Narrative:

Third flight since receiving aircraft for trip. The itt limitation for take-off was exceeded. The conditions were OAT 21 C; reduced power 98%; 100% available; V1 speed of 126 KTS. At approx 115 KTS; first officer called 'left itt'; when I looked down I noted 940C. The first officer said the itt spiked/jumped to 940C from 900C. The flight was carrying 30 passengers at approx 28;000 pounds; there was approx 2;000 ft of runway remaining and I made the decision not to abort and take the flight airborne. A high speed abort with those conditions would have been more dangerous than taking the aircraft airborne. This event occurred due to maintenance not fixing the itt issue. This same discrepancy has been noted four times prior to this incident. This makes the fifth time in nine days. I could only go back in the logbook any further. I did not feel that I had adequate time and distance to stop the aircraft safely at such a high speed. I continued the takeoff. After acceleration altitude I reduced the power to a normal level; approx 20% below the right torque; after 2 minutes the itt normalized and the power was then brought back to normal. This exact situation occurred in the previous four discrepancies. Prior to departing; I skimmed through the logbook and briefed my first officer on the past reoccurring discrepancy and the corrective action. They varied from cleaning a connector to replacing the decu (which was written as deck); and the last discrepancy corrective action was transferred to a non-routine work card. Both myself and my first officer agreed that the safest thing to do was to take the aircraft airborne. I do not know the exact procedures used to verify that the aircraft was fixed and ready for service. Due to the fact that each one of these discrepancies happened at takeoff power; the procedure to ops check the aircraft should have been done at takeoff power. Was this done? Also instead of using logic to find what is wrong with the aircraft; I feel maintenance is just throwing parts at it and returning it to service. This is easily shown in the corrective actions!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SF340 flight crew experienced a left engine ITT exceedance on takeoff. Power reduction after departure returned the temperatures to normal; and the flight continued to their destination.

Narrative: Third flight since receiving aircraft for trip. The ITT limitation for take-off was exceeded. The conditions were OAT 21 C; reduced power 98%; 100% available; V1 speed of 126 KTS. At approx 115 KTS; First Officer called 'left ITT'; when I looked down I noted 940C. The First Officer said the ITT spiked/jumped to 940C from 900C. The flight was carrying 30 passengers at approx 28;000 LBS; there was approx 2;000 FT of runway remaining and I made the decision not to abort and take the flight airborne. A high speed abort with those conditions would have been more dangerous than taking the aircraft airborne. This event occurred due to maintenance not fixing the ITT issue. This same discrepancy has been noted four times prior to this incident. This makes the fifth time in nine days. I could only go back in the logbook any further. I did not feel that I had adequate time and distance to stop the aircraft safely at such a high speed. I continued the takeoff. After Acceleration Altitude I reduced the power to a normal level; approx 20% below the Right torque; after 2 minutes the ITT normalized and the power was then brought back to normal. This exact situation occurred in the previous four discrepancies. Prior to departing; I skimmed through the logbook and briefed my First Officer on the past reoccurring discrepancy and the corrective action. They varied from cleaning a connector to replacing the DECU (which was written as DECK); and the last discrepancy corrective action was transferred to a Non-Routine Work Card. Both myself and my First Officer agreed that the safest thing to do was to take the aircraft airborne. I do not know the exact procedures used to verify that the aircraft was fixed and ready for service. Due to the fact that each one of these discrepancies happened at takeoff power; the procedure to ops check the aircraft should have been done at takeoff power. Was this done? Also instead of using logic to find what is wrong with the aircraft; I feel maintenance is just throwing parts at it and returning it to service. This is easily shown in the corrective actions!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.