Narrative:

I got a duats briefing; cross-checked with NOAA data and was satisfied that I had a handle on the weather. I saw that the coastal areas of the northern panhandle were bad; but likely would move north so I had to be alert for flight plan alteration in flight. I also have a garmin 496 with weather. I contacted miami center for flight following at 8500 and to my surprise I was cleared direct to 82J. I queried the controller and was assured that I was cleared direct. I was turned over to tampa and they warned me that my present heading would take me through W470 (a fact that I was aware of; but thought the center clearance was sufficient. I quickly altered my route to navigate directly to hevvn intersection and then to pfn and 82J) I noted severe weather after hevvn on my path; tallahassee apc also warned me and I noted that there was a defined area of no apparent activity south of my route that I could use; I visually confirmed that deviation to the left (south) would be the correct move. I was not informed about 'hot' areas as I indicated my route and was cleared; however I was now informed that I could not alter left because of artillery firing! My planned route was closed to me; but I decided to descend and try to 'skirt' the indicated areas of bad weather (note that I could still see the ground occasionally and that aided my decision). However; before I could get around an go down I was 'in it and inadvertently IFR' I immediately told the controller and was asked if I wanted an IFR clearance and that I should try to contact tyndall approach. I replied that 'I was very busy flying the aircraft and I'll get back to you.' the controller persisted and I told him that I was very busy controlling the aircraft and getting bounced around severely. I got the distinct impression that he did not appreciate the situation I was in. I did not declare an emergency because I was able to control the aircraft and did not feel that I was in danger of losing it! I finally got on to tyndall approach and the first controller asked me if I was aware that I had excessive rates of heading changes and altitude-I did; again mention that I was busy and a controller got on the line and asked the correct questions about my qualifications to fly IFR. (Before assuming the lsa status; I was a rated instrument pilot and in this situation I took the clearance. It took a while before I could get relatively stable on the 260 heading and 6000 ft she requested; I then said I preferred aaf airport and requested a lower altitude; she said okay but that 2100 ft was the lowest she could offer I acknowledged and started down. Soon I saw a hole that was large enough to maneuver into; visual to the ground; and I canceled descended to VFR at 1000-1300. From this point I decided; again using my in-flight weather and the excellent advisories from tyndall; to fly around the weather and head for destin and then home. The above reflects several disturbing things to me: first I admit that I tested the weather a bit farther than was wise. However; I did think that I had an adequate plan; until it was taken away from me by the late notification of 'hot' areas. Had I known that; I would have gone north just prior to hevvn intersection and miss the bulk of the nasty weather. What concerned me was the apparent lack of controller understanding that I was (potentially) in a serious; if not deadly; situation. There were no offers of 'the fastest way out' 'did I need help such as heading to nearest suitable airfield etc.' I was pelted with unnecessary communications that frankly were not helpful. The second tyndall controller was first-rate; we quickly got together and all was well. Lessons learned: I should not have accepted a 'direct' clearance from miami as I had a good plan and knew that direct was improbable given the complexities of tampa class B and the eglin defense areas. When I had my escape route eliminated I should; at that point said no; reversed course and deviated to get better weather--I could see the better way. I should realize the many controllers are not pilots and have no idea what it is like trying to control an aircraft in a storm with vertical and lateral vectors affecting control. They could be more sensitive to obvious stress situations and tailor information to help. In this instance; I learned that my lsa aircraft is controllable through a wide range of external inputs. As soon I saw I was in for a tough ride I thought to reverse course; but I found it impossible to do so because I felt that attempting the turn could possibly be an unsafe maneuver. At this point I concentrated on aircraft control; but I did not cinch my shoulder straps sufficiently; I got a bloody nose. Point here is that I could have been rendered unconscious-stupid mistake! I recognize that I did everything correctly to have a safe flight but failed to follow through. Instrument training is a life saver!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Light Sport Aircraft pilot took off in marginal conditions and subsequently flew in to IMC and turbulence.

Narrative: I got a DUATs briefing; cross-checked with NOAA data and was satisfied that I had a handle on the weather. I saw that the coastal areas of the northern Panhandle were bad; but likely would move north so I had to be alert for flight plan alteration in flight. I also have a GARMIN 496 with weather. I contacted Miami Center for flight following at 8500 and to my surprise I was cleared direct to 82J. I queried the controller and was assured that I was cleared direct. I was turned over to Tampa and they warned me that my present heading would take me through W470 (a fact that I was aware of; but thought the center clearance was sufficient. I quickly altered my route to navigate directly to HEVVN intersection and then to PFN and 82J) I noted severe weather after HEVVN on my path; Tallahassee APC also warned me and I noted that there was a defined area of no apparent activity south of my route that I could use; I visually confirmed that deviation to the left (south) would be the correct move. I was not informed about 'hot' areas as I indicated my route and was cleared; however I was NOW INFORMED THAT I COULD NOT ALTER LEFT BECAUSE OF Artillery firing! MY PLANNED ROUTE WAS CLOSED TO ME; but I decided to descend and try to 'skirt' the indicated areas of bad weather (Note that I could still see the ground occasionally and that aided my decision). However; before I could get around an go down I was 'in it and inadvertently IFR' I immediately told the controller and was asked if I wanted an IFR Clearance and that I should try to contact Tyndall Approach. I replied that 'I was very busy flying the aircraft and I'LL get back to you.' the Controller persisted and I told him that I was VERY BUSY controlling the aircraft and getting bounced around severely. I got the distinct impression that he did not appreciate the situation I was in. I did not declare an emergency because I was able to control the aircraft and did not feel that I was in danger of losing it! I finally got on to Tyndall APCH and the first Controller asked me if I was aware that I had excessive rates of heading changes and altitude-I did; again mention that I was busy and a Controller got on the line and asked the correct questions about my qualifications to fly IFR. (Before assuming the LSA status; I was a rated instrument pilot and in this situation I took the clearance. It took a while before I could get relatively stable on the 260 heading and 6000 FT she requested; I then said I preferred AAF airport and requested a lower altitude; she said okay but that 2100 FT was the lowest she could offer I acknowledged and started down. Soon I saw a hole that was large enough to maneuver into; visual to the ground; and I canceled descended to VFR at 1000-1300. From this point I decided; again using my in-flight weather and the excellent advisories from Tyndall; to fly around the weather and head for Destin and then home. The above reflects several disturbing things to me: first I admit that I tested the weather a bit farther than was wise. However; I did think that I had an adequate plan; until it was taken away from me by the late notification of 'hot' areas. Had I known that; I would have gone north just prior to HEVVN intersection and miss the bulk of the nasty weather. What concerned me was the apparent lack of controller understanding that I was (potentially) in a serious; if not deadly; situation. There were no offers of 'the fastest way out' 'did I need help such as heading to nearest suitable airfield etc.' I was pelted with unnecessary communications that frankly were not helpful. The second Tyndall controller was first-rate; we quickly got together and all was well. Lessons learned: I should not have accepted a 'direct' clearance from Miami as I had a good plan and knew that direct was improbable given the complexities of Tampa Class B and the Eglin Defense Areas. When I had my escape route eliminated I should; at that point said no; reversed course and deviated to get better weather--I could see the better way. I should realize the many controllers are not pilots and have no idea what it is like trying to control an aircraft in a storm with vertical and lateral vectors affecting control. They could be more sensitive to obvious stress situations and tailor information to help. In this instance; I learned that my LSA aircraft is controllable through a wide range of external inputs. As soon I saw I was in for a tough ride I thought to reverse course; but I found it impossible to do so because I felt that attempting the turn could possibly be an unsafe maneuver. At this point I concentrated on aircraft control; but I did not cinch my shoulder straps sufficiently; I got a bloody nose. Point here is that I could have been rendered unconscious-stupid mistake! I recognize that I did everything correctly to have a safe flight but failed to follow through. INSTRUMENT TRAINING IS A LIFE SAVER!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.