Narrative:

Aircraft not deiced upon arrival at airport. Approximately 4-5 inches of ice and snow on the aircraft. Initial deice began well inside an hour before departure. This is most likely because the previous flight used most of the deicing fluid in the truck. Reported bli weather: bli XA53Z 00000 KTS 10 SM visibility; few 018; overcast 060; M04/M07 rmk AO2 SLP186 T10441067. No precipitation. Halfway through the initial deice of the right wing; the truck ran out of fluid and had to return to tagging area to refill. Passengers boarded. Added 500 pounds of fuel due to APU usage and delay. Delay became far longer than expected so I added an additional 1500 pounds of fuel to the aircraft. Deice truck returned. Coordinated with deice crew to signal me after initial deicing was completed and 'final' deicing was to begin. Deice crew complied but I was late configuring the aircraft for takeoff so deice crew was instructed to spray the l wing again due to it not being in the takeoff configuration when they started the 'final' procedure. Reported bli weather: bli XC25Z 340 degrees 03 KTS 2 SM visibility -sn br OVC020 M03/M06 A3005 rmk AO2 SNB15 P0000. Precipitation began before deicing procedure was complete. After 'final' deicing was complete; I opened the clearview window to take a look down the left side of the aircraft. I noticed snow on top of the engine nacelle and instructed the deice crew to remove it before taxi out. Before movement began; I received the following information from the deice crew: aircraft was free of frozen contamination; fluid type; fluid concentration; start time of final procedure; end time of final procedure; gallons of fluid delivered. Type I hot expired before or very shortly after taxi out (11-18 minutes in -sn). Taxied to runway 34. Nearing the end of taxiway a; I applied brakes to slow the aircraft from; what I considered to be a prudent speed (based upon braking and traction conditions leaving the ramp area); and experienced nil braking action on the taxiway. The aircraft continued straight ahead before coming to a stop approximately 2 ft into a ragged snow berm left over from plowing. The snow berm was on the paved portion of the taxiway. The aircraft never departed a hard paved surface due to the location of the berm. Called ground to inform them of our situation called maintenance to come out to the aircraft to see what could be done to free the aircraft. Started the APU and shut down both engines. Maintenance arrived at the aircraft. Using a snow shovel; they cleared an area he considered sufficient for the aircraft to turn out onto the plowed part of the taxiway. Started engines positioned nosewheel per visual instructions; and powered up to move the aircraft. Insufficient nosewheel traction caused the aircraft to move forward but not turn in the direction of the angled nosewheels. Stopped aircraft; conferred with both first officer and maintenance supervisor (standing on taxiway). I did not want to attempt another power-out only to exit the paved taxiway. Decision was made with collaboration and concurrence of all parties to have a tug come out to the aircraft and pull the nose 90 degrees to the right. There was some concern the tug would not have enough traction to perform the job. Maintenance supervisor indicated he was standing on solid ice 90 degrees to the right of the aircraft's nose. Called bli ground; informed them of the need for a tug to come to the aircraft. Shut down both engines. Tug arrived; hooked up; and was able to pull the nose of the aircraft round to face 90 degrees to the runway. Clearly there was an inconsistent surface condition in this area of the taxiway. Started both engines; taxied down the runway to the end; taxied back to the ramp via taxiways a and H. Write-up was made in aircraft logbook. Maintenance supervisor inspected nosewheel assembly and found no damage or defect. Fueler was called to add fuel prior to deicing. I exited the aircraft to perform a cursory preflight walkaround. Upon reaching the tail of the aircraft; I noticed approximately 4-6 inches of snow covered ice on both engine pylons. I was shocked considering I was given the 'aircraft free of contamination' verbiage by the deice crew prior to initial taxi out and this after I specifically requested deicing of the engine nacelles. Queried the deice crew why the engine pylons were not deiced. Driver said the deice crews were trained not to spray deice fluid on the engine area -- neither in the inlet; on the nacelle;; nor on the pylons. The second deice crew member concurred with this. Told deice crew the residual ice on the aircraft must be removed no matter what their training indicated and to make sure all contamination on the aircraft was removed. Aircraft was deiced. Aircraft departed for las via runway 16. Braking action on taxiway a at the approach end of runway 16 was good and quite a bit of urea was noted on the frozen contamination in the area unlike at the opposite end of the taxiway. Bli weather at time of departure (XA44Z): XE19Z 130 degrees 05 KTS 9 SM visibility FEW013 BKN018 OVC030 01/M01 A3002 rmk AO2 SNE13 P0000. No precipitation. Factors for consideration and commentary: 1) significant time pressure. Due to the need to clear a large amount of frozen contamination on 2 aircraft with departure times in close proximity to one another the initial deicing operation of my aircraft (second departure of the morning) caused a significant delay (1 hour 15 minutes). Add to this falling frozen precipitation and the availability of only type I deicing fluid. The hot of type I fluid in light snow conditions is only 11-18 minutes per the table in the dapm; page 26-3-3-4. By the time the deicing procedure is complete (1 truck rather than a simultaneous 2 truck operation) the hot has already expired or will in a very short amount of time. This requires a mandatory pre-takeoff contamination check which; in itself; takes a bit more time than the pre-takeoff check performed while within the hot. The above event happened during daylight hours. At night (which comes early this far north in the wintertime) an adequate pre-takeoff contamination check might not be possible through cabin windows opaqued with dirt and deicing fluid. Prudence dictates an external pre-takeoff contamination check be performed in these conditions. Since the forward air stairs have been removed from our fleet; one of the flight crew would not be able to exit the aircraft to perform this exterior check. This necessitates dap-trained personnel perform this check. Currently; our ground personnel do not have the security clearance for unescorted access to the taxiway areas here at bli. Unless pre-arranged prior to taxi; the time required to muster the required port of bellingham escort and drive a vehicle to the aircraft parked at the approach end of the runway makes this operation an exercise in futility -- the hot would have long expired -- and; under active precipitation conditions; imprudent to attempt a takeoff. This; of course; would require returning to the gate for yet another deicing procedure incurring yet more expense. It should be noted that use of type iv fluid in an appropriate concentration would; in most cases; obviate the need to return for an additional round of deicing. What is the comparative expense? 2) my mind was more focused on the condition of my wings and whether the type I fluid had failed. This caused my attention to shift from the task at hand (taxiing on a contaminated surface) to the next phase -- flight. If we were deiced with type iv fluid I would be far less concerned about not wasting a spare second getting out to the runway for departure and could rest a bit easier knowing I'd most likely be within the type I hot. 3) I was reluctant to use idle reverse thrust to slow the aircraft as I approached the end of the taxiway due to its possible disruption of an already fragile layer of expired type I deicing fluid. The 'we can do more with less' attitude here; while seemingly safe in moderate weather climates; is not conservative nor is it appropriate for more severe winter climates in areas such as the northwest and northeast united states. I must admit I am affected by this and feel it is my responsibility to save the company money. This adds pressure to cut corners and compromises safety despite the entreaty from flight operations to always err on the side of safety. 4) a couple of rhetorical questions: how many times must I deice -- how much expense must I incur -- before I make the determination it is not safe to depart delaying the flight indefinitely? Why must I battle our dispatch who will push despite my on-the-scene judgement as pilot in command.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD83 captain recounts poorly coordinated ramp deicing procedure and taxi encounter with a snow bank due to nil braking.

Narrative: Aircraft not deiced upon arrival at airport. Approximately 4-5 inches of ice and snow on the aircraft. Initial deice began well inside an hour before departure. This is most likely because the previous flight used most of the deicing fluid in the truck. Reported BLI weather: BLI XA53Z 00000 KTS 10 SM VISIBILITY; FEW 018; OVERCAST 060; M04/M07 RMK AO2 SLP186 T10441067. No precipitation. Halfway through the initial deice of the right wing; the truck ran out of fluid and had to return to tagging area to refill. Passengers boarded. Added 500 LBS of fuel due to APU usage and delay. Delay became far longer than expected so I added an additional 1500 LBS of fuel to the aircraft. Deice truck returned. Coordinated with deice crew to signal me after initial deicing was completed and 'final' deicing was to begin. Deice crew complied but I was late configuring the aircraft for takeoff so deice crew was instructed to spray the l wing again due to it not being in the takeoff configuration when they started the 'final' procedure. Reported BLI weather: BLI XC25Z 340 degrees 03 KTS 2 SM visibility -SN BR OVC020 M03/M06 A3005 RMK AO2 SNB15 P0000. Precipitation began before deicing procedure was complete. After 'final' deicing was complete; I opened the clearview window to take a look down the left side of the aircraft. I noticed snow on top of the engine nacelle and instructed the deice crew to remove it before taxi out. Before movement began; I received the following information from the deice crew: aircraft was free of frozen contamination; fluid type; fluid concentration; start time of final procedure; end time of final procedure; gallons of fluid delivered. Type I Hot expired before or very shortly after taxi out (11-18 minutes in -SN). Taxied to Runway 34. Nearing the end of Taxiway A; I applied brakes to slow the aircraft from; what I considered to be a prudent speed (based upon braking and traction conditions leaving the ramp area); and experienced nil braking action on the taxiway. The aircraft continued straight ahead before coming to a stop approximately 2 FT into a ragged snow berm left over from plowing. The snow berm was on the paved portion of the taxiway. The aircraft never departed a hard paved surface due to the location of the berm. Called Ground to inform them of our situation Called Maintenance to come out to the aircraft to see what could be done to free the aircraft. Started the APU and shut down both engines. Maintenance arrived at the aircraft. Using a snow shovel; they cleared an area he considered sufficient for the aircraft to turn out onto the plowed part of the taxiway. Started engines positioned nosewheel per visual instructions; and powered up to move the aircraft. Insufficient nosewheel traction caused the aircraft to move forward but not turn in the direction of the angled nosewheels. Stopped aircraft; conferred with both First Officer and Maintenance Supervisor (standing on taxiway). I did not want to attempt another power-out only to exit the paved taxiway. Decision was made with collaboration and concurrence of all parties to have a tug come out to the aircraft and pull the nose 90 degrees to the right. There was some concern the tug would not have enough traction to perform the job. Maintenance Supervisor indicated he was standing on solid ice 90 degrees to the right of the aircraft's nose. Called BLI Ground; informed them of the need for a tug to come to the aircraft. Shut down both engines. Tug arrived; hooked up; and was able to pull the nose of the aircraft round to face 90 degrees to the runway. Clearly there was an inconsistent surface condition in this area of the taxiway. Started both engines; taxied down the runway to the end; taxied back to the ramp via Taxiways A and H. Write-up was made in aircraft logbook. Maintenance Supervisor inspected nosewheel assembly and found no damage or defect. Fueler was called to add fuel prior to deicing. I exited the aircraft to perform a cursory preflight walkaround. Upon reaching the tail of the aircraft; I noticed approximately 4-6 inches of snow covered ice on both engine pylons. I was shocked considering I was given the 'aircraft free of contamination' verbiage by the deice crew prior to initial taxi out and this after I specifically requested deicing of the engine nacelles. Queried the deice crew why the engine pylons were not deiced. Driver said the deice crews were trained NOT to spray deice fluid on the engine area -- neither in the inlet; on the nacelle;; nor on the pylons. The second deice crew member concurred with this. Told deice crew the residual ice on the aircraft must be removed no matter what their training indicated and to make sure all contamination on the aircraft was removed. Aircraft was deiced. Aircraft departed for LAS via Runway 16. Braking action on Taxiway A at the approach end of Runway 16 was good and quite a bit of urea was noted on the frozen contamination in the area unlike at the opposite end of the taxiway. BLI weather at time of departure (XA44Z): XE19Z 130 degrees 05 KTS 9 SM visibility FEW013 BKN018 OVC030 01/M01 A3002 RMK AO2 SNE13 P0000. No precipitation. Factors for consideration and commentary: 1) Significant time pressure. Due to the need to clear a large amount of frozen contamination on 2 aircraft with departure times in close proximity to one another the initial deicing operation of my aircraft (second departure of the morning) caused a significant delay (1 hour 15 minutes). Add to this falling frozen precipitation and the availability of only Type I deicing fluid. The HOT of Type I fluid in light snow conditions is only 11-18 minutes per the table in the DAPM; Page 26-3-3-4. By the time the deicing procedure is complete (1 truck rather than a simultaneous 2 truck operation) the HOT has already expired or will in a very short amount of time. This requires a mandatory pre-takeoff contamination check which; in itself; takes a bit more time than the pre-takeoff check performed while within the HOT. The above event happened during daylight hours. At night (which comes early this far north in the wintertime) an adequate pre-takeoff contamination check might not be possible through cabin windows opaqued with dirt and deicing fluid. Prudence dictates an external pre-takeoff contamination check be performed in these conditions. Since the forward air stairs have been removed from our fleet; one of the flight crew would not be able to exit the aircraft to perform this exterior check. This necessitates DAP-trained personnel perform this check. Currently; our ground personnel do not have the security clearance for unescorted access to the taxiway areas here at BLI. Unless pre-arranged prior to taxi; the time required to muster the required Port of Bellingham escort and drive a vehicle to the aircraft parked at the approach end of the runway makes this operation an exercise in futility -- the HOT would have long expired -- and; under active precipitation conditions; imprudent to attempt a takeoff. This; of course; would require returning to the gate for yet another deicing procedure incurring yet more expense. It should be noted that use of Type IV fluid in an appropriate concentration would; in most cases; obviate the need to return for an additional round of deicing. What is the comparative expense? 2) My mind was more focused on the condition of my wings and whether the Type I fluid had failed. This caused my attention to shift from the task at hand (taxiing on a contaminated surface) to the next phase -- flight. If we were deiced with Type IV fluid I would be far less concerned about not wasting a spare second getting out to the runway for departure and could rest a bit easier knowing I'd most likely be within the Type I HOT. 3) I was reluctant to use idle reverse thrust to slow the aircraft as I approached the end of the taxiway due to its possible disruption of an already fragile layer of expired Type I deicing fluid. The 'we can do more with less' attitude here; while seemingly safe in moderate weather climates; is not conservative nor is it appropriate for more severe winter climates in areas such as the northwest and northeast United States. I must admit I am affected by this and feel it is my responsibility to save the company money. This adds pressure to cut corners and compromises safety despite the entreaty from Flight Operations to always err on the side of safety. 4) A couple of rhetorical questions: How many times must I deice -- how much expense must I incur -- before I make the determination it is not safe to depart delaying the flight indefinitely? Why must I battle our Dispatch who will push despite my on-the-scene judgement as Pilot in Command.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.