Narrative:

Crew arrived to a cold aircraft. On power up; ECAM showed: F/control slat sys 2 fault. Captain coordinated with maintenance control and placed item in the logbook. Contract maintenance arrived at the aircraft and cleared the ECAM and checked the status. With nothing in the status box; the mechanic declared the problem solved. The captain pushed recall and the fault displayed. The mechanic explained that it always brings back the last fault. The captain patiently explained that; that was not true and demonstrated the same by turning off the nosewheel steering /anti-skid switch; clearing the ECAM and recalling the fault; then clearing again and turning on the switch; and recalling with no; nose wheel/ anti-skid fault displayed. The mechanic then put me on with maintenance control; who asked to be put on with the mechanic on the airplane. They did some further trouble shooting and decided to defer the item. The contract mechanic was in constant communication with the maintenance control. The deferral was item 27-51-01. The last item in the corrective action block of the log page was ' MEL procedure complete'. The crew reviewed chapters 1 and 2 of the MEL. The MEL had five items that made the deferral valid. We also reviewed the cockpit operating manual (communication). Two operational items required our attention: 1)- forbid flaps-1 takeoff. The other directed us to ignore spurious ecams and status messages. The slats were slow. On arrival in ZZZ1; a mechanic met the aircraft and asked the captain to assist him in a procedure maintenance control had sent him. The captain assumed that it was an effort to clear the fault. The mechanic said 'no'; it was a required test to check the wing tip brake (wtb) for the number-1 system; one of the five items that made the MEL valid. The check was logged as MEL procedure 27-81-00-710 in the logbook. The crew then consulted chapter 3 of the MEL. The required test was there; plain as day and was not completed in ZZZ by the mechanic under the direct supervision of maintenance control. The crew concluded in ZZZ that all required checks were complete by a competent mechanic and a competent controller. It clearly was not. We concluded that the aircraft operated in an un-airworthy condition.maintenance came out with the correct procedure in ZZZ1. Crew did further research.I believe that maintenance control rushed the procedure in an effort to push the delay onto flight operations. We received the logbook and deferral five minutes prior to scheduled push. I also believe that as captain; I exercised due diligence. The conclusion that all items required to be completed by maintenance were done; should be sufficient simply by reviewing the corrective action block of the logbook. 'All MEL procedures complete'; and by the crew's awareness of the close cooperation of the contract mechanic and the controller. The conclusion that the aircraft operated in an un-airworthy condition is sobering. In the future; I will exercise exceptional diligence. I simply must conclude that maintenance control is not doing their job which is chapter 3 of the MEL. I personally am outraged that this happened to me. I feel like I was set up. Maintenance got it right by the time the aircraft arrived in ZZZ1. Downline legs were in compliance with the MEL.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Captain and a First Officer report a Contract Mechanic under the direction of their Maintenance Control failed to perform a Wing Tip Brake test for the Slat Flap Control Computer (SFCC) System-1; as part of the deferral of the SFCC System -2 for an A319. They unknowingly flew the aircraft in an un-airworthy condition.

Narrative: Crew arrived to a cold aircraft. On power up; ECAM showed: F/CTL Slat Sys 2 fault. Captain coordinated with Maintenance Control and placed item in the Logbook. Contract Maintenance arrived at the aircraft and cleared the ECAM and checked the Status. With nothing in the Status box; the Mechanic declared the problem solved. The Captain pushed recall and the fault displayed. The Mechanic explained that it always brings back the last fault. The Captain patiently explained that; that was not true and demonstrated the same by turning off the Nosewheel Steering /Anti-skid switch; clearing the ECAM and recalling the fault; then clearing again and turning on the switch; and recalling with no; Nose wheel/ Anti-skid fault displayed. The Mechanic then put me on with Maintenance Control; who asked to be put on with the Mechanic on the airplane. They did some further trouble shooting and decided to defer the item. The Contract Mechanic was in constant communication with the Maintenance Control. The deferral was item 27-51-01. The last item in the corrective action block of the Log page was ' MEL procedure complete'. The Crew reviewed Chapters 1 and 2 of the MEL. The MEL had five items that made the deferral valid. We also reviewed the Cockpit Operating Manual (COM). Two Operational items required our attention: 1)- Forbid flaps-1 takeoff. The other directed us to ignore spurious ECAMS and Status messages. The slats were slow. On arrival in ZZZ1; a Mechanic met the aircraft and asked the Captain to assist him in a procedure Maintenance Control had sent him. The Captain assumed that it was an effort to clear the fault. The Mechanic said 'no'; it was a Required test to check the Wing Tip Brake (WTB) for the Number-1 system; one of the five items that made the MEL valid. The Check was logged as MEL procedure 27-81-00-710 in the Logbook. The Crew then consulted Chapter 3 of the MEL. The required test was there; plain as day and WAS NOT completed in ZZZ by the Mechanic under the direct Supervision of Maintenance Control. The Crew concluded in ZZZ that all required checks were complete by a competent Mechanic and a competent Controller. It clearly was not. We concluded that the aircraft operated in an Un-airworthy condition.Maintenance came out with the correct procedure in ZZZ1. Crew did further research.I believe that Maintenance Control rushed the procedure in an effort to push the delay onto Flight Operations. We received the Logbook and deferral five minutes prior to scheduled push. I also believe that as Captain; I exercised due diligence. The conclusion that all items required to be completed by Maintenance were done; should be sufficient simply by reviewing the Corrective action block of the Logbook. 'All MEL procedures complete'; and by the Crew's awareness of the close cooperation of the Contract Mechanic and the Controller. The conclusion that the aircraft operated in an Un-airworthy condition is sobering. In the future; I will exercise exceptional diligence. I simply must conclude that Maintenance Control is not doing their job which is Chapter 3 of the MEL. I personally am outraged that this happened to me. I feel like I WAS SET UP. Maintenance got it right by the time the aircraft arrived in ZZZ1. Downline legs were in compliance with the MEL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.