Narrative:

The takeoff was conducted in a normal engine bleeds on configuration. Shortly after the flaps were up; the number one engine completely failed. ATC was notified immediately by the first officer (pilot not flying); and 3;000 ft was assigned. A decision was made to return to our departure airport. The engine fire severe damage checklist was conducted due to zero N2 rotation. No other engine or aircraft damage was noted (no fire indication; vibration; etc.). The engine was secured as per the QRH; and a re-light was not attempted; due to a lack of N2 rotation. The first officer notified the flight attendants of the situation and that an evacuation was not planned; operations was also contacted; and a request was made for operations to contact dispatch. A successful flaps 15 landing was conducted. After rollout and clearing the runway; crash fire rescue equipment was requested to conduct a visual exterior of the number one engine; to verify that no fluid was leaking or damage existed that would prevent taxiing to the gate. Crash fire rescue equipment stated the engine appeared normal with no leaks. The aircraft was taxied to gate followed by crash fire rescue equipment. The passengers were deplaned through the normal entry door. The captain contacted dispatch; and completed the logbook entries for engine failure and a subsequent overweight landing.I feel that training for non-normal procedures with memory items should be clarified. The pilot flying should call for '___ memory items;' and the pilot not flying should perform the items with confirmation. Following the memory item completion; the respective QRH procedure should be called for by the pilot flying. This needs to be stressed on performance tests and performance checks. We need to have actual profiles for engine fire/fail events. I find that if the captain is the pilot flying; he usually performs the memory items while hand-flying the aircraft; often without confirmation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 flight crew experienced an engine failure at 1;200 FT after takeoff. The engine was shut down by the Captain and the flight returned to the departure airport.

Narrative: The takeoff was conducted in a normal engine bleeds on configuration. Shortly after the flaps were up; the number one engine completely failed. ATC was notified immediately by the First Officer (pilot not flying); and 3;000 FT was assigned. A decision was made to return to our departure airport. The Engine Fire Severe Damage Checklist was conducted due to zero N2 rotation. No other engine or aircraft damage was noted (no fire indication; vibration; etc.). The engine was secured as per the QRH; and a re-light was not attempted; due to a lack of N2 rotation. The First Officer notified the Flight Attendants of the situation and that an evacuation was not planned; Operations was also contacted; and a request was made for Operations to contact Dispatch. A successful flaps 15 landing was conducted. After rollout and clearing the runway; CFR was requested to conduct a visual exterior of the number one engine; to verify that no fluid was leaking or damage existed that would prevent taxiing to the gate. CFR stated the engine appeared normal with no leaks. The aircraft was taxied to gate followed by CFR. The passengers were deplaned through the normal entry door. The Captain contacted Dispatch; and completed the logbook entries for engine failure and a subsequent overweight landing.I feel that training for non-normal procedures with memory items should be clarified. The pilot flying should call for '___ memory items;' and the pilot not flying should perform the items with confirmation. Following the memory item completion; the respective QRH procedure should be called for by the pilot flying. This needs to be stressed on performance tests and performance checks. We need to have actual profiles for engine fire/fail events. I find that if the Captain is the pilot flying; he usually performs the memory items while hand-flying the aircraft; often without confirmation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.