Narrative:

During taxi-in; after landing; I noticed the hydraulic quantity appeared to be lower than what we thought to be normal; however it was still in the green arc and all accumulators were indicating normal pressures. While monitoring; the quantity seemed to be slowly dropping>. Therefor; in an anticipation of a possible leak; I shut the hydraulic pump off. At this time the emergency/non normal checklist was consulted for a possible hydraulic fluid loss. It was also discussed that if the quantity continued to decrease; I would slow the aircraft to a complete stop in the nearest safe area and be towed to the gate. A short time later; the quantity dropped into the yellow arc; and even though all accumulators were still indicating normal; I decided to park the aircraft at the nearby deice pad and be towed into the gate. As the aircraft was being slowed to a stop; the hydraulic look down caution light on the cwp illuminated once the quantity dropped to the red line. After the aircraft was brought to a complete stop; ground control was notified; and the emergency/non normal checklist was completed. Operations were then immediately notified and chocks and a tug were requested multiple times. Dispatch and maintenance were then notified. After multiple calls to operations; a tug arrived approximately 20 minutes later; however chocks were forgotten. The tug was able to hook up the aircraft but we were told that towing would not be possible because of the angle the nose wheel was pointed. We asked the tug to stay connected until a mechanic could come out and look at it. Maintenance was contacted and a mechanic was requested. A mechanic arrived approximately 15 minutes later. Eventually chocks arrived; I then shut down the left engine with the tug still attached so the left main wheels could be chocked. I decided to the leave the right engine running in feather to maintain cabin temperature and lavatory lighting since I was uncertain how the aircraft was going to be towed. Eventually a mechanic showed up; then a large towbar and larger tug. The aircraft was towed into the gate without incident approximately 45 minutes from the time the aircraft was stopped at the de-ice pad. The aircraft had a mechanical failure in the right main landing gear brake system. When I called operations and asked for assistance with a tug and to chock an aircraft with no brakes or no steering I find it extremely unacceptable to have to make multiple calls and wait for over half hour for assistance. They actually pushed an aircraft right in front of us so that we had to wait for that tug; I know we have more than one tug. Then I found it very disturbing and unsafe that they had another aircraft taxi around us and exit around on the ramp instead of through the alleyway like most normal departures. I felt that operations and ramp wanted to keep blowing us off. Maybe we need better trained personnel for these jobs. Thanks to a little luck and prior planning on our part the aircraft was not damaged; this type of situation is an urgent one; and needs immediate attention next time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A SF340's right main landing gear brake system developed a leak after landing. The aircraft was parked and after a lengthy delay was towed to the gate.

Narrative: During taxi-in; after landing; I noticed the hydraulic quantity appeared to be lower than what we thought to be normal; however it was still in the green arc and all accumulators were indicating normal pressures. While monitoring; the quantity seemed to be slowly dropping>. Therefor; in an anticipation of a possible leak; I shut the hydraulic pump off. At this time the Emergency/Non Normal checklist was consulted for a possible hydraulic fluid loss. It was also discussed that if the quantity continued to decrease; I would slow the aircraft to a complete stop in the nearest safe area and be towed to the gate. A short time later; the quantity dropped into the yellow arc; and even though all accumulators were still indicating normal; I decided to park the aircraft at the nearby deice pad and be towed into the gate. As the aircraft was being slowed to a stop; the hydraulic look down caution light on the CWP illuminated once the quantity dropped to the red line. After the aircraft was brought to a complete stop; ground control was notified; and the Emergency/Non Normal checklist was completed. Operations were then immediately notified and chocks and a tug were requested multiple times. Dispatch and Maintenance were then notified. After multiple calls to Operations; a tug arrived approximately 20 minutes later; however chocks were forgotten. The tug was able to hook up the aircraft but we were told that towing would not be possible because of the angle the nose wheel was pointed. We asked the tug to stay connected until a mechanic could come out and look at it. Maintenance was contacted and a mechanic was requested. A mechanic arrived approximately 15 minutes later. Eventually chocks arrived; I then shut down the left engine with the tug still attached so the left main wheels could be chocked. I decided to the leave the right engine running in feather to maintain cabin temperature and lavatory lighting since I was uncertain how the aircraft was going to be towed. Eventually a mechanic showed up; then a large towbar and larger tug. The aircraft was towed into the gate without incident approximately 45 minutes from the time the aircraft was stopped at the de-ice pad. The aircraft had a mechanical failure in the right main landing gear brake system. When I called Operations and asked for assistance with a tug and to chock an aircraft with no brakes or no steering I find it extremely unacceptable to have to make multiple calls and wait for over half hour for assistance. They actually pushed an aircraft right in front of us so that we had to wait for that tug; I know we have more than one tug. Then I found it very disturbing and unsafe that they had another aircraft taxi around us and exit around on the ramp instead of through the alleyway like most normal departures. I felt that Operations and Ramp wanted to keep blowing us off. Maybe we need better trained personnel for these jobs. Thanks to a little luck and prior planning on our part the aircraft was not damaged; this type of situation is an urgent one; and needs IMMEDIATE ATTENTION next time.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.