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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 83942 |
Time | |
Date | 198803 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : sjc |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 500 msl bound upper : 1800 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : sjc |
Operator | general aviation : instructional |
Make Model Name | Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear |
Flight Phase | descent : approach |
Flight Plan | VFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | general aviation : instructional |
Make Model Name | Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear |
Flight Phase | other |
Flight Plan | VFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | instruction : instructor |
Qualification | pilot : cfi pilot : commercial pilot : instrument |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 100 flight time total : 5540 flight time type : 1000 |
ASRS Report | 83942 |
Person 2 | |
Qualification | pilot : student |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : nmac |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance flight crew : took evasive action other |
Consequence | faa : investigated faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 0 vertical : 20 |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
The student pilot was doing well and I had him under the hood, tracking in on the sjc VOR. To avoid any conflict with the ILS, I set the mc on 295 degrees to allow for any difficulty on his part with tracking the right. This put our position nearly to highway 101 on the east as we reported at ibm and set our transponder to 0136(?) and confirmed the squawk code with the tower. We were asked to report at the fairgrounds and told of traffic about 1 1/2 mi at 11 O'clock which we acknowledged. We were at 1800' at the OM when the pilot tried to report, but was unable to due to heavy radio traffic until 5 DME. We were still doing about 120 KTS at the marker as the student pilot was still under the hood and was unfamiliar with this type of approach. I cautioned him to slow, which he did to about 90 KTS. We were still way to the right of final approach course for the right and were angling in towards final. About 2 mi out the controller instructed us to turn out to the right and re-enter on base. As we were still well to the right I took the controls from the student and turned slightly right, but not much because this already put us out far enough to be opposing the downwind traffic I was only vaguely aware of. This opp traffic made me apprehensive, but I nevertheless complied as I searched the downwind for conflict and re-entered on a sharp 90 degree base leg and then turned to position us on a true straight in for runway 20R at about over highway 17. I spotted what I thought was our traffic ahead nearing touch down and gave the controls back to the student who had removed the hood shortly before I had taken the controls. 3 or 4 seconds later the controller said something like, 'no, I want you to continue through the final for the left and turn back.' I asked, 'do you want us to make an south turn?' he said, 'yes.' I immediately took the play again and made a hard left. 3-5 seconds later out my left peripheral vision I saw what I took to be ground lights flashing as the plane made a steep left bank. Almost immediately the rear passenger grabbed our shoulders as they variously shouted, 'we almost hit him!,' 'we just missed that plane!' I pulled up hard straight ahead and just short of the left final and looked over my right shoulder and saw no lights moving with us about 100-200 ft at about our 5 O'clock. I could not see the shape by then and asked, 'what was it?' the replies: 'it was a low wing small aircraft.' I proceeded to fly between the finals and held altitude as the controller told us to go around. I mumbled something as I was shaken, and the controller asked me to repeat it. I said, 'you just turned us in front of another plane. We almost had a midair!' 'oh, ok, re-enter right traffic.' we landed with out further incident, parked, fueled and went to ground operations window to get the phone number for the tower. The shift supervisor met us and we proceeded to discuss the matter as he took pencil notes on a report form. After a while he began to contradict our account and said that he had the position at the time and what we said was impossible. He had us on radar and there was no plane there and that we were going too fast and were running down the small aircraft Y we were instructed to follow and that he was trying to save us a go around by giving us the south turn. We said we thought it was an small aircraft X and that we remembered hearing one following us. He said that the small aircraft X plane was 2 mi behind us on radar and what we saw was an small aircraft Y and that there was no conflict. Since the passenger that had seen the most (as it occurred on her side) had gone home, I only saw lights, the pilot saw nothing, and now the other passenger wasn't positive anymore. We started to go on the assumption that it must have been the small aircraft Y. We were still puzzled. How, if we were following too closely, traffic that we hadn't seen, an south turn could possibly cause us to overtake him. Our assertion was that we would have to have been in front of the small aircraft Y when we were told to turn. He just said that we were wrong. The radar didn't lie. He said further that we were a problem aircraft for them and his mistake was not telling us to go around at the OM. When he came to a question on his form about evasive action, we said that there had not been time during the encounter. He put 'non taken.' we objected that this sounded like we were admitting negligence and that our following his vectors was our action. He said he didn't give us any vectors (which was technically correct). We went upstairs to see the radar and learned that it could not discriminate traffic less than 750' apart and were once again puzzled at how he could be so sure. He yelled at us some more while in the tower and we finally left saying we would phone him to find out what the tape revealed. Subsequently, he said that the tape showed that we had acknowledged we were to follow the small aircraft Y. He played the tape for me over the phone which confirmed that we were to follow the small aircraft Y. However, it also revealed that a second small aircraft X was cleared for takeoff and to remain in right traffic during all of this. The controller's previous glee with it not being 'his fault' and that we were following our traffic 'too close' and that 'there wasn't any conflict, I had it on radar' was rather annoying since at least 6 people were almost killed. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter discussed the incident with the local FSDO and they clarified many points in regard to the tower tapes. The aircraft involved in the near midair collision was in fact the small aircraft Y they had been following and not small aircraft X as identified by his wife. Small aircraft Y was flown by a student pilot and he was making a straight in approach. The information has been forwarded to okc and no further action against the reporter is planned. Student pilot did not feel the near midair collision was as close as indicated by the reporter and he continued to a normal landing. The third aircraft was small aircraft X that was in the traffic pattern making touch and goes. Report filled out by the tower was submitted as an FAA near midair collision. ASRS report was made at the suggestions of the FSDO office.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: NMAC ON FINAL APCH. NIGHT OPERATION. TRAFFIC ADVISORY GIVEN.
Narrative: THE STUDENT PLT WAS DOING WELL AND I HAD HIM UNDER THE HOOD, TRACKING IN ON THE SJC VOR. TO AVOID ANY CONFLICT WITH THE ILS, I SET THE MC ON 295 DEGS TO ALLOW FOR ANY DIFFICULTY ON HIS PART WITH TRACKING THE R. THIS PUT OUR POS NEARLY TO HWY 101 ON THE E AS WE RPTED AT IBM AND SET OUR XPONDER TO 0136(?) AND CONFIRMED THE SQUAWK CODE WITH THE TWR. WE WERE ASKED TO RPT AT THE FAIRGROUNDS AND TOLD OF TFC ABOUT 1 1/2 MI AT 11 O'CLOCK WHICH WE ACKNOWLEDGED. WE WERE AT 1800' AT THE OM WHEN THE PLT TRIED TO RPT, BUT WAS UNABLE TO DUE TO HEAVY RADIO TFC UNTIL 5 DME. WE WERE STILL DOING ABOUT 120 KTS AT THE MARKER AS THE STUDENT PLT WAS STILL UNDER THE HOOD AND WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH THIS TYPE OF APCH. I CAUTIONED HIM TO SLOW, WHICH HE DID TO ABOUT 90 KTS. WE WERE STILL WAY TO THE RIGHT OF FINAL APCH COURSE FOR THE RIGHT AND WERE ANGLING IN TOWARDS FINAL. ABOUT 2 MI OUT THE CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO TURN OUT TO THE RIGHT AND RE-ENTER ON BASE. AS WE WERE STILL WELL TO THE RIGHT I TOOK THE CTLS FROM THE STUDENT AND TURNED SLIGHTLY R, BUT NOT MUCH BECAUSE THIS ALREADY PUT US OUT FAR ENOUGH TO BE OPPOSING THE DOWNWIND TFC I WAS ONLY VAGUELY AWARE OF. THIS OPP TFC MADE ME APPREHENSIVE, BUT I NEVERTHELESS COMPLIED AS I SEARCHED THE DOWNWIND FOR CONFLICT AND RE-ENTERED ON A SHARP 90 DEG BASE LEG AND THEN TURNED TO POS US ON A TRUE STRAIGHT IN FOR RWY 20R AT ABOUT OVER HWY 17. I SPOTTED WHAT I THOUGHT WAS OUR TFC AHEAD NEARING TOUCH DOWN AND GAVE THE CTLS BACK TO THE STUDENT WHO HAD REMOVED THE HOOD SHORTLY BEFORE I HAD TAKEN THE CTLS. 3 OR 4 SECS LATER THE CTLR SAID SOMETHING LIKE, 'NO, I WANT YOU TO CONTINUE THROUGH THE FINAL FOR THE L AND TURN BACK.' I ASKED, 'DO YOU WANT US TO MAKE AN S TURN?' HE SAID, 'YES.' I IMMEDIATELY TOOK THE PLAY AGAIN AND MADE A HARD L. 3-5 SECS LATER OUT MY L PERIPHERAL VISION I SAW WHAT I TOOK TO BE GND LIGHTS FLASHING AS THE PLANE MADE A STEEP L BANK. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY THE REAR PAX GRABBED OUR SHOULDERS AS THEY VARIOUSLY SHOUTED, 'WE ALMOST HIT HIM!,' 'WE JUST MISSED THAT PLANE!' I PULLED UP HARD STRAIGHT AHEAD AND JUST SHORT OF THE L FINAL AND LOOKED OVER MY R SHOULDER AND SAW NO LIGHTS MOVING WITH US ABOUT 100-200 FT AT ABOUT OUR 5 O'CLOCK. I COULD NOT SEE THE SHAPE BY THEN AND ASKED, 'WHAT WAS IT?' THE REPLIES: 'IT WAS A LOW WING SMA.' I PROCEEDED TO FLY BTWN THE FINALS AND HELD ALT AS THE CTLR TOLD US TO GAR. I MUMBLED SOMETHING AS I WAS SHAKEN, AND THE CTLR ASKED ME TO REPEAT IT. I SAID, 'YOU JUST TURNED US IN FRONT OF ANOTHER PLANE. WE ALMOST HAD A MIDAIR!' 'OH, OK, RE-ENTER R TFC.' WE LANDED WITH OUT FURTHER INCIDENT, PARKED, FUELED AND WENT TO GND OPS WINDOW TO GET THE PHONE NUMBER FOR THE TWR. THE SHIFT SUPVR MET US AND WE PROCEEDED TO DISCUSS THE MATTER AS HE TOOK PENCIL NOTES ON A RPT FORM. AFTER A WHILE HE BEGAN TO CONTRADICT OUR ACCOUNT AND SAID THAT HE HAD THE POS AT THE TIME AND WHAT WE SAID WAS IMPOSSIBLE. HE HAD US ON RADAR AND THERE WAS NO PLANE THERE AND THAT WE WERE GOING TOO FAST AND WERE RUNNING DOWN THE SMA Y WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW AND THAT HE WAS TRYING TO SAVE US A GAR BY GIVING US THE S TURN. WE SAID WE THOUGHT IT WAS AN SMA X AND THAT WE REMEMBERED HEARING ONE FOLLOWING US. HE SAID THAT THE SMA X PLANE WAS 2 MI BEHIND US ON RADAR AND WHAT WE SAW WAS AN SMA Y AND THAT THERE WAS NO CONFLICT. SINCE THE PAX THAT HAD SEEN THE MOST (AS IT OCCURRED ON HER SIDE) HAD GONE HOME, I ONLY SAW LIGHTS, THE PLT SAW NOTHING, AND NOW THE OTHER PAX WASN'T POSITIVE ANYMORE. WE STARTED TO GO ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT IT MUST HAVE BEEN THE SMA Y. WE WERE STILL PUZZLED. HOW, IF WE WERE FOLLOWING TOO CLOSELY, TFC THAT WE HADN'T SEEN, AN S TURN COULD POSSIBLY CAUSE US TO OVERTAKE HIM. OUR ASSERTION WAS THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE BEEN IN FRONT OF THE SMA Y WHEN WE WERE TOLD TO TURN. HE JUST SAID THAT WE WERE WRONG. THE RADAR DIDN'T LIE. HE SAID FURTHER THAT WE WERE A PROB ACFT FOR THEM AND HIS MISTAKE WAS NOT TELLING US TO GAR AT THE OM. WHEN HE CAME TO A QUESTION ON HIS FORM ABOUT EVASIVE ACTION, WE SAID THAT THERE HAD NOT BEEN TIME DURING THE ENCOUNTER. HE PUT 'NON TAKEN.' WE OBJECTED THAT THIS SOUNDED LIKE WE WERE ADMITTING NEGLIGENCE AND THAT OUR FOLLOWING HIS VECTORS WAS OUR ACTION. HE SAID HE DIDN'T GIVE US ANY VECTORS (WHICH WAS TECHNICALLY CORRECT). WE WENT UPSTAIRS TO SEE THE RADAR AND LEARNED THAT IT COULD NOT DISCRIMINATE TFC LESS THAN 750' APART AND WERE ONCE AGAIN PUZZLED AT HOW HE COULD BE SO SURE. HE YELLED AT US SOME MORE WHILE IN THE TWR AND WE FINALLY LEFT SAYING WE WOULD PHONE HIM TO FIND OUT WHAT THE TAPE REVEALED. SUBSEQUENTLY, HE SAID THAT THE TAPE SHOWED THAT WE HAD ACKNOWLEDGED WE WERE TO FOLLOW THE SMA Y. HE PLAYED THE TAPE FOR ME OVER THE PHONE WHICH CONFIRMED THAT WE WERE TO FOLLOW THE SMA Y. HOWEVER, IT ALSO REVEALED THAT A SECOND SMA X WAS CLRED FOR TKOF AND TO REMAIN IN R TFC DURING ALL OF THIS. THE CTLR'S PREVIOUS GLEE WITH IT NOT BEING 'HIS FAULT' AND THAT WE WERE FOLLOWING OUR TFC 'TOO CLOSE' AND THAT 'THERE WASN'T ANY CONFLICT, I HAD IT ON RADAR' WAS RATHER ANNOYING SINCE AT LEAST 6 PEOPLE WERE ALMOST KILLED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR DISCUSSED THE INCIDENT WITH THE LCL FSDO AND THEY CLARIFIED MANY POINTS IN REGARD TO THE TWR TAPES. THE ACFT INVOLVED IN THE NMAC WAS IN FACT THE SMA Y THEY HAD BEEN FOLLOWING AND NOT SMA X AS IDENTIFIED BY HIS WIFE. SMA Y WAS FLOWN BY A STUDENT PLT AND HE WAS MAKING A STRAIGHT IN APCH. THE INFO HAS BEEN FORWARDED TO OKC AND NO FURTHER ACTION AGAINST THE RPTR IS PLANNED. STUDENT PLT DID NOT FEEL THE NMAC WAS AS CLOSE AS INDICATED BY THE RPTR AND HE CONTINUED TO A NORMAL LNDG. THE THIRD ACFT WAS SMA X THAT WAS IN THE TFC PATTERN MAKING TOUCH AND GOES. RPT FILLED OUT BY THE TWR WAS SUBMITTED AS AN FAA NMAC. ASRS RPT WAS MADE AT THE SUGGESTIONS OF THE FSDO OFFICE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.