Narrative:

I had completed the walk around of the aircraft for our flight to egll. I had noted one discrepancy related to the fire bottle armed light on the APU fire control panel located on the nose landing gear; the light was inop when pressed to test. I informed the captain and it was then written up via the ACARS and reported by voice to local maintenance. Within a few minutes the first mechanic came to the cockpit to ask for clarification of the problem and to start working on it. After looking at the light; the mechanic returned to explain to us that the entire light assembly had to be replaced and there were no parts available anywhere on the airport and even if they had them it would take anywhere between 3 and 4 hours to fix. After a short discussion with the mechanic it was determined the only alternative was to defer this assembly; but we were also informed that to do so would require the APU to be deferred inop along with the light assembly. After discussion with both first officers pertaining to possible need of the APU during a divert situation on the ground at a remote airport; the captain stated to maintenance that we would not be taking the aircraft to egll on an ETOPS flight with an inop APU. The mechanic stated that he would have to defer the APU and then we could refuse the aircraft when the deferral came through; he then left to start the deferral process. The aircraft was subsequently refused through dispatch with a meter to maintenance stating such. After the refusal came through another mechanic entered the cockpit; closed the door and explained to us that even though the APU would be deferred inop we could still use it if necessary for a diversion and continuing on with how we could use 'captain's emergency authority' to do so. This comment was viewed by the crew as an attempt to get us to back down from the refusal; take the aircraft and operate the APU in complete disregard for the far's and the MEL. In other words; the crew viewed this as an attempt at pilot pushing. After the mechanic's comment to us behind closed doors; I asked him 'if an FAA inspector was sitting with us right now; would you say the same thing?' his response was 'of course not;' which further solidified our thinking this was an attempt at pilot pushing. The mechanic left the cockpit and somehow the part that we were told was not available suddenly became available; work commenced and the aircraft was fixed. We departed 2 hours late; it did not take 3 to 4 hours to fix. This has to be the worst example of 'safety first' that I have ever seen. The flight crew was being pushed to accept something that they had already said no to; this is not acceptable and needs to stop.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Two B777-200 First Officers report attempts by Maintenance to coerce them to accept an aircraft for an ETOPs flight; which they considered unacceptable due to a deferred APU.

Narrative: I had completed the walk around of the aircraft for our flight to EGLL. I had noted one discrepancy related to the fire bottle armed light on the APU Fire Control Panel located on the nose landing gear; the light was inop when pressed to test. I informed the Captain and it was then written up via the ACARS and reported by voice to local maintenance. Within a few minutes the first Mechanic came to the cockpit to ask for clarification of the problem and to start working on it. After looking at the light; the Mechanic returned to explain to us that the entire light assembly had to be replaced and there were no parts available anywhere on the airport and even if they had them it would take anywhere between 3 and 4 hours to fix. After a short discussion with the Mechanic it was determined the only alternative was to defer this assembly; but we were also informed that to do so would require the APU to be deferred inop along with the light assembly. After discussion with both First Officers pertaining to possible need of the APU during a divert situation on the ground at a remote airport; the Captain stated to maintenance that we would not be taking the Aircraft to EGLL on an ETOPS flight with an inop APU. The Mechanic stated that he would have to defer the APU and then we could refuse the Aircraft when the deferral came through; he then left to start the deferral process. The aircraft was subsequently refused through Dispatch with a meter to Maintenance stating such. After the refusal came through another Mechanic entered the cockpit; closed the door and explained to us that even though the APU would be deferred inop we could still use it if necessary for a diversion and continuing on with how we could use 'Captain's emergency authority' to do so. This comment was viewed by the crew as an attempt to get us to back down from the refusal; take the aircraft and operate the APU in complete disregard for the FAR's and the MEL. In other words; the crew viewed this as an attempt at pilot pushing. After the Mechanic's comment to us behind closed doors; I asked him 'If an FAA inspector was sitting with us right now; would you say the same thing?' His response was 'of course not;' which further solidified our thinking this was an attempt at pilot pushing. The Mechanic left the cockpit and somehow the part that we were told was not available suddenly became available; work commenced and the aircraft was fixed. We departed 2 hours late; it did not take 3 to 4 hours to fix. This has to be the worst example of 'Safety First' that I have ever seen. The flight crew was being pushed to accept something that they had already said no to; this is not acceptable and needs to stop.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.