37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 847857 |
Time | |
Date | 200908 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZMP.ARTCC |
State Reference | MN |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | A320 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Climb |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120 Flight Crew Total 10000 Flight Crew Type 5000 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Conflict Airborne Conflict |
Narrative:
We had a conflict with a dc-9 that missed a clearance to stop their climb 1000 ft below us. We were at FL300 and he was initially cleared to climb to FL330; but missed the change to stop at FL290 (or was never issued the clearance). Regardless; by the time the controller re-cleared him to FL290 we had an RA as the directed us to climb and then level off to avoid a collision. I advised ATC of the RA and the other pilot denied being issued 290 to avoid conflict. He didn't mention if he had an RA also. The above is why I always advocate that if a crew I am working on is dispatched with TCAS inoperative; that we turn down the aircraft for safety reasons. If see and avoid was a safe way to maintain separation and collision avoidance we wouldn't have TCAS in the first place! It may have prevented a mid air here.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: An A320 at FL300 received a TCAS RA with traffic climbing allegedly restricted below at FL290.
Narrative: We had a conflict with a DC-9 that missed a clearance to stop their climb 1000 FT below us. We were at FL300 and he was initially cleared to climb to FL330; but missed the change to stop at FL290 (or was never issued the clearance). Regardless; by the time the controller re-cleared him to FL290 we had an RA as the directed us to climb and then level off to avoid a collision. I advised ATC of the RA and the other pilot denied being issued 290 to avoid conflict. He didn't mention if he had an RA also. The above is why I always advocate that if a crew I am working on is dispatched with TCAS inoperative; that we turn down the aircraft for safety reasons. If see and avoid was a safe way to maintain separation and collision avoidance we wouldn't have TCAS in the first place! It may have prevented a mid air here.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.