Narrative:

It was a cool, cloudy spring morning in wausau, wi, when my first officer and I started out for the airport. We had to leave the hotel at XA35 for the 20 min drive to cwa for an XB25 departure. We had arrived at xa-6 the night before after dodging thunderstorms and rain showers for 3 legs between msp and cwa. As is usually the case on these scheduled short overnights, we awoke dead tired. After we arrived at the airport, we learned that we would again be fighting rain showers for our return trip to msp in an small transport, but none of the showers should be of any major significance. The preflight procedures were completed west/O any major problems. However, as we were taxiing for departure, my attention was centered on the first flight of the day anti-ice and de-ice checks while my first officer did the passenger brief, received changes from company and received a clearance to msp from ATC. The clearance had a void time of XB30. We were not done with the checklist yet, so I advised my first officer to inform center that we would not be able to meet the void time. He did as such and center gave us a revised void time of XB33. We completed the checklist and were airborne at XB33. The clearance stated to maintain runway heading (runway 17 departure), but I was not aware of this due to being distracted by the ice checks. I should have had my first officer read the full clearance back to me, but failed to do so because of being slightly rushed by the void time. At any rate, after takeoff (it was first officer's leg) we made a turn to a heading of west, which is our normal departure out of cwa. At this point, as the PNF, I called center and reported climbing to 6000'. I was still unaware of our heading restriction. Center asked what heading we were on and I responded that we were on a heading of 270 degrees. Center then advised us of the airspace violation and gave us a number to call ATC upon landing in msp. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. In retrospect, I feel there were several contributing factors to this occurrence. First of all, both pilots should always know the clearance limits before takeoff--the turn in the wrong direction was an honest mistake on the first officer's part, but it also could have happened to me if it were my leg, and if both crew members understand the clearance this would be less likely to happen. Secondly, whenever a pilot receives a void time on a clearance, slow down and think twice to prevent these types of errors. Finally, I think the regulations allowing short overnights should be looked into. Four hours of sleep after 3 legs with WX is just not enough--especially if the hotel is a 20 min drive each way. This was a potentially dangerous situation. Apparently, there was an aircraft in a holding pattern west of the airport and although we were well above him by the time we xed his position, we must have climbed through the outer edge of his protected airspace. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following. FSDO is investigating incident. Called reporter and asked for flight numbers, etc, but nothing else heard from FSDO. Said tower did say was possible loss of sep.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR SMT ON DEP HEADING DEVIATION RESULTED IN POSSIBLE LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION AND POTENTIAL CONFLICT.

Narrative: IT WAS A COOL, CLOUDY SPRING MORNING IN WAUSAU, WI, WHEN MY F/O AND I STARTED OUT FOR THE ARPT. WE HAD TO LEAVE THE HOTEL AT XA35 FOR THE 20 MIN DRIVE TO CWA FOR AN XB25 DEP. WE HAD ARRIVED AT XA-6 THE NIGHT BEFORE AFTER DODGING TSTMS AND RAIN SHOWERS FOR 3 LEGS BTWN MSP AND CWA. AS IS USUALLY THE CASE ON THESE SCHEDULED SHORT OVERNIGHTS, WE AWOKE DEAD TIRED. AFTER WE ARRIVED AT THE ARPT, WE LEARNED THAT WE WOULD AGAIN BE FIGHTING RAIN SHOWERS FOR OUR RETURN TRIP TO MSP IN AN SMT, BUT NONE OF THE SHOWERS SHOULD BE OF ANY MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE. THE PREFLT PROCS WERE COMPLETED W/O ANY MAJOR PROBS. HOWEVER, AS WE WERE TAXIING FOR DEP, MY ATTN WAS CENTERED ON THE FIRST FLT OF THE DAY ANTI-ICE AND DE-ICE CHKS WHILE MY F/O DID THE PAX BRIEF, RECEIVED CHANGES FROM COMPANY AND RECEIVED A CLRNC TO MSP FROM ATC. THE CLRNC HAD A VOID TIME OF XB30. WE WERE NOT DONE WITH THE CHKLIST YET, SO I ADVISED MY F/O TO INFORM CENTER THAT WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MEET THE VOID TIME. HE DID AS SUCH AND CENTER GAVE US A REVISED VOID TIME OF XB33. WE COMPLETED THE CHKLIST AND WERE AIRBORNE AT XB33. THE CLRNC STATED TO MAINTAIN RWY HDG (RWY 17 DEP), BUT I WAS NOT AWARE OF THIS DUE TO BEING DISTRACTED BY THE ICE CHKS. I SHOULD HAVE HAD MY F/O READ THE FULL CLRNC BACK TO ME, BUT FAILED TO DO SO BECAUSE OF BEING SLIGHTLY RUSHED BY THE VOID TIME. AT ANY RATE, AFTER TKOF (IT WAS F/O'S LEG) WE MADE A TURN TO A HDG OF W, WHICH IS OUR NORMAL DEP OUT OF CWA. AT THIS POINT, AS THE PNF, I CALLED CENTER AND RPTED CLBING TO 6000'. I WAS STILL UNAWARE OF OUR HDG RESTRICTION. CENTER ASKED WHAT HDG WE WERE ON AND I RESPONDED THAT WE WERE ON A HDG OF 270 DEGS. CENTER THEN ADVISED US OF THE AIRSPACE VIOLATION AND GAVE US A NUMBER TO CALL ATC UPON LNDG IN MSP. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. IN RETROSPECT, I FEEL THERE WERE SEVERAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS OCCURRENCE. FIRST OF ALL, BOTH PLTS SHOULD ALWAYS KNOW THE CLRNC LIMITS BEFORE TKOF--THE TURN IN THE WRONG DIRECTION WAS AN HONEST MISTAKE ON THE F/O'S PART, BUT IT ALSO COULD HAVE HAPPENED TO ME IF IT WERE MY LEG, AND IF BOTH CREW MEMBERS UNDERSTAND THE CLRNC THIS WOULD BE LESS LIKELY TO HAPPEN. SECONDLY, WHENEVER A PLT RECEIVES A VOID TIME ON A CLRNC, SLOW DOWN AND THINK TWICE TO PREVENT THESE TYPES OF ERRORS. FINALLY, I THINK THE REGS ALLOWING SHORT OVERNIGHTS SHOULD BE LOOKED INTO. FOUR HRS OF SLEEP AFTER 3 LEGS WITH WX IS JUST NOT ENOUGH--ESPECIALLY IF THE HOTEL IS A 20 MIN DRIVE EACH WAY. THIS WAS A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SITUATION. APPARENTLY, THERE WAS AN ACFT IN A HOLDING PATTERN W OF THE ARPT AND ALTHOUGH WE WERE WELL ABOVE HIM BY THE TIME WE XED HIS POS, WE MUST HAVE CLBED THROUGH THE OUTER EDGE OF HIS PROTECTED AIRSPACE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING. FSDO IS INVESTIGATING INCIDENT. CALLED RPTR AND ASKED FOR FLT NUMBERS, ETC, BUT NOTHING ELSE HEARD FROM FSDO. SAID TWR DID SAY WAS POSSIBLE LOSS OF SEP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.