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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 851706 |
Time | |
Date | 200909 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | A320 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack |
Person 1 | |
Function | Other / Unknown |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Enroute with #1 pack on MEL 2152A; pack inop due to fault when selected on; valve would not open (I deferred the pack that am). While enroute; at altitude; the #2 pack overheated and shut down. Within the span of 4 minutes the flt crew and I traded ACARS messages. Flt crew: losing pack 2 now; maintenance control: copy; pack 1 deferred; what is happening with pack 2; flt crew: pack 2 overheated; maintenance control: copy; captain discretion to try using the #1 pack; nothing deactivated on #1 pack; just switch selected off. That was the extent of my interaction with the flight crew. From my conversation with dispatch; the flight crew elected to try pack #1; it turned on and worked normally; then they were also able to regain the #2 pack. I also understand that the crew leveled off at approx FL15O; after regaining pack control; elected to go back up to altitude and continue the flight; using both packs. From my perspective; I was providing the crew with an option; if they elected to use it. I was familiar with the pack; since I had deferred it earlier that day; and there was one previous log gripe 6 days earlier; same problem; with a reset of the pack controller fixing the problem. Knowing this I felt the probability of the pack #1 working when selected on were good; or I would not have even mentioned this as an option for the crew to try (using the captain's emergency authority). My thoughts were for the safety and comfort of the crew and passengers; having no packs; potential high rate of descent; possibility of O2 masks dropping; and no temp control of cabin. The remainder of the flight was uneventful; with both packs operative. The question remains; should I have sent the ACARS messages as described earlier; or should I have not gotten involved and let the flight crew execute their procedures for flight with no packs. I believe my actions were prudent in giving the flight crew that option.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Maintenance controller reports on his role in authorizing an A320 flight crew to turn on a PACK on MEL when the only operational PACK shut down in flight. The deferred PACK operated normally and the second PACK was restored shortly thereafter.
Narrative: Enroute with #1 PACK on MEL 2152A; Pack inop due to fault when selected on; valve would not open (I deferred the pack that AM). While enroute; at altitude; the #2 PACK overheated and shut down. Within the span of 4 minutes the flt crew and I traded ACARS messages. Flt Crew: Losing PACK 2 now; Maintenance Control: Copy; pack 1 deferred; what is happening with PACK 2; Flt Crew: PACK 2 overheated; Maintenance Control: Copy; Captain discretion to try using the #1 pack; nothing deactivated on #1 PACK; just switch selected off. That was the extent of my interaction with the Flight crew. From my conversation with dispatch; the flight crew elected to try pack #1; it turned on and worked normally; then they were also able to regain the #2 PACK. I also understand that the crew leveled off at approx FL15O; after regaining pack control; elected to go back up to altitude and continue the flight; using both packs. From my perspective; I was providing the crew with an option; if they elected to use it. I was familiar with the pack; since I had deferred it earlier that day; and there was one previous log gripe 6 days earlier; same problem; with a reset of the PACK controller fixing the problem. Knowing this I felt the probability of the PACK #1 working when selected on were good; or I would not have even mentioned this as an option for the crew to try (using the Captain's emergency authority). My thoughts were for the safety and comfort of the crew and passengers; having no packs; potential high rate of descent; possibility of O2 masks dropping; and no temp control of cabin. The remainder of the flight was uneventful; with both PACKs operative. The question remains; should I have sent the ACARS messages as described earlier; or should I have not gotten involved and let the flight crew execute their procedures for flight with no packs. I believe my actions were prudent in giving the Flight crew that option.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.