Narrative:

We departed 39 minutes after our scheduled departure time due to a fueling delay caused by needing to drip the left tank. We departed with me as the flying pilot. Takeoff and initial climb were normal through flap retraction and completion of the after takeoff checklist. I was hand flying the aircraft out of 8000 feet with a clearance to FL190 when we got a green hydraulic system ECAM. I turned on the autopilot to offload myself; and took over ATC communication while the captain ran the ECAM. Things started to happen very quickly as the ptu surged while trying to pressurize the now empty green system causing repetitive ECAM chimes; the a flight attendant called to report loud noises in the cabin; and the yellow system pump overheated. The captain was extremely busy running checklists and starting to coordinate with the cabin and dispatch. At this point we turned off the yellow pump and ptu to get control of the overheat situation. I declared an emergency; coordinated with ATC for a return; and got us started on vectors to the north of the airport. At this point I was back to hand flying in alternate law on just the blue hydraulic system. When the captain completed the ECAM checklists and did a performance analysis; we realized we needed something like 13;000 feet of runway to land. We did some more holding while conferring with dispatch. About this time the yellow pump had cooled below the overheat threshold and we regained the yellow system; alleviating our landing distance problem. At this point we were ready to return for the visual approach. I flew the approach while the captain did a manual gear extension. We configured early to allow for the gear extension and slower than normal flap/slat operation. The landing and rollout were uneventful with one reverser and light braking beginning at about 100 knots. Our landing weight was 16X;000 pounds; and touchdown was smooth and light. We stopped and shut down on the runway; and fire rescue was in position and communicating with us immediately. They chocked us and checked our brake temps; which we showed at about 255 degrees max. Company personnel arrived to tow us to the gate. Turning onto the lead-in line the tug blew a tire; which was quite loud and we thought was a nose gear problem at first. Three items stand out to me about this incident. First; removing crews after an incident like this is essential. I was ready to continue; and didn't crash until about an hour later. At that point I was extremely fatigued. Secondly; automation (in this case the automatic operation of the ptu) was actually a detriment to our safety. To be able to work the problem and then select the ptu at our leisure would have eliminated a lot of confusion; excess ECAM warnings; and possibly the yellow pump overheat. If the pump had failed or caught fire the situation would have obviously been much worse. Thirdly; the condensed training (I have only been on the A-320 since january) leaves some knowledge gaps. If it had been me trying to run five or six ECAM checklists at once; we would still be in holding. During training; most scenarios just let you start the ECAM and then it's a new airplane; new day; in order to accomplish too much training in too little time.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 Flight Crew reports loss of the Green hydraulic system during climb out. The Yellow hydraulic pump overheats and is turned off putting the aircraft in Alternate Law. The Yellow pump cools and is restored prior to landing at departure airport.

Narrative: We departed 39 minutes after our scheduled departure time due to a fueling delay caused by needing to drip the left tank. We departed with me as the flying pilot. Takeoff and initial climb were normal through flap retraction and completion of the after takeoff checklist. I was hand flying the aircraft out of 8000 feet with a clearance to FL190 when we got a green hydraulic system ECAM. I turned on the autopilot to offload myself; and took over ATC communication while the Captain ran the ECAM. Things started to happen very quickly as the PTU surged while trying to pressurize the now empty Green system causing repetitive ECAM chimes; the A Flight Attendant called to report loud noises in the cabin; and the Yellow system pump overheated. The Captain was extremely busy running checklists and starting to coordinate with the cabin and dispatch. At this point we turned off the Yellow pump and PTU to get control of the overheat situation. I declared an emergency; coordinated with ATC for a return; and got us started on vectors to the north of the airport. At this point I was back to hand flying in Alternate Law on just the Blue hydraulic system. When the Captain completed the ECAM checklists and did a performance analysis; we realized we needed something like 13;000 feet of runway to land. We did some more holding while conferring with dispatch. About this time the Yellow pump had cooled below the overheat threshold and we regained the Yellow system; alleviating our landing distance problem. At this point we were ready to return for the visual approach. I flew the approach while the Captain did a manual gear extension. We configured early to allow for the gear extension and slower than normal flap/slat operation. The landing and rollout were uneventful with one reverser and light braking beginning at about 100 knots. Our landing weight was 16X;000 pounds; and touchdown was smooth and light. We stopped and shut down on the runway; and fire rescue was in position and communicating with us immediately. They chocked us and checked our brake temps; which we showed at about 255 degrees max. Company personnel arrived to tow us to the gate. Turning onto the lead-in line the tug blew a tire; which was quite loud and we thought was a nose gear problem at first. Three items stand out to me about this incident. First; removing crews after an incident like this is essential. I was ready to continue; and didn't crash until about an hour later. At that point I was extremely fatigued. Secondly; automation (in this case the automatic operation of the PTU) was actually a detriment to our safety. To be able to work the problem and then select the PTU at our leisure would have eliminated a lot of confusion; excess ECAM warnings; and possibly the Yellow pump overheat. If the pump had failed or caught fire the situation would have obviously been much worse. Thirdly; the condensed training (I have only been on the A-320 since January) leaves some knowledge gaps. If it had been me trying to run five or six ECAM checklists at once; we would still be in holding. During training; most scenarios just let you start the ECAM and then it's a new airplane; new day; in order to accomplish too much training in too little time.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.