Rotation at vref was normal, but as the main gear lifted off the runway we heard a loud bang from the right side of the aircraft and the second officer announced we had lost power on engine #4. The amber overtemp light on #4 was illuminated and the maximum egt indicator was pegged off the top of the scale. The second officer responded to my request for more power by selecting maximum power on engines #1, #2 and #3. A positive rate of climb was verified and the landing gear was raised. The second officer then initiated fuel dumping procedures as briefed. The stick shaker activated, and the airspeed oscillated quite wildly slightly above and below the vref airspeed bug. The aircraft felt as though it was being buffeted by gusty winds and flashing 8's (indicating windshear) were observed intermittently on the INS. I worked to establish a pitch attitude to maintain clearance with the visible and rising terrain off the end of the runway, while at the same time attempting to maintain as level a flight profile as possible to stabilize and increase airspeed. No GPWS warning was activated. Runway heading was maintained as closely as possible. Airspeed gradually increased, the sticker shaker stopped and at V2 a shallow climb was initiated to approximately 800' AGL. The climb rate was then neutralized to allow a further increase in airspeed, and the flaps were retracted on schedule. Climb was then continued to our initial assigned altitude of 3000' MSL and the first officer called in our emergency to gatwick tower, informing them we were dumping fuel and climbing to 3000' MSL. We were switched to a radar frequency and requested a radar box pattern to continue fuel dumping and a further climb to 4000' MSL to remain clear of a thin cloud layer in the area. The engine failure checklist was accomplished. The engine was shutdown according to the checklist procedures. F/a's were notified of the problem and our intentions, and then an announcement was made to the passenger by the second officer. Total fuel dump time was approximately 36 mins to dump about 160000# of fuel. Our maximum landing weight limit was 585000 pounds. We were subsequently informed by the F/a's that crewmembers and passenger at the rear of the aircraft had witnessed flames shoot out of both engines #1 and #4 at the time of the loud bang. While continuing to dump fuel we completed the one gen inoperative and the one engine inoperative approach and landing checklist. We discussed the impending approach and the possibility of encountering more gusty conditions and windshear, and knowing we might also have a problem with engine #1, I elected to attempt to restart engine #4. There was no known malfunction or indication of mechanical engine damage, and engine was restarted normally by checklist procedures. Its subsequent operation was normal and within all operation limits. When fuel dumping was completed, requested radar vectors at 4000' MSL to ILS final approach runway 26L at gatwick. Approach and landing checklists were completed routinely and aircraft was configured for a flaps 25 approach and landing due windy conditions. An uneventful T/D was made on 26L. Reverse was used only on engines #2 and #3, engine #4 was shutdown after clearing runway. Gatwick fire personnel visually inspected engines and undercarriage and approved further taxi to stand. No crew members are aware of any passenger problems/complaints related to above events. I personally feel that engine #4 experienced compressor stall and subsequent failure due wind conditions or windshear encountered at liftoff, and that engine #1 probably was affected by similar but less severe wind conditions. Our ability to recover the aircraft from this situation is a tribute to our trainers and the crew concept. Each crew member performed professionally, with quick, accurate actions and decisions. The cohesiveness and rapport on the flight deck was instrumental to the smooth flow of both information and procedures. I am thankful that I was flying with 2 highly trained, skilled and experienced professionals who responded instantly and accurately to the situation we faced. Supplemental information from acn 81539: they had reported shear 30-45 mins earlier while our cabin team was boarding our 425 passenger. I do not recall an associated altitude or shear factor. The stick shaker sounded and I called for power. The stick shaker continued and airspeed waivered within +/- 3K of vr. Supplemental information from acn 81667: it should also be noted that as I was setting power the first officer asked the captain if he would like the gear raised and he answered yes (so did I). We later learned was virtually treetop level (we caused 'substantial tree damage along the departure path'). Flying the airplane for almost 30 seconds at stick shaker between V1 and vr. Dumping jet fuel on not a few angry residents. It was a relief to hear another voice, but all the same it should be emphasized their policy of maintaining radio silence during an emergency was very important to our intracockpit equilibrium (ie, we didn't want to hear from them till we were good and ready). In order to dump the second officer-F/east on a widebody transport must swivel his seat and slide back to reach the dump panel. To get back up to reach the power levers the electric motor is required to overcome the steep deck angle associated with even a normal departure. The electric motor is an acceptable deferred maintenance item.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR WDB COMPRESSOR STALL AT VR. FUEL DUMP RETURN LAND.

Narrative: FLT WAS SCHEDULED TO DEPART LONDON GATWICK ENRTE TO MIAMI. ATIS INFO HAD NOTED RPTS OF WINDSHEAR EARLIER IN THE MORNING. PUSHBACK FROM STAND AND ENG START AND TAXIOUT WERE NORMAL, AFTER START AND TAXI CHKLISTS ACCOMPLISHED ROUTINELY. WE HELD SHORT OF THE RWY APPROX 4-5 MINS FOR LNDG AND DEPARTING TFC. TWR REPEATEDLY ISSUED WINDS THROUGHOUT THIS APCH AND LNDG, AND THEN THE DEP, AND THEY WERE CONSISTENTLY 210/20. WX WAS VFR, NO PRECIPITATION, NO ACTIVE WINDSHEAR ALERT OR RPTS. WE WERE INITIALLY CLRD ON TO HOLD, AND BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED WHILE TAXIING INTO POS. BEGAN TKOF ROLL ON RWY 26L APPROX TKOF WT 730000 LBS, TKOF EPR 1.45, FLAPS 20, ALL ENGS OPERATING NORMALLY AT TKOF PWR. ROLLING DOWN THE RWY, THE F/O ANNOUNCED A MOMENTARY PAUSE OF THE AIRSPD AT ABOUT 120 KTS AND AGAIN AT ABOUT 140 KTS. NO FLASHING 8'S (INDICATING WINDSHEAR) WERE OBSERVED ON THE INS DURING THE ROLL. ROTATION AT VREF WAS NORMAL, BUT AS THE MAIN GEAR LIFTED OFF THE RWY WE HEARD A LOUD BANG FROM THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE ACFT AND THE S/O ANNOUNCED WE HAD LOST PWR ON ENG #4. THE AMBER OVERTEMP LIGHT ON #4 WAS ILLUMINATED AND THE MAX EGT INDICATOR WAS PEGGED OFF THE TOP OF THE SCALE. THE S/O RESPONDED TO MY REQUEST FOR MORE PWR BY SELECTING MAX PWR ON ENGS #1, #2 AND #3. A POSITIVE RATE OF CLB WAS VERIFIED AND THE LNDG GEAR WAS RAISED. THE S/O THEN INITIATED FUEL DUMPING PROCS AS BRIEFED. THE STICK SHAKER ACTIVATED, AND THE AIRSPD OSCILLATED QUITE WILDLY SLIGHTLY ABOVE AND BELOW THE VREF AIRSPD BUG. THE ACFT FELT AS THOUGH IT WAS BEING BUFFETED BY GUSTY WINDS AND FLASHING 8'S (INDICATING WINDSHEAR) WERE OBSERVED INTERMITTENTLY ON THE INS. I WORKED TO ESTABLISH A PITCH ATTITUDE TO MAINTAIN CLRNC WITH THE VISIBLE AND RISING TERRAIN OFF THE END OF THE RWY, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME ATTEMPTING TO MAINTAIN AS LEVEL A FLT PROFILE AS POSSIBLE TO STABILIZE AND INCREASE AIRSPD. NO GPWS WARNING WAS ACTIVATED. RWY HDG WAS MAINTAINED AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE. AIRSPD GRADUALLY INCREASED, THE STICKER SHAKER STOPPED AND AT V2 A SHALLOW CLB WAS INITIATED TO APPROX 800' AGL. THE CLB RATE WAS THEN NEUTRALIZED TO ALLOW A FURTHER INCREASE IN AIRSPD, AND THE FLAPS WERE RETRACTED ON SCHEDULE. CLB WAS THEN CONTINUED TO OUR INITIAL ASSIGNED ALT OF 3000' MSL AND THE F/O CALLED IN OUR EMER TO GATWICK TWR, INFORMING THEM WE WERE DUMPING FUEL AND CLBING TO 3000' MSL. WE WERE SWITCHED TO A RADAR FREQ AND REQUESTED A RADAR BOX PATTERN TO CONTINUE FUEL DUMPING AND A FURTHER CLB TO 4000' MSL TO REMAIN CLR OF A THIN CLOUD LAYER IN THE AREA. THE ENG FAILURE CHKLIST WAS ACCOMPLISHED. THE ENG WAS SHUTDOWN ACCORDING TO THE CHECKLIST PROCS. F/A'S WERE NOTIFIED OF THE PROB AND OUR INTENTIONS, AND THEN AN ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE TO THE PAX BY THE S/O. TOTAL FUEL DUMP TIME WAS APPROX 36 MINS TO DUMP ABOUT 160000# OF FUEL. OUR MAX LNDG WT LIMIT WAS 585000 LBS. WE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY INFORMED BY THE F/A'S THAT CREWMEMBERS AND PAX AT THE REAR OF THE ACFT HAD WITNESSED FLAMES SHOOT OUT OF BOTH ENGS #1 AND #4 AT THE TIME OF THE LOUD BANG. WHILE CONTINUING TO DUMP FUEL WE COMPLETED THE ONE GEN INOP AND THE ONE ENG INOP APCH AND LNDG CHKLIST. WE DISCUSSED THE IMPENDING APCH AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ENCOUNTERING MORE GUSTY CONDITIONS AND WINDSHEAR, AND KNOWING WE MIGHT ALSO HAVE A PROB WITH ENG #1, I ELECTED TO ATTEMPT TO RESTART ENG #4. THERE WAS NO KNOWN MALFUNCTION OR INDICATION OF MECHANICAL ENG DAMAGE, AND ENG WAS RESTARTED NORMALLY BY CHKLIST PROCS. ITS SUBSEQUENT OP WAS NORMAL AND WITHIN ALL OP LIMITS. WHEN FUEL DUMPING WAS COMPLETED, REQUESTED RADAR VECTORS AT 4000' MSL TO ILS FINAL APCH RWY 26L AT GATWICK. APCH AND LNDG CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED ROUTINELY AND ACFT WAS CONFIGURED FOR A FLAPS 25 APCH AND LNDG DUE WINDY CONDITIONS. AN UNEVENTFUL T/D WAS MADE ON 26L. REVERSE WAS USED ONLY ON ENGS #2 AND #3, ENG #4 WAS SHUTDOWN AFTER CLRING RWY. GATWICK FIRE PERSONNEL VISUALLY INSPECTED ENGS AND UNDERCARRIAGE AND APPROVED FURTHER TAXI TO STAND. NO CREW MEMBERS ARE AWARE OF ANY PAX PROBS/COMPLAINTS RELATED TO ABOVE EVENTS. I PERSONALLY FEEL THAT ENG #4 EXPERIENCED COMPRESSOR STALL AND SUBSEQUENT FAILURE DUE WIND CONDITIONS OR WINDSHEAR ENCOUNTERED AT LIFTOFF, AND THAT ENG #1 PROBABLY WAS AFFECTED BY SIMILAR BUT LESS SEVERE WIND CONDITIONS. OUR ABILITY TO RECOVER THE ACFT FROM THIS SITUATION IS A TRIBUTE TO OUR TRAINERS AND THE CREW CONCEPT. EACH CREW MEMBER PERFORMED PROFESSIONALLY, WITH QUICK, ACCURATE ACTIONS AND DECISIONS. THE COHESIVENESS AND RAPPORT ON THE FLT DECK WAS INSTRUMENTAL TO THE SMOOTH FLOW OF BOTH INFO AND PROCS. I AM THANKFUL THAT I WAS FLYING WITH 2 HIGHLY TRAINED, SKILLED AND EXPERIENCED PROFESSIONALS WHO RESPONDED INSTANTLY AND ACCURATELY TO THE SITUATION WE FACED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 81539: THEY HAD RPTED SHEAR 30-45 MINS EARLIER WHILE OUR CABIN TEAM WAS BOARDING OUR 425 PAX. I DO NOT RECALL AN ASSOCIATED ALT OR SHEAR FACTOR. THE STICK SHAKER SOUNDED AND I CALLED FOR PWR. THE STICK SHAKER CONTINUED AND AIRSPD WAIVERED WITHIN +/- 3K OF VR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 81667: IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT AS I WAS SETTING PWR THE F/O ASKED THE CAPT IF HE WOULD LIKE THE GEAR RAISED AND HE ANSWERED YES (SO DID I). WE LATER LEARNED WAS VIRTUALLY TREETOP LEVEL (WE CAUSED 'SUBSTANTIAL TREE DAMAGE ALONG THE DEP PATH'). FLYING THE AIRPLANE FOR ALMOST 30 SECS AT STICK SHAKER BTWN V1 AND VR. DUMPING JET FUEL ON NOT A FEW ANGRY RESIDENTS. IT WAS A RELIEF TO HEAR ANOTHER VOICE, BUT ALL THE SAME IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THEIR POLICY OF MAINTAINING RADIO SILENCE DURING AN EMER WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO OUR INTRACOCKPIT EQUILIBRIUM (IE, WE DIDN'T WANT TO HEAR FROM THEM TILL WE WERE GOOD AND READY). IN ORDER TO DUMP THE S/O-F/E ON A WDB MUST SWIVEL HIS SEAT AND SLIDE BACK TO REACH THE DUMP PANEL. TO GET BACK UP TO REACH THE PWR LEVERS THE ELECTRIC MOTOR IS REQUIRED TO OVERCOME THE STEEP DECK ANGLE ASSOCIATED WITH EVEN A NORMAL DEP. THE ELECTRIC MOTOR IS AN ACCEPTABLE DEFERRED MAINT ITEM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.