Narrative:

Miami ground control directed us to taxi to runway 27 via taxiway P. After turning onto taxiway P we switched to tower frequency who cleared us into 'position and hold' on runway 27 while we were still taxiing. The first officer completed the final items on the before takeoff checklist while I taxied the aircraft to runway 27 via taxiways P and Q8. We inadvertently taxied through the runway 27 threshold extension (slight extended threshold) and continued on taxiway Q8 toward runway 30. The tower directed us to hold short of runway 30; followed almost immediately by 'stop!' we realized the error just as the tower directed us to stop. I immediately stopped the aircraft; but had already taxied across the hold short line for runway 30. An air carrier flight was on 2 to 3 mile final and tower directed the flight to go around. We then taxied to runway 27 and departed. I later called the controllers at miami tower and accepted responsibility for the incident; there were no ATC controller errors contributing to this incident.factors: 1. This runway intersection is a designated runway incursion hot spot; (HS3) on the airport diagram. 2. Even though it was the first officer's leg to fly; I did not insure that the crew discussed or briefed the runway incursion hot spot during the departure briefing. 3. When cleared position and hold onto runway 27; I did not visually confirm the correct runway with the first officer and instead allowed the first officer to go heads down to complete the before takeoff checklist. 4. Complacency due to a perceived familiarity with miami international airport contributed directly to the error. 5. The flight was also slightly rushed due to the short taxi. Instead of slowing down to provide adequate time and to preclude errors; I allowed the crew to rush to complete all required before takeoff checklist items while taxiing to the assigned runway.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An air carrier flight crew crossed the runway to which they were cleared into position and taxied across the hold short line for a nearby intersecting runway. An aircraft on final was directed to go around.

Narrative: Miami Ground Control directed us to taxi to Runway 27 via Taxiway P. After turning onto Taxiway P we switched to Tower frequency who cleared us into 'Position and Hold' on Runway 27 while we were still taxiing. The First Officer completed the final items on the Before Takeoff Checklist while I taxied the aircraft to Runway 27 via Taxiways P and Q8. We inadvertently taxied through the Runway 27 threshold extension (slight extended threshold) and continued on Taxiway Q8 toward Runway 30. The tower directed us to hold short of Runway 30; followed almost immediately by 'Stop!' We realized the error just as the Tower directed us to stop. I immediately stopped the aircraft; but had already taxied across the hold short line for Runway 30. An air carrier flight was on 2 to 3 mile final and Tower directed the flight to go around. We then taxied to Runway 27 and departed. I later called the controllers at Miami Tower and accepted responsibility for the incident; there were no ATC Controller errors contributing to this incident.Factors: 1. This runway intersection is a designated runway incursion hot spot; (HS3) on the airport diagram. 2. Even though it was the First Officer's leg to fly; I did not insure that the crew discussed or briefed the runway incursion hot spot during the departure briefing. 3. When cleared position and hold onto Runway 27; I did not visually confirm the correct runway with the First Officer and instead allowed the First Officer to go heads down to complete the Before Takeoff Checklist. 4. Complacency due to a perceived familiarity with Miami International Airport contributed directly to the error. 5. The flight was also slightly rushed due to the short taxi. Instead of slowing down to provide adequate time and to preclude errors; I allowed the crew to rush to complete all required Before Takeoff Checklist items while taxiing to the assigned runway.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.