Narrative:

On CAT III final; the captain was flying and was high and slightly fast on approach. At the outer marker (OM); we did not have aiii. We were above glidepath and descending. We were otherwise configured appropriately. While diving inside the LOM for the glidepath; the pilot flying was making incredibly large (30-40 degree) corrections for the localizer. At no point did we get full scale deflection; but it was basically huge s-turns across a localizer. At 600 ft AGL; we met the glidepath; then descended through it. GPWS alerted 'sink rate;' followed by 'pull up.' we executed a missed approach at 500 ft AGL. On missed; we failed to reset the command bars with 'heading and altitude select;' and missed the missed approach altitude by +300 ft. We immediately corrected and configured the afcs (automatic flight control system) appropriately. We were simply high and slightly fast on arrival. Our judgment was bad; and we continued the approach past the OM with no aiii. Shortly after this; I made the comment 'lets get out of here;' meaning lets go missed. The captain said 'what?' and I let it go. I should have stuck to my guns and said it again; more clearly; but I didn't. I felt like he's the captain; and he's the boss. I made comments to the large intercepts on the localizer; but I really didn't know how to clearly note the large intercepts. I also did not know what the hgs was commanding; but I did note that the command bars matched what he was doing. This was hard for me to communicate to the captain. When we caught the glide path; the captain continued a steep descent; passing through the glide path. We received a GPWS warning; followed by the 'pull up (at the same time; ATC issued a low altitude alert).' I commanded a missed approach; and the captain complied. On missed; we failed to set the afcs simply because of task saturation and lack of proficiency in the missed approach procedure (I haven't done it since last year in the simulator); and exceeded the missed approach altitude. The altitude alerter chime brought it to our attention. It must also be noted that our wake up call was very early; and there is no doubt in my mind that our mental judgment was not nearly as sharp as it could have been due to being awoken during our circadian low; even though we received plenty of rest. Finally; during the GPWS event; ATC's low altitude warning; and our missed approach commands; it was very hard to identify exactly what was what...there was too much noise and commands. Our training helped us execute the missed approach by memory; but it was extremely noisy and very messy.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Q400 First Officer reports unstabilized CAT III approach with the Captain flying using HGS. A go-around was initiated at 500 FT after descending below glide path and receiving both ATC and GPWS terrain warnings. Missed approach altitude was then overshot by 300 FT due to failure to reset AFCS.

Narrative: On CAT III final; the Captain was flying and was high and slightly fast on approach. At the Outer Marker (OM); we did not have AIII. We were above glidepath and descending. We were otherwise configured appropriately. While diving inside the LOM for the glidepath; the pilot flying was making incredibly large (30-40 degree) corrections for the localizer. At no point did we get full scale deflection; but it was basically huge S-Turns across a localizer. At 600 FT AGL; we met the glidepath; then descended through it. GPWS alerted 'sink rate;' followed by 'pull up.' We executed a missed approach at 500 FT AGL. On missed; we failed to reset the command bars with 'heading and altitude select;' and missed the missed approach altitude by +300 FT. We immediately corrected and configured the AFCS (Automatic Flight Control System) appropriately. We were simply high and slightly fast on arrival. Our judgment was bad; and we continued the approach past the OM with no AIII. Shortly after this; I made the comment 'lets get out of here;' meaning lets go missed. The Captain said 'what?' and I let it go. I should have stuck to my guns and said it again; more clearly; but I didn't. I felt like he's the Captain; and he's the boss. I made comments to the large intercepts on the localizer; but I really didn't know how to clearly note the large intercepts. I also did not know what the HGS was commanding; but I did note that the command bars matched what he was doing. This was hard for me to communicate to the Captain. When we caught the glide path; the Captain continued a steep descent; passing through the glide path. We received a GPWS warning; followed by the 'pull up (at the same time; ATC issued a low altitude alert).' I commanded a missed approach; and the Captain complied. On missed; we failed to set the AFCS simply because of task saturation and lack of proficiency in the missed approach procedure (I haven't done it since last year in the simulator); and exceeded the missed approach altitude. The altitude alerter chime brought it to our attention. It must also be noted that our wake up call was very early; and there is no doubt in my mind that our mental judgment was not nearly as sharp as it could have been due to being awoken during our circadian low; even though we received plenty of rest. Finally; during the GPWS event; ATC's low altitude warning; and our missed approach commands; it was very hard to identify exactly what was what...there was too much noise and commands. Our training helped us execute the missed approach by memory; but it was extremely noisy and very messy.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.