Narrative:

I had a cockpit window that was not sealed completely. Even though the handle was in the full down and locked position the 2 latches at the rear of the window were on the inside of the flanges instead of behind them. I became aware of this situation due to abnormal and distracting noise on the initial portion of the takeoff roll. I immediately rejected the takeoff roll to resolve the air leak on the ground, rather than create an in-flight situation. I rejected the takeoff roll in accordance with the procedure in the pilot's handbook at 80 KTS, as my first officer advised the tower of the reject. I exited the runway with 50% of the 11500' usable runway remaining, safety never having been compromised, and we advised the tower of the reason for the rejected takeoff. After opening and closing the window several times to ensure it was completely sealed with the latches behind the flanges, I made a passenger announcement of explanation and conducted a normal flight to my destination, terminating with an on time arrival. I discovered after talking the following day to the captain who brought the aircraft in approximately 45 minutes prior to my departure, how the problem arose. We are both new capts on the aircraft and were ground school classmates and simulator partners, finishing our training in dec. He told me he had opened the window to tell a mechanic to bring a screwdriver to the cockpit, and when he shut the window, he did not close it securely. When I entered the cockpit, I did not observe that the window was not securely shut, not being a checklist item, but discovered it on the takeoff roll. I have now included checking these latches in my personal cockpit preflight inspection. After discussing my experience with several other pilots who have flown the aircraft for sometime, I have discovered this is a situation that has happened to those who have flown the aircraft on at least one occasion, and appears to be a design flaw in the engineering of the cockpit sliding window latching mechanism. In order to prevent continual recurrences and correct the situation, I present two possible remedies. The first would be to incorporate the cockpit window-secure as a checklist item on the before start checklist. The second would be a design fix, installing a block in from of the flange that would prevent the handle from moving into the full down and locked position unless the latches were behind the flanges in the truly secure position. Callback conversation revealed the following. The company has not taken any action to date but reporter says as a result of our callback he will actively follow up his recommends.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG TKOF ABORT BECAUSE OF HIGH WIND NOISE AROUND THE CAPT'S SIDE WINDOW. THE LATCH HANDLE WAS POSITIONED CORRECTLY BUT THE DOGS THAT SECURE THE WINDOW WERE ON THE WRONG SIDE OF THE STRIKER PLATE.

Narrative: I HAD A COCKPIT WINDOW THAT WAS NOT SEALED COMPLETELY. EVEN THOUGH THE HANDLE WAS IN THE FULL DOWN AND LOCKED POS THE 2 LATCHES AT THE REAR OF THE WINDOW WERE ON THE INSIDE OF THE FLANGES INSTEAD OF BEHIND THEM. I BECAME AWARE OF THIS SIT DUE TO ABNORMAL AND DISTRACTING NOISE ON THE INITIAL PORTION OF THE TKOF ROLL. I IMMEDIATELY REJECTED THE TKOF ROLL TO RESOLVE THE AIR LEAK ON THE GND, RATHER THAN CREATE AN INFLT SIT. I REJECTED THE TKOF ROLL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROC IN THE PLT'S HANDBOOK AT 80 KTS, AS MY F/O ADVISED THE TWR OF THE REJECT. I EXITED THE RWY WITH 50% OF THE 11500' USABLE RWY REMAINING, SAFETY NEVER HAVING BEEN COMPROMISED, AND WE ADVISED THE TWR OF THE REASON FOR THE REJECTED TKOF. AFTER OPENING AND CLOSING THE WINDOW SEVERAL TIMES TO ENSURE IT WAS COMPLETELY SEALED WITH THE LATCHES BEHIND THE FLANGES, I MADE A PAX ANNOUNCEMENT OF EXPLANATION AND CONDUCTED A NORMAL FLT TO MY DEST, TERMINATING WITH AN ON TIME ARR. I DISCOVERED AFTER TALKING THE FOLLOWING DAY TO THE CAPTAIN WHO BROUGHT THE ACFT IN APPROX 45 MINUTES PRIOR TO MY DEP, HOW THE PROBLEM AROSE. WE ARE BOTH NEW CAPTS ON THE ACFT AND WERE GND SCHOOL CLASSMATES AND SIMULATOR PARTNERS, FINISHING OUR TRAINING IN DEC. HE TOLD ME HE HAD OPENED THE WINDOW TO TELL A MECHANIC TO BRING A SCREWDRIVER TO THE COCKPIT, AND WHEN HE SHUT THE WINDOW, HE DID NOT CLOSE IT SECURELY. WHEN I ENTERED THE COCKPIT, I DID NOT OBSERVE THAT THE WINDOW WAS NOT SECURELY SHUT, NOT BEING A CHECKLIST ITEM, BUT DISCOVERED IT ON THE TKOF ROLL. I HAVE NOW INCLUDED CHKING THESE LATCHES IN MY PERSONAL COCKPIT PREFLT INSPECTION. AFTER DISCUSSING MY EXPERIENCE WITH SEVERAL OTHER PLTS WHO HAVE FLOWN THE ACFT FOR SOMETIME, I HAVE DISCOVERED THIS IS A SITUATION THAT HAS HAPPENED TO THOSE WHO HAVE FLOWN THE ACFT ON AT LEAST ONE OCCASION, AND APPEARS TO BE A DESIGN FLAW IN THE ENGINEERING OF THE COCKPIT SLIDING WINDOW LATCHING MECHANISM. IN ORDER TO PREVENT CONTINUAL RECURRENCES AND CORRECT THE SITUATION, I PRESENT TWO POSSIBLE REMEDIES. THE FIRST WOULD BE TO INCORPORATE THE COCKPIT WINDOW-SECURE AS A CHECKLIST ITEM ON THE BEFORE START CHECKLIST. THE SECOND WOULD BE A DESIGN FIX, INSTALLING A BLOCK IN FROM OF THE FLANGE THAT WOULD PREVENT THE HANDLE FROM MOVING INTO THE FULL DOWN AND LOCKED POSITION UNLESS THE LATCHES WERE BEHIND THE FLANGES IN THE TRULY SECURE POSITION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION REVEALED THE FOLLOWING. THE COMPANY HAS NOT TAKEN ANY ACTION TO DATE BUT RPTR SAYS AS A RESULT OF OUR CALLBACK HE WILL ACTIVELY FOLLOW UP HIS RECOMMENDS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.