Narrative:

I was working local control at the time of the event. There were 2 aircraft in the pattern on runway 1R. I cleared a PA31 for takeoff runway 1R. The PA31 was going to go west-southwestbound. About 10-20 seconds later; I cleared B737 for takeoff from runway 1L. When the PA31 was about 1/2 mile north of the airport; I turned the PA31 on course and told the aircraft to contact departure. I instantly realized that the PA31 was going to be a conflict with the B737 and attempted to contact him again but the aircraft already switched to departure. The B737 was just airborne off the runway and I immediately told the B737 about the PA31. The B737 had the aircraft in sight and turned away from the aircraft to avoid any conflicts with the aircraft. There was no separation loss between the IFR B737 and the VFR PA31. My visual scanning was a major factor in this event. I should have realized that the PA31 was going to be a factor for the B737 and I should have controlled it differently. This was the first time that something like this had ever happened and it will never happen again. Another possible factor for this was because this was my 6th day of work. I worked 42 hours the first 5 days of my rotating schedule work week and I was scheduled to work 10 hours on this day. At the time of this event; I was about 1/2 way done with my 10 hour day. Although I may have not felt tired; my ability to perform at the level that I should may have been affected by fatigue. This facility has lost 17 ATC controllers in the nearly 2 years that I have been working in this facility; and only 4 controllers have come to replace those that we have lost. Hundreds of overtime hours have been assigned so far this year due to staffing and there is no solution to fix this problem that we have. It is a surprise that things like this have not occurred on a more regular basis. A very valuable tool that can help all controllers in this facility is taxi into position and hold (tiph). Many FAA facilities have tiph; but we are not allowed to use this. This tool ensures proper departure separation is provided for all aircraft and it will provide a more effective traffic flow. All in all; the event that occurred yesterday could have been prevented had I done a better job at visually scanning the airport. Although there may have been other contributing factors to this event; it is my responsibility to provide safe; orderly; and expeditious flow of traffic within the airport.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FAI Controller described conflict event when IFR air carrier departure conflicted with previous VFR departure; reporter listing fatigue and lack of visual scanning as causal factors.

Narrative: I was working Local Control at the time of the event. There were 2 aircraft in the pattern on Runway 1R. I cleared a PA31 for takeoff Runway 1R. The PA31 was going to go west-southwestbound. About 10-20 seconds later; I cleared B737 for takeoff from Runway 1L. When the PA31 was about 1/2 mile north of the airport; I turned the PA31 on course and told the aircraft to contact departure. I instantly realized that the PA31 was going to be a conflict with the B737 and attempted to contact him again but the aircraft already switched to departure. The B737 was just airborne off the runway and I immediately told the B737 about the PA31. The B737 had the aircraft in sight and turned away from the aircraft to avoid any conflicts with the aircraft. There was no separation loss between the IFR B737 and the VFR PA31. My visual scanning was a major factor in this event. I should have realized that the PA31 was going to be a factor for the B737 and I should have controlled it differently. This was the first time that something like this had ever happened and it will never happen again. Another possible factor for this was because this was my 6th day of work. I worked 42 hours the first 5 days of my rotating schedule work week and I was scheduled to work 10 hours on this day. At the time of this event; I was about 1/2 way done with my 10 hour day. Although I may have not felt tired; my ability to perform at the level that I should may have been affected by fatigue. This facility has lost 17 ATC controllers in the nearly 2 years that I have been working in this facility; and only 4 controllers have come to replace those that we have lost. Hundreds of overtime hours have been assigned so far this year due to staffing and there is no solution to fix this problem that we have. It is a surprise that things like this have not occurred on a more regular basis. A very valuable tool that can help all controllers in this facility is taxi into position and hold (TIPH). Many FAA facilities have TIPH; but we are not allowed to use this. This tool ensures proper departure separation is provided for all aircraft and it will provide a more effective traffic flow. All in all; the event that occurred yesterday could have been prevented had I done a better job at visually scanning the airport. Although there may have been other contributing factors to this event; it is my responsibility to provide safe; orderly; and expeditious flow of traffic within the airport.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.