Narrative:

While being vectored for a visual approach to runway 26R at denver we experienced a near miss with an large transport Y flight. When we turned base, 16 miles east of the field we were told to report sighting an large transport Y approaching from the southeast, who was to make a visual approach to runway 26L, maintain visual with him and we were cleared for a visual approach to runway 26R. We responded in the negative and stated that visibility was very limited. We did not hear radio transmissions between large transport Y and approach control as they were on another frequency. As we descended through approximately 9700' to our cleared altitude of 8000, large transport Y passed overhead only a few hundred feet above us and remained in sight only seconds. I estimate the distance between us at not more than 500'. Just prior to sighting large transport Y we were advised to expedite our descent to 8000'. At the time of the near miss we were still north of the 26L localizer which we had tuned and identified even though we were expecting to land on 26R. We subsequently passed through the localizer before our controller gave us a turn to the northwest. On reaching 8000' some 11 miles east of the field we sighted the airport and accepted clearance for a visual approach to runway 26R. The controller then stated that large transport Y was at our 2 O'clock high, and when I questioned the controller as to how he planned to cross large transport Y over to our left for his approach to runway 26L, he corrected himself and said large transport Y was at 10 O'clock high. As we got closer to the field where the ceiling was higher and visibility was better, we did see large transport Y at 10 O'clock high, too high to make a successful approach from anything like a normal profile. During a phone conversation with the tower supervisor after landing, he stated that the controller working large transport Y forgot to give him a turn onto final and when he noticed the potential conflict with us he 'stopped' large transport Y descent at 10,500'. I strongly disagree with his contention that a collision was not a possibility. In fact, as I told him at the time, there was no reason why a collision did not occur if you discount luck. There was never any intimidation of urgency either by inflection or wording from our controller. The tower supervisor admitted that it had not been a 'good operation' and that they were 'discussing it with their people'. He also said that they failed to appreciate how the visibility had deteriorated east of the airport. We had enroute to denver experienced the usual maneuvering and speed controls and it is clear to me that in order to keep from going to an instrument approach condition, possibly necessitating holding and further delays, they continued operating as though visual conditions existed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HVT BEING VECTORED FOR VISUAL APCH HAD NMAC WITH LGT ALSO BEING VECTORED FOR VISUAL TO PARALLEL RWY.

Narrative: WHILE BEING VECTORED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 26R AT DENVER WE EXPERIENCED A NEAR MISS WITH AN LGT Y FLT. WHEN WE TURNED BASE, 16 MILES EAST OF THE FIELD WE WERE TOLD TO REPORT SIGHTING AN LGT Y APCHING FROM THE SE, WHO WAS TO MAKE A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 26L, MAINTAIN VISUAL WITH HIM AND WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 26R. WE RESPONDED IN THE NEGATIVE AND STATED THAT VISIBILITY WAS VERY LIMITED. WE DID NOT HEAR RADIO TRANSMISSIONS BETWEEN LGT Y AND APCH CTL AS THEY WERE ON ANOTHER FREQ. AS WE DESCENDED THROUGH APPROX 9700' TO OUR CLRED ALT OF 8000, LGT Y PASSED OVERHEAD ONLY A FEW HUNDRED FEET ABOVE US AND REMAINED IN SIGHT ONLY SECONDS. I ESTIMATE THE DISTANCE BETWEEN US AT NOT MORE THAN 500'. JUST PRIOR TO SIGHTING LGT Y WE WERE ADVISED TO EXPEDITE OUR DESCENT TO 8000'. AT THE TIME OF THE NEAR MISS WE WERE STILL NORTH OF THE 26L LOC WHICH WE HAD TUNED AND IDENTIFIED EVEN THOUGH WE WERE EXPECTING TO LAND ON 26R. WE SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED THROUGH THE LOC BEFORE OUR CTLR GAVE US A TURN TO THE NORTHWEST. ON REACHING 8000' SOME 11 MILES EAST OF THE FIELD WE SIGHTED THE ARPT AND ACCEPTED CLRNC FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 26R. THE CTLR THEN STATED THAT LGT Y WAS AT OUR 2 O'CLOCK HIGH, AND WHEN I QUESTIONED THE CTLR AS TO HOW HE PLANNED TO CROSS LGT Y OVER TO OUR LEFT FOR HIS APCH TO RWY 26L, HE CORRECTED HIMSELF AND SAID LGT Y WAS AT 10 O'CLOCK HIGH. AS WE GOT CLOSER TO THE FIELD WHERE THE CEILING WAS HIGHER AND VISIBILITY WAS BETTER, WE DID SEE LGT Y AT 10 O'CLOCK HIGH, TOO HIGH TO MAKE A SUCCESSFUL APCH FROM ANYTHING LIKE A NORMAL PROFILE. DURING A PHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE TWR SUPERVISOR AFTER LNDG, HE STATED THAT THE CTLR WORKING LGT Y FORGOT TO GIVE HIM A TURN ONTO FINAL AND WHEN HE NOTICED THE POTENTIAL CONFLICT WITH US HE 'STOPPED' LGT Y DESCENT AT 10,500'. I STRONGLY DISAGREE WITH HIS CONTENTION THAT A COLLISION WAS NOT A POSSIBILITY. IN FACT, AS I TOLD HIM AT THE TIME, THERE WAS NO REASON WHY A COLLISION DID NOT OCCUR IF YOU DISCOUNT LUCK. THERE WAS NEVER ANY INTIMIDATION OF URGENCY EITHER BY INFLECTION OR WORDING FROM OUR CTLR. THE TWR SUPERVISOR ADMITTED THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN A 'GOOD OPERATION' AND THAT THEY WERE 'DISCUSSING IT WITH THEIR PEOPLE'. HE ALSO SAID THAT THEY FAILED TO APPRECIATE HOW THE VISIBILITY HAD DETERIORATED EAST OF THE ARPT. WE HAD ENROUTE TO DENVER EXPERIENCED THE USUAL MANEUVERING AND SPEED CTLS AND IT IS CLEAR TO ME THAT IN ORDER TO KEEP FROM GOING TO AN INSTRUMENT APCH CONDITION, POSSIBLY NECESSITATING HOLDING AND FURTHER DELAYS, THEY CONTINUED OPERATING AS THOUGH VISUAL CONDITIONS EXISTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.