Narrative:

We initially came on duty on aircraft X for a position flight to be followed by a live flight. We arrived after the position flight and completed our preparation for the passenger flight on aircraft X when the captain was informed that we were to change planes for the trip. Captain did not want to change planes as this would cause a delay for the passengers but he was told that this is what we were required to do. We took the delay; changed aircraft and completed our preparations for the flight. The MEL deferral log indicated that the aircraft had recently had a right gen fail and that this had been signed off as corrected; thereby placing the aircraft in a status. We boarded our passengers; taxied for takeoff and were cleared to depart. During the takeoff roll at approximately 65-70 KTS; I heard a single chime; saw the master caution and we aborted the takeoff. When I could safely look at the cas; it showed an amber right gen fail. We exited the runway; taxied to a safe location and began to assess the problem. Captain entered the discrepancy and called maintenance while I monitored the aircraft. He received a deferral number and we read the deferral procedure to ascertain whether it was something the crew was authorized to complete. We determined that we did not know for certain as neither of us had encountered this particular problem before. Captain called maintenance again to get clarification of this and to find out exactly what needed to be done to complete the deferral. When we were satisfied that we had complied with the required procedure and the paperwork was complete and correct; we again taxied for departure. What we did not know was that we in fact had not complied with all required procedures due in large part to a confusion of instructions in the MEL and subsequent explanation of the procedures in a call to maintenance. During the second takeoff attempt; at approximately the same speed; the exact same caution/cas combination occurred and we again rejected our takeoff. Upon further investigation; we ascertained that the required deferral procedure had been completed incorrectly. The passenger decided after the second rejected takeoff to cancel their flight. This event would not have occurred if: 1) we had remained on the first aircraft assigned. It was ready to go and the passengers were at the FBO. 2) the deferral procedure had been fully understood and completed correctly. What we thought was correct was not the complete procedure. Had a maintenance technician been sent to the aircraft; perhaps that would have helped the crew to fully understand and complete the deferral procedure. Since it was explained to the captain via the telephone; perhaps the person on the other end did not know exactly what he was asking and the captain did not fully understand the explanation of which switches needed to be repositioned. Having experienced this malfunction firsthand; I believe that both members of the crew now fully understand this procedure and I do not believe either of us will have a recurrence of this event.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CL300 rejected its takeoff two times because of a 'R GEN FAIL' CAS warning. Following the first rejected takeoff an MEL was improperly applied so that on the second takeoff the generator problem with the same CAS warning reoccurred.

Narrative: We initially came on duty on Aircraft X for a position flight to be followed by a live flight. We arrived after the position flight and completed our preparation for the passenger flight on Aircraft X when the Captain was informed that we were to change planes for the trip. Captain did not want to change planes as this would cause a delay for the passengers but he was told that this is what we were required to do. We took the delay; changed aircraft and completed our preparations for the flight. The MEL deferral log indicated that the aircraft had recently had a R GEN FAIL and that this had been signed off as corrected; thereby placing the aircraft in A status. We boarded our passengers; taxied for takeoff and were cleared to depart. During the takeoff roll at approximately 65-70 KTS; I heard a single chime; saw the Master Caution and we aborted the takeoff. When I could safely look at the CAS; it showed an amber R GEN FAIL. We exited the runway; taxied to a safe location and began to assess the problem. Captain entered the discrepancy and called Maintenance while I monitored the aircraft. He received a deferral number and we read the deferral procedure to ascertain whether it was something the crew was authorized to complete. We determined that we did not know for certain as neither of us had encountered this particular problem before. Captain called Maintenance again to get clarification of this and to find out exactly what needed to be done to complete the deferral. When we were satisfied that we had complied with the required procedure and the paperwork was complete and correct; we again taxied for departure. What we did not know was that we in fact had not complied with all required procedures due in large part to a confusion of instructions in the MEL and subsequent explanation of the procedures in a call to Maintenance. During the second takeoff attempt; at approximately the same speed; the exact same caution/CAS combination occurred and we again rejected our takeoff. Upon further investigation; we ascertained that the required deferral procedure had been completed incorrectly. The passenger decided after the second rejected takeoff to cancel their flight. This event would not have occurred if: 1) We had remained on the first aircraft assigned. It was ready to go and the passengers were at the FBO. 2) The deferral procedure had been fully understood and completed correctly. What we thought was correct was not the complete procedure. Had a maintenance technician been sent to the aircraft; perhaps that would have helped the crew to fully understand and complete the deferral procedure. Since it was explained to the Captain via the telephone; perhaps the person on the other end did not know exactly what he was asking and the Captain did not fully understand the explanation of which switches needed to be repositioned. Having experienced this malfunction firsthand; I believe that both members of the crew now fully understand this procedure and I do not believe either of us will have a recurrence of this event.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.