Narrative:

After listening to ATIS, I obtained clearance on 127.6 as small transport X to depart the den TCA VFR northbound, maintain 7000', departure frequency 126.9, squawk XXXX. After reading back the clearance, I advised clearance delivery that I was ready to taxi from FBO ramp with the ATIS. I was advised to monitor ground on 121.9 for taxi clearance. (I remember thinking that this was somewhat unusual, since the e-w tower frequency is normally used for all aircraft taxiing out of the south side of the airport, especially when the e-w runways are active, as they were today.) (some confusion is indicated here. The controller apparently thought I was at the north cargo ramp.) I advised ground control that I was requesting taxi from FBO ramp expecting to be switched to tower on 118.3 for taxi. Instead, ground control advised me to expect a runway 7 departure, and instructed me to hold short of runway 8R at bravo 4. A short time later, I was issued a clearance which I heard as follows: 'small transport X hold short of 8L now and monitor tower on 118.3.' since the frequency was busy, I replied with only, 'small transport X roger,' and, seeing a medium large transport Y apparently holding in position at the departure end of runway 8R, proceeded across the runway west/O delay, tuning in the tower frequency 118.3 at the same time. As I was crossing runway 8R I noticed that the medium large transport Y was beginning his takeoff roll and realized instantly that a problem existed. However, it was too late to stop at that point, so, already committed, I continued to cross the runway very quickly, then stopped as soon as I was clear, waiting for the inevitable call from tower. The pilot in the right seat of my aircraft, although he said that he was not really paying close attention to the radio xmissions, indicated that he did not sense any problem at the time. In retrospect, since I could have avoided the incursion by questioning the clearance I thought I had been issued, I largely assume responsibility for the incident. However, I feel that the incident would never have occurred had any one of the recommendations below been followed. Recommendations: 1) pilots should read back all clrncs and questions those which may in anyway be confusing. Such action would also catch the occasional error that a controller could make in issuing a clearance. 2) taxiing aircraft should, whenever possible, be assigned the active runway tower frequency before approaching the runway. In that way, all pilots of potentially conflicting aircraft would be in communication with the same controller, as well as able to monitor one another's xmissions. 3) if potentially conflicting aircraft must, for some reason, be assigned different frequencys, then controllers should refrain from restating a clearance that has already been issued and complied with. To reissue such a clearance only raises the possibility that the pilot will misinterpret it as a new clearance. 4) if a controller wishes to reinforce a clearance that has previously been issued and complied with, he should precede the repeat of the clearance with words 'continue to.' many controllers now use this phraseology and it works well. In the above incident, there would have been no doubt of the ground controller's intent had his last transmission to me been, 'small transport X continue to hold short of 8R, monitor tower now on 118.3.' supplemental information from acn 82085: during takeoff noticed twin engine airplane crossing 8R from right to left downfield. Tower said, '(twin) you were not cleared to cross. Medium large transport Y cancel takeoff clearance.' at this time my airspeed was 100+ KTS and the twin was clear of the runway. I replied, 'we see him and we're clear.' I chose not to abort and continued takeoff. On return to den about 3 hours later, I called den tower. The supervisor said they had reviewed the tapes and the twin was told to hold short of runway 8R. The supervisor also said he thought I should have aborted since the tower had told me to do so. I replied, the tower's exact words were, 'cancel takeoff clearance.' the decision to abort is mine and since my airspeed was above 100 KTS, and the twin was clear of the runway, I decided the safest course of action was continuing the takeoff.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMT CROSSED ACTIVE RWY WHILE MLG WAS TAKING OFF, LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION.

Narrative: AFTER LISTENING TO ATIS, I OBTAINED CLRNC ON 127.6 AS SMT X TO DEPART THE DEN TCA VFR NBND, MAINTAIN 7000', DEP FREQ 126.9, SQUAWK XXXX. AFTER READING BACK THE CLRNC, I ADVISED CLRNC DELIVERY THAT I WAS READY TO TAXI FROM FBO RAMP WITH THE ATIS. I WAS ADVISED TO MONITOR GND ON 121.9 FOR TAXI CLRNC. (I REMEMBER THINKING THAT THIS WAS SOMEWHAT UNUSUAL, SINCE THE E-W TWR FREQ IS NORMALLY USED FOR ALL ACFT TAXIING OUT OF THE S SIDE OF THE ARPT, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE E-W RWYS ARE ACTIVE, AS THEY WERE TODAY.) (SOME CONFUSION IS INDICATED HERE. THE CTLR APPARENTLY THOUGHT I WAS AT THE N CARGO RAMP.) I ADVISED GND CTL THAT I WAS REQUESTING TAXI FROM FBO RAMP EXPECTING TO BE SWITCHED TO TWR ON 118.3 FOR TAXI. INSTEAD, GND CTL ADVISED ME TO EXPECT A RWY 7 DEP, AND INSTRUCTED ME TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 8R AT BRAVO 4. A SHORT TIME LATER, I WAS ISSUED A CLRNC WHICH I HEARD AS FOLLOWS: 'SMT X HOLD SHORT OF 8L NOW AND MONITOR TWR ON 118.3.' SINCE THE FREQ WAS BUSY, I REPLIED WITH ONLY, 'SMT X ROGER,' AND, SEEING A MLG Y APPARENTLY HOLDING IN POS AT THE DEP END OF RWY 8R, PROCEEDED ACROSS THE RWY W/O DELAY, TUNING IN THE TWR FREQ 118.3 AT THE SAME TIME. AS I WAS XING RWY 8R I NOTICED THAT THE MLG Y WAS BEGINNING HIS TKOF ROLL AND REALIZED INSTANTLY THAT A PROB EXISTED. HOWEVER, IT WAS TOO LATE TO STOP AT THAT POINT, SO, ALREADY COMMITTED, I CONTINUED TO CROSS THE RWY VERY QUICKLY, THEN STOPPED AS SOON AS I WAS CLR, WAITING FOR THE INEVITABLE CALL FROM TWR. THE PLT IN THE RIGHT SEAT OF MY ACFT, ALTHOUGH HE SAID THAT HE WAS NOT REALLY PAYING CLOSE ATTN TO THE RADIO XMISSIONS, INDICATED THAT HE DID NOT SENSE ANY PROB AT THE TIME. IN RETROSPECT, SINCE I COULD HAVE AVOIDED THE INCURSION BY QUESTIONING THE CLRNC I THOUGHT I HAD BEEN ISSUED, I LARGELY ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INCIDENT. HOWEVER, I FEEL THAT THE INCIDENT WOULD NEVER HAVE OCCURRED HAD ANY ONE OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS BELOW BEEN FOLLOWED. RECOMMENDATIONS: 1) PLTS SHOULD READ BACK ALL CLRNCS AND QUESTIONS THOSE WHICH MAY IN ANYWAY BE CONFUSING. SUCH ACTION WOULD ALSO CATCH THE OCCASIONAL ERROR THAT A CTLR COULD MAKE IN ISSUING A CLRNC. 2) TAXIING ACFT SHOULD, WHENEVER POSSIBLE, BE ASSIGNED THE ACTIVE RWY TWR FREQ BEFORE APCHING THE RWY. IN THAT WAY, ALL PLTS OF POTENTIALLY CONFLICTING ACFT WOULD BE IN COM WITH THE SAME CTLR, AS WELL AS ABLE TO MONITOR ONE ANOTHER'S XMISSIONS. 3) IF POTENTIALLY CONFLICTING ACFT MUST, FOR SOME REASON, BE ASSIGNED DIFFERENT FREQS, THEN CTLRS SHOULD REFRAIN FROM RESTATING A CLRNC THAT HAS ALREADY BEEN ISSUED AND COMPLIED WITH. TO REISSUE SUCH A CLRNC ONLY RAISES THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE PLT WILL MISINTERPRET IT AS A NEW CLRNC. 4) IF A CTLR WISHES TO REINFORCE A CLRNC THAT HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN ISSUED AND COMPLIED WITH, HE SHOULD PRECEDE THE REPEAT OF THE CLRNC WITH WORDS 'CONTINUE TO.' MANY CTLRS NOW USE THIS PHRASEOLOGY AND IT WORKS WELL. IN THE ABOVE INCIDENT, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO DOUBT OF THE GND CTLR'S INTENT HAD HIS LAST XMISSION TO ME BEEN, 'SMT X CONTINUE TO HOLD SHORT OF 8R, MONITOR TWR NOW ON 118.3.' SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 82085: DURING TKOF NOTICED TWIN ENG AIRPLANE XING 8R FROM RIGHT TO LEFT DOWNFIELD. TWR SAID, '(TWIN) YOU WERE NOT CLRED TO CROSS. MLG Y CANCEL TKOF CLRNC.' AT THIS TIME MY AIRSPD WAS 100+ KTS AND THE TWIN WAS CLR OF THE RWY. I REPLIED, 'WE SEE HIM AND WE'RE CLR.' I CHOSE NOT TO ABORT AND CONTINUED TKOF. ON RETURN TO DEN ABOUT 3 HRS LATER, I CALLED DEN TWR. THE SUPVR SAID THEY HAD REVIEWED THE TAPES AND THE TWIN WAS TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 8R. THE SUPVR ALSO SAID HE THOUGHT I SHOULD HAVE ABORTED SINCE THE TWR HAD TOLD ME TO DO SO. I REPLIED, THE TWR'S EXACT WORDS WERE, 'CANCEL TKOF CLRNC.' THE DECISION TO ABORT IS MINE AND SINCE MY AIRSPD WAS ABOVE 100 KTS, AND THE TWIN WAS CLR OF THE RWY, I DECIDED THE SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION WAS CONTINUING THE TKOF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.