Small transport operating in arsa, not in contact with approach control, came very close to air carr...

Narrative:

During feb and april of 1988 there were 2 instances of VFR aircraft operating within the phx arsa without having established two way radio communications with phx approach control. Both situations were very dangerous operations; one included a traffic alert being issued to an medium large transport on departure off phx. When the FAA attempted to process these pilots for violations of far 91-88 it was discovered that both pilots had been in communications with sdl tower (satellite facility) and therefore it was determined that no violation of far 9/88 had occurred. It appears that a pilot is not required to be in two-way radio communication. With the ATC facility having jurisdiction of the arsa while operating in the arsa. This is an extremely dangerous and hazardous situation. It is completely unsafe and undermines the very nature and intent of arsa airspace. This unsatisfactory condition has been documented and included on a vcr dated 4-SUN-88. The following proposed solutions were recommended. (3-POSSIBLE). Require all tower and FSS controllers to include the instructions to 'remain outside the arsa' when establishing two-way radio communications with all pilots. Change far 9/88 to require pilots to be in two-way radio communications with the 'parent' ATC facility having jurisdiction of the arsa prior to operating in the arsa. Change far 9/88 to require an aircraft to be in radar contact prior to operating in the arsa. With all the problems that have already surfaced out of this issue. This appears to be the overall best solution. Specific phraseology to enter the arsa would not be required but would be understood to be automatic once radar contact had been established. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that he has seen and heard about numerous incidents caused by the situation outlined in his report. The far that establishes airport radar service areas (arsas) states, in part, 'no person may operate an aircraft in an airport radar service area unless two-way radio communication is established with ATC prior to entering that arsa and is thereafter maintained with ATC while in that area.' (emphasis added by analyst) the problem arises in the phx area because on numerous occasions aircraft have been observed operating in the arsa without being in two-way communication with phx approach control. In some cases, these aircraft have passed very close to IFR aircraft departure and arrival at phx. When the ATC facility has investigated the incident, they have found that the subject pilot has been in contact with scottsdale tower, landing VFR at that airport. Since the pilot is in contact with ATC, flight standards will take no action to either counsel or take enforcement action against the pilot. Reporter thinks that something should be done to correct this potentially dangerous area of arsa operation. Analyst agrees. The reporter made suggestions and they are found in the text of his report.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMT OPERATING IN ARSA, NOT IN CONTACT WITH APCH CTL, CAME VERY CLOSE TO ACR MLG DEPARTING THE PRIMARY ARPT.

Narrative: DURING FEB AND APRIL OF 1988 THERE WERE 2 INSTANCES OF VFR ACFT OPERATING WITHIN THE PHX ARSA WITHOUT HAVING ESTABLISHED TWO WAY RADIO COMMUNICATIONS WITH PHX APCH CTL. BOTH SITUATIONS WERE VERY DANGEROUS OPERATIONS; ONE INCLUDED A TFC ALERT BEING ISSUED TO AN MLG ON DEP OFF PHX. WHEN THE FAA ATTEMPTED TO PROCESS THESE PLTS FOR VIOLATIONS OF FAR 91-88 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT BOTH PLTS HAD BEEN IN COMMUNICATIONS WITH SDL TWR (SATELLITE FACILITY) AND THEREFORE IT WAS DETERMINED THAT NO VIOLATION OF FAR 9/88 HAD OCCURRED. IT APPEARS THAT A PLT IS NOT REQUIRED TO BE IN TWO-WAY RADIO COMMUNICATION. WITH THE ATC FACILITY HAVING JURISDICTION OF THE ARSA WHILE OPERATING IN THE ARSA. THIS IS AN EXTREMELY DANGEROUS AND HAZARDOUS SITUATION. IT IS COMPLETELY UNSAFE AND UNDERMINES THE VERY NATURE AND INTENT OF ARSA AIRSPACE. THIS UNSATISFACTORY CONDITION HAS BEEN DOCUMENTED AND INCLUDED ON A VCR DATED 4-SUN-88. THE FOLLOWING PROPOSED SOLUTIONS WERE RECOMMENDED. (3-POSSIBLE). REQUIRE ALL TWR AND FSS CTLRS TO INCLUDE THE INSTRUCTIONS TO 'REMAIN OUTSIDE THE ARSA' WHEN ESTABLISHING TWO-WAY RADIO COMMUNICATIONS WITH ALL PLTS. CHANGE FAR 9/88 TO REQUIRE PLTS TO BE IN TWO-WAY RADIO COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE 'PARENT' ATC FACILITY HAVING JURISDICTION OF THE ARSA PRIOR TO OPERATING IN THE ARSA. CHANGE FAR 9/88 TO REQUIRE AN ACFT TO BE IN RADAR CONTACT PRIOR TO OPERATING IN THE ARSA. WITH ALL THE PROBLEMS THAT HAVE ALREADY SURFACED OUT OF THIS ISSUE. THIS APPEARS TO BE THE OVERALL BEST SOLUTION. SPECIFIC PHRASEOLOGY TO ENTER THE ARSA WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED BUT WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD TO BE AUTOMATIC ONCE RADAR CONTACT HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH REPORTER REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: REPORTER STATED THAT HE HAS SEEN AND HEARD ABOUT NUMEROUS INCIDENTS CAUSED BY THE SITUATION OUTLINED IN HIS REPORT. THE FAR THAT ESTABLISHES AIRPORT RADAR SERVICE AREAS (ARSAS) STATES, IN PART, 'NO PERSON MAY OPERATE AN ACFT IN AN ARPT RADAR SERVICE AREA UNLESS TWO-WAY RADIO COMMUNICATION IS ESTABLISHED WITH ATC PRIOR TO ENTERING THAT ARSA AND IS THEREAFTER MAINTAINED WITH ATC WHILE IN THAT AREA.' (EMPHASIS ADDED BY ANALYST) THE PROBLEM ARISES IN THE PHX AREA BECAUSE ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS ACFT HAVE BEEN OBSERVED OPERATING IN THE ARSA WITHOUT BEING IN TWO-WAY COMMUNICATION WITH PHX APCH CTL. IN SOME CASES, THESE ACFT HAVE PASSED VERY CLOSE TO IFR ACFT DEP AND ARR AT PHX. WHEN THE ATC FAC HAS INVESTIGATED THE INCIDENT, THEY HAVE FOUND THAT THE SUBJECT PLT HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH SCOTTSDALE TWR, LNDG VFR AT THAT ARPT. SINCE THE PLT IS IN CONTACT WITH ATC, FLT STANDARDS WILL TAKE NO ACTION TO EITHER COUNSEL OR TAKE ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST THE PLT. RPTR THINKS THAT SOMETHING SHOULD BE DONE TO CORRECT THIS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS AREA OF ARSA OPERATION. ANALYST AGREES. THE RPTR MADE SUGGESTIONS AND THEY ARE FOUND IN THE TEXT OF HIS REPORT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	85330
Time
Date	198804
Day	Sun
Local Time Of Day	1801 To 2400
Place
Locale Reference	atc facility : az
State Reference	AZ
Altitude	msl bound lower : 3300 msl bound upper : 3500
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Dusk
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tracon : phx tower : sdl
Operator	general aviation : personal
Make Model Name	Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Recip Eng
Flight Phase	descent : approach landing other
Aircraft 2
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Flight Phase	climbout : intermediate altitude
Route In Use	departure other
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	government : faa
Function	controller : approach
Qualification	controller : radar
Experience	controller non radar : 3 controller radar : 15
ASRS Report	85330
Person 2
Function	flight crew : single pilot
Events
Anomaly	conflict : airborne less severe other anomaly other
Independent Detector	atc equipment other atc equipment : unspecified other controllera
Resolutory Action	other
Consequence	faa : investigated Other
Miss Distance	horizontal : 6000 vertical : 200
Supplementary
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	other
Situations
ATC Facility	procedure or policy : unspecified

Small transport operating in arsa, not in contact with approach control, came very close to air carrier medium large transport departing the primary airport.