Narrative:

During climb out of ZZZ; we experienced a bleed 1 failure as indicated on the EICAS and confirmed by the ecs synoptic page. Our altitude was between FL190 and FL220. We immediately ran the quick reference handbook checklist for the associated EICAS warning message. Due to the fact that the aircraft already had engine bleed 2 deferred; we also requested a descent to MEA. With no bleed air to supply the packs; the cabin altitude climbed continuously until we were able to regain use of engine bleed 1. The cabin altitude climbed as high as 8;400 ft before the packs started to re-pressurize the aircraft. At this point; the quick reference handbook procedure was complete; with guidance to continue the flight normally. As a precaution; we started the APU. Because of the fact that we were able to restore normal cabin pressure; we did not declare an emergency. The captain and I decided that continuing to our destination was not an option. The maintenance log had almost the exact same occurrence on record for the deferred engine 2 bleed valve; and we felt that engine bleed 1 could fail again without warning. We requested and received vectors back to ZZZ. While enroute back to the airport; I briefed the flight attendants and passengers on our situation. I also advised our dispatch via ACARS. When I finished; the captain and I briefed our arrival and approach in to the airport. Then the captain made a final brief to the passengers. We made a normal descent and approach to the airport. After landing without further incident; we taxied to our gate and waited for maintenance to arrive. By knowing the maintenance history of the aircraft; we were able to quickly assess the situation and react in a timely manner. However; the quick reference handbook procedure we followed did not take into account the fact that there might only be 1 bleed source to begin with. Had we been without bleed air for much longer; we would have been forced to abandon the bleed air issue and instead go to the 'cabin bleed valve failure' checklist for dual failures; or failure of one bleed with the other bleed deferred. This could help to provide a more defined path to follow in the event that the bleed 1 (2) fail checklist was unsuccessful. Also; the bleed 1 (2) fail quick reference handbook states 'continue with normal operations' if bleed air is restored. In a single bleed situation; is this always a valid option? Finally; I was a little concerned with how maintenance was carried out once we arrived back at our gate. Maintenance said that we had 'cleared' the malfunction by completing the quick reference handbook procedure; and signed off the write-up with no inspection of the affected system. Furthermore; our dispatcher recommended that if we encounter the same malfunction in the future; and are able to reset the bleed; that we should continue to our destination. I feel that even though this was not a repeat malfunction for the bleed 1 valve -- the way in which the bleed 2 valve had failed and been written up should have warranted a much closer look by maintenance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An ERJ170 flight crew experienced ECS BLEED 1 FAILURE on departure. They ran the procedure and returned to land at their departure airport.

Narrative: During climb out of ZZZ; we experienced a Bleed 1 Failure as indicated on the EICAS and confirmed by the ECS synoptic page. Our altitude was between FL190 and FL220. We immediately ran the Quick Reference Handbook checklist for the associated EICAS warning message. Due to the fact that the aircraft already had engine bleed 2 deferred; we also requested a descent to MEA. With no bleed air to supply the packs; the cabin altitude climbed continuously until we were able to regain use of engine bleed 1. The cabin altitude climbed as high as 8;400 FT before the packs started to re-pressurize the aircraft. At this point; the Quick Reference Handbook procedure was complete; with guidance to continue the flight normally. As a precaution; we started the APU. Because of the fact that we were able to restore normal cabin pressure; we did not declare an emergency. The Captain and I decided that continuing to our destination was not an option. The maintenance log had almost the exact same occurrence on record for the deferred engine 2 bleed valve; and we felt that engine bleed 1 could fail again without warning. We requested and received vectors back to ZZZ. While enroute back to the airport; I briefed the Flight Attendants and passengers on our situation. I also advised our Dispatch via ACARS. When I finished; the Captain and I briefed our arrival and approach in to the airport. Then the Captain made a final brief to the passengers. We made a normal descent and approach to the airport. After landing without further incident; we taxied to our gate and waited for Maintenance to arrive. By knowing the maintenance history of the aircraft; we were able to quickly assess the situation and react in a timely manner. However; the Quick Reference Handbook procedure we followed did not take into account the fact that there might only be 1 bleed source to begin with. Had we been without bleed air for much longer; we would have been forced to abandon the bleed air issue and instead go to the 'Cabin Bleed Valve Failure' checklist for DUAL failures; or failure of one bleed with the other bleed deferred. This could help to provide a more defined path to follow in the event that the Bleed 1 (2) Fail checklist was unsuccessful. Also; the Bleed 1 (2) Fail Quick Reference Handbook states 'Continue with normal OPS' if bleed air is restored. In a single bleed situation; is this always a valid option? Finally; I was a little concerned with how maintenance was carried out once we arrived back at our gate. Maintenance said that we had 'cleared' the malfunction by completing the Quick Reference Handbook procedure; and signed off the write-up with no inspection of the affected system. Furthermore; our Dispatcher recommended that if we encounter the same malfunction in the future; and are able to reset the bleed; that we should continue to our destination. I feel that even though this was not a repeat malfunction for the Bleed 1 Valve -- the way in which the Bleed 2 Valve had failed and been written up should have warranted a much closer look by Maintenance.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.