Narrative:

I was cleared for takeoff on runway 16 at pwk. I was cleared via the pal-waukee two departure with a right turn to a heading of 360 degrees and an altitude assignment of 2100 ft MSL. This departure is designed to separate aircraft departing pwk with aircraft arriving at ord on runway 14R. After accelerating down the runway and rotating; I immediately received numerous crew alerting system (cas) warning messages. This indicated a failure of certain systems on my aircraft. I continued the climb trying to maintain focus on flying the aircraft first and dealing with the cas messages second. As I began my normal after-takeoff process of retracting gear and flaps; retarding the throttles; and starting to engage systems on the aircraft; I was unable to engage my yaw damper. This was due to the systems that had failed and were giving the cas messages. The yaw damper focused my attention back to the cas messages. I wanted to verify which messages they were; as that would determine how critical they were; and how quickly I would need to respond to them. As I was looking at the cas messages; I initiated my right hand turn to a heading of 360. A few seconds later; pwk tower told me to; contact chicago departure and keep my turn tight. Unfortunately; as my focus was on my aircraft and the failure messages I was getting; I had taken too long to start my initial right turn. This turn is required to be started within one nautical mile of the departure end of runway 16. This requirement is in place because if you don't start your initial turn within one mile; you will not be able to turn tight enough to avoid flying through the 345 degree radial of the ord VOR. Consequentially; my delayed turn caused me to make too wide of a turn and I lost the required separation between my aircraft and an aircraft arriving to ord. After troubleshooting the cas messages; I made the decision to return to pwk. I made a normal landing by following the procedures in the quick reference handbook. I believe the problem was caused by a number of factors. First; I was highly loaded with tasks to complete in an extremely short period of time. The demand to retract the gear; retract the flaps; bring the throttles back; engage the yaw damper; maintain airspeed and altitude; respond to tower; contact departure control; start an aggressive right turn; and level off after 1500 ft is very fast paced. In addition to that usual flow of procedures; I was given a potential emergency situation that required my immediate attention. I allowed myself to become distracted by the cas messages which caused me to momentarily delay the start of my initial turn. Second; I believe that a contributing factor was the fact that I was flying the jet single pilot. While I am single pilot certified; have a fair amount of single pilot operation experience; and feel comfortable flying single pilot; I believe that if I were to have had a second pilot on board to deal with the cas messages; this incident would not have occurred. Third; I feel the departure procedure at pwk is inherently problematic. I have completed that departure many times and even when everything is functioning as it should; it is still very hard to complete that turn within the 345 degree radial. It requires a turn radius of less than 5000 ft. Also to avoid banking the aircraft more than 30 degrees; it requires a maximum airspeed of 180 KTS. Imagine if there is a strong wind blowing; how much aircraft bank or how slow you have to be going to meet the restriction. For most jet aircraft this is quite a task. I know for a fact that this departure procedure is frequently broken. Lastly; a contributing factor was the mechanic who had done an inspection on my aircraft the day before. As part of his inspection he had to remove a sensor while he preformed his checks. When replacing that sensor; the mechanic did not fully tighten the sensor or completely replace it to its usual position. This caused the sensor to not work properly; which is what caused the cas warning messages to occur as soon as I rotated. In the future to prevent this from happening again; I will remain more vigilant when accepting this (and all other) departure procedure. I will also consider not accepting this procedure if I feel the conditions or other factors may prevent me from safely complying with it. I will also remember to always fly the airplane first when a potential problem arises; then deal with the issue second. This is something that we learn in training; and now I can say I fully understand the concept. If I had focused on flying the airplane first; and started the turn; I would not have caused the potential traffic conflict. I could have dealt with the situation after that and made a safe return to the airport; as the cas messages weren't items that required immediate action.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Erroneous CAS messages and a demanding departure procedure out of PWK cause a VLJ pilot to lose separation with an aircraft inbound to ORD.

Narrative: I was cleared for takeoff on Runway 16 at PWK. I was cleared via the Pal-Waukee Two Departure with a right turn to a heading of 360 degrees and an altitude assignment of 2100 FT MSL. This departure is designed to separate aircraft departing PWK with aircraft arriving at ORD on Runway 14R. After accelerating down the runway and rotating; I immediately received numerous crew alerting system (CAS) warning messages. This indicated a failure of certain systems on my aircraft. I continued the climb trying to maintain focus on flying the aircraft first and dealing with the CAS messages second. As I began my normal after-takeoff process of retracting gear and flaps; retarding the throttles; and starting to engage systems on the aircraft; I was unable to engage my yaw damper. This was due to the systems that had failed and were giving the CAS messages. The yaw damper focused my attention back to the CAS messages. I wanted to verify which messages they were; as that would determine how critical they were; and how quickly I would need to respond to them. As I was looking at the CAS messages; I initiated my right hand turn to a heading of 360. A few seconds later; PWK Tower told me to; contact Chicago Departure and keep my turn tight. Unfortunately; as my focus was on my aircraft and the failure messages I was getting; I had taken too long to start my initial right turn. This turn is required to be started within one nautical mile of the departure end of Runway 16. This requirement is in place because if you don't start your initial turn within one mile; you will not be able to turn tight enough to avoid flying through the 345 degree radial of the ORD VOR. Consequentially; my delayed turn caused me to make too wide of a turn and I lost the required separation between my aircraft and an aircraft arriving to ORD. After troubleshooting the CAS messages; I made the decision to return to PWK. I made a normal landing by following the procedures in the Quick Reference Handbook. I believe the problem was caused by a number of factors. First; I was highly loaded with tasks to complete in an extremely short period of time. The demand to retract the gear; retract the flaps; bring the throttles back; engage the yaw damper; maintain airspeed and altitude; respond to Tower; contact Departure Control; start an aggressive right turn; and level off after 1500 FT is very fast paced. In addition to that usual flow of procedures; I was given a potential emergency situation that required my immediate attention. I allowed myself to become distracted by the CAS messages which caused me to momentarily delay the start of my initial turn. Second; I believe that a contributing factor was the fact that I was flying the jet single pilot. While I am single pilot certified; have a fair amount of single pilot operation experience; and feel comfortable flying single pilot; I believe that if I were to have had a second pilot on board to deal with the CAS messages; this incident would not have occurred. Third; I feel the departure procedure at PWK is inherently problematic. I have completed that departure many times and even when everything is functioning as it should; it is still very hard to complete that turn within the 345 degree radial. It requires a turn radius of less than 5000 FT. Also to avoid banking the aircraft more than 30 degrees; it requires a maximum airspeed of 180 KTS. Imagine if there is a strong wind blowing; how much aircraft bank or how slow you have to be going to meet the restriction. For most jet aircraft this is quite a task. I know for a fact that this departure procedure is frequently broken. Lastly; a contributing factor was the Mechanic who had done an inspection on my aircraft the day before. As part of his inspection he had to remove a sensor while he preformed his checks. When replacing that sensor; the Mechanic did not fully tighten the sensor or completely replace it to its usual position. This caused the sensor to not work properly; which is what caused the CAS warning messages to occur as soon as I rotated. In the future to prevent this from happening again; I will remain more vigilant when accepting this (and all other) departure procedure. I will also consider not accepting this procedure if I feel the conditions or other factors may prevent me from safely complying with it. I will also remember to always fly the airplane first when a potential problem arises; then deal with the issue second. This is something that we learn in training; and now I can say I fully understand the concept. If I had focused on flying the airplane first; and started the turn; I would not have caused the potential traffic conflict. I could have dealt with the situation after that and made a safe return to the airport; as the CAS messages weren't items that required immediate action.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.