Narrative:

Widebody transport X was southbound at FL390 and requested FL430 due to moderate turbulence. I advised widebody transport X to expect higher in 35-40 mi due to traffic northbound 12 O'clock, 65 mi and 11 O'clock, 75 mi at FL410. Widebody transport X said he could be level in 2 2 1/2 mins, a climb rate of 1600-2000 FPM, if I would climb him. This was more than sufficient to top traffic 65 mi ahead, so I issued a climb to FL430 to widebody transport X. At this time I was working alone at a busy sector and had a minimum to 12 aircraft on the frequency. A control situation arose between my sector and an adjoining sector and I became distracted from widebody transport X while we were discussing our options to resolve the situation. C/a activated and I asked widebody transport X his climb rate. He said 700 FPM and was just leaving FL407. I turned both aircraft. After the 2 aircraft passed, widebody transport X informed me that he had encountered an inversion layer which had degraded his climb capabilities. I think there are 3 important factors which contributed to this incident: 1) I was working a busy sector alone and became distracted. This happens all too regularly at our center due to insufficient staffing and it eliminates the redundancy factor which was built into this job to avoid exactly this sort of incident. I believe there should be standards set to ensure the elimination of one man sectors because by eliminating the redundance factor, we are decreasing our margin of safety. 2) the pilot told me he could do something it turned out he could not do . Neither the pilot nor I could foresee the problem with the inversion layer, but the pilot could see his climb rate degrade significantly from that which we had discussed. I think pilots should be required to inform ATC in a timely manner when an unpredictable factor such as this diminishes the capabilities of his aircraft to a level below that which he has advised ATC to expect. 3) our facility went to a '2-2-1' schedule this yr in which we work a combination of evening, day and midnight shifts in each week. Many of the controllers wanted this schedule, but many of us did not. Unfortunately, those of us who did not want it have had it imposed upon us anyway. This is a very specialized schedule designed for resilient people who function normally on 5 or 6 hours of sleep. I am not one of these people. Because my work hours change on a daily basis, I have become unable to form any normal sleep patterns and suffer from bouts of fatigue and insomnia. I know it affects the quality of my performance and I know I am only one of many. I think that by imposing this sort of schedule on people who are not physically capable of making the adjustments, the FAA is depleting its most valuable resource unnecessarily and compromising the safety of air traffic.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CTLR HAD LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION BETWEEN WDB CLIMBING THROUGH ALT OF OPPOSITE DIRECTION TRAFFIC.

Narrative: WDB X WAS SBND AT FL390 AND REQUESTED FL430 DUE TO MODERATE TURB. I ADVISED WDB X TO EXPECT HIGHER IN 35-40 MI DUE TO TFC NBOUND 12 O'CLOCK, 65 MI AND 11 O'CLOCK, 75 MI AT FL410. WDB X SAID HE COULD BE LEVEL IN 2 2 1/2 MINS, A CLB RATE OF 1600-2000 FPM, IF I WOULD CLB HIM. THIS WAS MORE THAN SUFFICIENT TO TOP TFC 65 MI AHEAD, SO I ISSUED A CLB TO FL430 TO WDB X. AT THIS TIME I WAS WORKING ALONE AT A BUSY SECTOR AND HAD A MINIMUM TO 12 ACFT ON THE FREQ. A CTL SITUATION AROSE BTWN MY SECTOR AND AN ADJOINING SECTOR AND I BECAME DISTRACTED FROM WDB X WHILE WE WERE DISCUSSING OUR OPTIONS TO RESOLVE THE SITUATION. C/A ACTIVATED AND I ASKED WDB X HIS CLB RATE. HE SAID 700 FPM AND WAS JUST LEAVING FL407. I TURNED BOTH ACFT. AFTER THE 2 ACFT PASSED, WDB X INFORMED ME THAT HE HAD ENCOUNTERED AN INVERSION LAYER WHICH HAD DEGRADED HIS CLB CAPABILITIES. I THINK THERE ARE 3 IMPORTANT FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT: 1) I WAS WORKING A BUSY SECTOR ALONE AND BECAME DISTRACTED. THIS HAPPENS ALL TOO REGULARLY AT OUR CENTER DUE TO INSUFFICIENT STAFFING AND IT ELIMINATES THE REDUNDANCY FACTOR WHICH WAS BUILT INTO THIS JOB TO AVOID EXACTLY THIS SORT OF INCIDENT. I BELIEVE THERE SHOULD BE STANDARDS SET TO ENSURE THE ELIMINATION OF ONE MAN SECTORS BECAUSE BY ELIMINATING THE REDUNDANCE FACTOR, WE ARE DECREASING OUR MARGIN OF SAFETY. 2) THE PLT TOLD ME HE COULD DO SOMETHING IT TURNED OUT HE COULD NOT DO . NEITHER THE PLT NOR I COULD FORESEE THE PROB WITH THE INVERSION LAYER, BUT THE PLT COULD SEE HIS CLB RATE DEGRADE SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THAT WHICH WE HAD DISCUSSED. I THINK PLTS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO INFORM ATC IN A TIMELY MANNER WHEN AN UNPREDICTABLE FACTOR SUCH AS THIS DIMINISHES THE CAPABILITIES OF HIS ACFT TO A LEVEL BELOW THAT WHICH HE HAS ADVISED ATC TO EXPECT. 3) OUR FAC WENT TO A '2-2-1' SCHEDULE THIS YR IN WHICH WE WORK A COMBINATION OF EVENING, DAY AND MIDNIGHT SHIFTS IN EACH WK. MANY OF THE CTLRS WANTED THIS SCHEDULE, BUT MANY OF US DID NOT. UNFORTUNATELY, THOSE OF US WHO DID NOT WANT IT HAVE HAD IT IMPOSED UPON US ANYWAY. THIS IS A VERY SPECIALIZED SCHEDULE DESIGNED FOR RESILIENT PEOPLE WHO FUNCTION NORMALLY ON 5 OR 6 HRS OF SLEEP. I AM NOT ONE OF THESE PEOPLE. BECAUSE MY WORK HRS CHANGE ON A DAILY BASIS, I HAVE BECOME UNABLE TO FORM ANY NORMAL SLEEP PATTERNS AND SUFFER FROM BOUTS OF FATIGUE AND INSOMNIA. I KNOW IT AFFECTS THE QUALITY OF MY PERFORMANCE AND I KNOW I AM ONLY ONE OF MANY. I THINK THAT BY IMPOSING THIS SORT OF SCHEDULE ON PEOPLE WHO ARE NOT PHYSICALLY CAPABLE OF MAKING THE ADJUSTMENTS, THE FAA IS DEPLETING ITS MOST VALUABLE RESOURCE UNNECESSARILY AND COMPROMISING THE SAFETY OF AIR TFC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.