Narrative:

We briefed an RNAV Y runway 25R approach to be flown by me; even though we had ATIS showing VMC. This is SOP for back-up. When handed over to phx approach; I told him I had the airport in sight. (Meaning I felt comfortable with shooting a visual approach whenever it was offered by ATC or the captain decided to request it.) unbeknownst to either myself or ATC; the captain still intended for us to fly the RNAV approach. This would require a wider base/final path to allow for autopilot. We continued to fly by vector from ATC; and finally on about a 7 mile base leg; ATC asked us if we 'had the airport.' the captain was pilot not flying; so he worked the radio and responded airport in sight. This allowed ATC to clear us for the visual approach; runway 25R. Because we were on base; flaps 5 degrees; I immediately clicked off the autopilot and hand turned the airplane to align with the final approach course. The captain immediately began to berate me for hand flying the airplane; not engaging LNAV and VNAV; and to select progress page 2 on my FMC. Knowing this was wrong; I hastily pushed the approach button on the MCP. This is incorrect; but harmless at this point. I hoped it would quiet the captain down. It didn't. He continued his insistence of RNAV approach. So instead of arguing at this critical phase of flight; I did as he asked. (Wrongly so by our operations procedures; of pilot flying not to take hands off controls and ask for all mode changes.) as soon as we went into LNAV/VNAV; the airspeed bug dropped to 140 KTS as he had previously instructed me to do for setting up the approach. Not good. The airplane was still at flaps 5 degrees. I immediately called for flaps 20 degrees; then seeing that our airspeed was dangerously close to 'stick shaker speed' (stall) I requested flaps 25 degrees to keep this 140 ton airplane in the air at 2;000 AGL. This triggered the master warning telling us that the landing gear was still 'up' with landing flaps. All the while the captain is sitting there doing nothing. In the meantime; the autopilot had us overshoot our base to final turn so we were now aligned somewhere in between runway 25R and runway 26; then it corrects us to between runway 25L and runway 25R (too close of an intercept for the autopilot). I click the autopilot off at 1;700 ft MSL (about 120 ft before decision height) because at this point I don't care what the captain wants; I am going to safely align this airplane with the runway myself. I also had called for gear down landing check and flaps 30 degrees. The final approach and landing I must say turned out fine (probably due to my rush of adrenaline) and we continued to the gate normally. Afterward for debrief; the captain strongly berated me for not pressing the right buttons at the right time (his job by flight procedures in company manual). We were close to stalling a B767 at 2;000 ft AGL; and he was worried about what mode to select the FMC. The captain's preoccupation with not paying attention to aircraft phase of flight; FMC operation; poor CRM skills; and lack of communication with ATC regarding his intentions caused us to operate unsafely. Had this been in poor weather; with any other aircraft problems; and with a first officer who did not have as much experience on the aircraft; things could have turned out a lot worse.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767-300 First Officer reports difficulties encountered during a visual approach attempting to placate the Captain; who has strong beliefs about the way the aircraft should be flown that are different from his own.

Narrative: We briefed an RNAV Y Runway 25R approach to be flown by me; even though we had ATIS showing VMC. This is SOP for back-up. When handed over to PHX Approach; I told him I had the airport in sight. (Meaning I felt comfortable with shooting a visual approach whenever it was offered by ATC or the Captain decided to request it.) Unbeknownst to either myself or ATC; the Captain still intended for us to fly the RNAV approach. This would require a wider base/final path to allow for autopilot. We continued to fly by vector from ATC; and finally on about a 7 mile base leg; ATC asked us if we 'had the airport.' The Captain was pilot not flying; so he worked the radio and responded airport in sight. This allowed ATC to clear us for the visual approach; Runway 25R. Because we were on base; flaps 5 degrees; I immediately clicked off the autopilot and hand turned the airplane to align with the final approach course. The Captain immediately began to berate me for hand flying the airplane; not engaging LNAV and VNAV; and to select Progress Page 2 on my FMC. Knowing this was wrong; I hastily pushed the approach button on the MCP. This is incorrect; but harmless at this point. I hoped it would quiet the Captain down. It didn't. He continued his insistence of RNAV approach. So instead of arguing at this critical phase of flight; I did as he asked. (Wrongly so by our operations procedures; of pilot flying not to take hands off controls and ask for all mode changes.) As soon as we went into LNAV/VNAV; the airspeed bug dropped to 140 KTS as he had previously instructed me to do for setting up the approach. Not good. The airplane was still at flaps 5 degrees. I immediately called for flaps 20 degrees; then seeing that our airspeed was dangerously close to 'stick shaker speed' (stall) I requested flaps 25 degrees to keep this 140 ton airplane in the air at 2;000 AGL. This triggered the Master Warning telling us that the landing gear was still 'up' with landing flaps. All the while the Captain is sitting there doing nothing. In the meantime; the autopilot had us overshoot our base to final turn so we were now aligned somewhere in between Runway 25R and Runway 26; then it corrects us to between Runway 25L and Runway 25R (too close of an intercept for the autopilot). I click the autopilot off at 1;700 FT MSL (about 120 FT before decision HGT) because at this point I don't care what the Captain wants; I am going to safely align this airplane with the runway myself. I also had called for gear down landing check and flaps 30 degrees. The final approach and landing I must say turned out fine (probably due to my rush of adrenaline) and we continued to the gate normally. Afterward for debrief; the Captain strongly berated me for not pressing the right buttons at the right time (his job by flight procedures in company manual). We were close to stalling a B767 at 2;000 FT AGL; and he was worried about what mode to select the FMC. The Captain's preoccupation with not paying attention to aircraft phase of flight; FMC operation; poor CRM skills; and lack of communication with ATC regarding his intentions caused us to operate unsafely. Had this been in poor weather; with any other aircraft problems; and with a First Officer who did not have as much experience on the aircraft; things could have turned out a lot worse.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.