Narrative:

I was captain in command of xyz airlines flight in 3/88 from sdf to evv. On approach to sdf we encountered moderate rime ice and knew we would need both engines and airfoil heat for takeoff and climb when we departed. After arrival at the gate the agent gave us the paperwork and said we had an FAA inspector on the jumpseat, and additionally that we would have 3 bcd air pilots riding in first class on xyz business passes. The pilots of xyy are in a bitter dispute with the xyz management over this issue. In my mind, and I'm sure the first officer's mind, these people, bcd, represent a threat to our livelihood. This may be more perceived than real. However, the negative emotion about their presence on board had an impact on both of us. In the time remaining before departure we checked the weight and performance requirements for the use of engine and airfoil heat for the takeoff and climb in addition to the checklists, etc. Besides the icing conditions, IMC, we were looking at a short flight (25 mins) to evv, meaning we would be very busy in the cockpit. We also had the added pressure of having an inspector observing every move, in addition to our feelings about the bcd pilots on board. The sum of this adds up to a very high level of stress! I have, for most of my 35 yrs of flying, been able to deal with the stress we all have associated with our profession. However, the level of stress has increased markedly here at xyz during the past few yrs, and this day was more exceptional. In retrospect, having gone over that short segment of this 4 day trip, I have tried to recall what I may have done wrong. There was an apparent problem of no audible voice from either the observers interphone/radio, jackbox or the inspectors own personal headset. I asked if the cockpit speakers would suffice--he agreed. I later remembered that on arrival at evv (with a crew change and minimal ground time), I failed to note the possible jackbox problem in the aircraft logbook. What else did I do that was improper? I don't know. A lot of things happened in a very short time frame and that can lead to possible errors. I have personally taken action to reduce the job related stress. I have submitted my request for early retirement on X/88 to be effective Y/88. This is not what I originally planned for my career. I would have preferred to fly the remaining yrs, but the existing and presumably future level of stress of xyz is approaching intolerable levels. Stress does affect human performance--I know! I am saddened that I cannot prescribe a remedy for those who must remaining.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG FLT CREW COMPLAINT OF STRESS DUE TO COMPANY POLICY AND FAA INSPECTOR ON BOARD.

Narrative: I WAS CAPT IN COMMAND OF XYZ AIRLINES FLT IN 3/88 FROM SDF TO EVV. ON APCH TO SDF WE ENCOUNTERED MODERATE RIME ICE AND KNEW WE WOULD NEED BOTH ENGS AND AIRFOIL HEAT FOR TKOF AND CLB WHEN WE DEPARTED. AFTER ARR AT THE GATE THE AGENT GAVE US THE PAPERWORK AND SAID WE HAD AN FAA INSPECTOR ON THE JUMPSEAT, AND ADDITIONALLY THAT WE WOULD HAVE 3 BCD AIR PLTS RIDING IN FIRST CLASS ON XYZ BUSINESS PASSES. THE PLTS OF XYY ARE IN A BITTER DISPUTE WITH THE XYZ MGMNT OVER THIS ISSUE. IN MY MIND, AND I'M SURE THE F/O'S MIND, THESE PEOPLE, BCD, REPRESENT A THREAT TO OUR LIVELIHOOD. THIS MAY BE MORE PERCEIVED THAN REAL. HOWEVER, THE NEGATIVE EMOTION ABOUT THEIR PRESENCE ON BOARD HAD AN IMPACT ON BOTH OF US. IN THE TIME REMAINING BEFORE DEP WE CHKED THE WT AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE USE OF ENG AND AIRFOIL HEAT FOR THE TKOF AND CLB IN ADDITION TO THE CHKLISTS, ETC. BESIDES THE ICING CONDITIONS, IMC, WE WERE LOOKING AT A SHORT FLT (25 MINS) TO EVV, MEANING WE WOULD BE VERY BUSY IN THE COCKPIT. WE ALSO HAD THE ADDED PRESSURE OF HAVING AN INSPECTOR OBSERVING EVERY MOVE, IN ADDITION TO OUR FEELINGS ABOUT THE BCD PLTS ON BOARD. THE SUM OF THIS ADDS UP TO A VERY HIGH LEVEL OF STRESS! I HAVE, FOR MOST OF MY 35 YRS OF FLYING, BEEN ABLE TO DEAL WITH THE STRESS WE ALL HAVE ASSOCIATED WITH OUR PROFESSION. HOWEVER, THE LEVEL OF STRESS HAS INCREASED MARKEDLY HERE AT XYZ DURING THE PAST FEW YRS, AND THIS DAY WAS MORE EXCEPTIONAL. IN RETROSPECT, HAVING GONE OVER THAT SHORT SEGMENT OF THIS 4 DAY TRIP, I HAVE TRIED TO RECALL WHAT I MAY HAVE DONE WRONG. THERE WAS AN APPARENT PROB OF NO AUDIBLE VOICE FROM EITHER THE OBSERVERS INTERPHONE/RADIO, JACKBOX OR THE INSPECTORS OWN PERSONAL HEADSET. I ASKED IF THE COCKPIT SPEAKERS WOULD SUFFICE--HE AGREED. I LATER REMEMBERED THAT ON ARR AT EVV (WITH A CREW CHANGE AND MINIMAL GND TIME), I FAILED TO NOTE THE POSSIBLE JACKBOX PROB IN THE ACFT LOGBOOK. WHAT ELSE DID I DO THAT WAS IMPROPER? I DON'T KNOW. A LOT OF THINGS HAPPENED IN A VERY SHORT TIME FRAME AND THAT CAN LEAD TO POSSIBLE ERRORS. I HAVE PERSONALLY TAKEN ACTION TO REDUCE THE JOB RELATED STRESS. I HAVE SUBMITTED MY REQUEST FOR EARLY RETIREMENT ON X/88 TO BE EFFECTIVE Y/88. THIS IS NOT WHAT I ORIGINALLY PLANNED FOR MY CAREER. I WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO FLY THE REMAINING YRS, BUT THE EXISTING AND PRESUMABLY FUTURE LEVEL OF STRESS OF XYZ IS APPROACHING INTOLERABLE LEVELS. STRESS DOES AFFECT HUMAN PERFORMANCE--I KNOW! I AM SADDENED THAT I CANNOT PRESCRIBE A REMEDY FOR THOSE WHO MUST REMAINING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.