Narrative:

Medical flight. During climb out and while enroute at approximately 16;500 ft MSL on way to cruise altitude of 17;000 ft; pilot in command and medical crew identified strong smoke odor and dense haze/smoke appearance in the cabin environment. Pilot in command in addition viewed 'curling' motion to haze/smoke in cockpit (curling smoke). Pilot in command responded with the following actions: notified ATC that he had 'smoke in cockpit' and requested lower altitude and potential landing at a nearby airport and initiated an immediate descent while attempting to determine smoke source and run checklist (electrical smoke or fire). Pulled out pilot in command oxygen mask and pull oxygen handle to full on. Advised medical crew to prepare for oxygen mask use. Verified heating source were 'off' (cabin temperature mode off). Turned off ground heat (which was in the 'normal' position). Vent blower set to automatic initially (per checklist). Shut off avionic master. Verified all electrical switches 'off;' smoke ended. Visually confirmed that no fire exists. Cabin and cockpit rapidly cleared of all smoke. Pilot in command leveled off at 15;000 ft MSL and followed the following actions: re-energized avionics master and evaluated - no smoke; fumes; or fire noted. Turned vent blower 'high;' then 'off' - no smoke; fumes; or fire noted. Reevaluated weather conditions at the diversion airport and current ground speed and ETA to our filed destination and elected to remain in VFR conditions and continue on our original destination. Advised of intent to continue on to our destination; identified several potential enroute diversion airports if any contra-indication occurred to discontinue flight between current position and our destination. Approximately 19 minutes later; smoke reappeared in same manner and at same density and appearance as initial occurrence. Pilot in command immediately responded in the following manner- run second checklist (environmental smoke or fumes). Requested another descent below 10;000 ft MSL (intending to potentially dump cabin pressurization). Prepared to don pilot in command oxygen mask and verified oxygen handle full on. Advised medical crew to prepare for oxygen mask use. Verified heating sources were 'off' (cabin temperature mode). Turned cabin vent blower to 'high.' during closing of bleed valves left; then right alternating per checklist; smoke ended. Note- position of valves had no effect of smoke clearing. Upon reaching 9;000 ft MSL; smoke/haze again completely cleared with aircraft approximately 11 to 14 minutes out. Pilot in command did not dump cabin pressurization as a result of the discontinuation of smoke; pilot in command then: reevaluated weather conditions a nearby airport and at our current ground speed and ETA and elected to remain in VFR conditions and continue on. Advised ATC that all was fine - no issues noted and of intent to continue on. Pilot in command advised ATC that he was not declaring an emergency and that all was fine followed by an uneventful landing and taxi to company location. During event pilot maintained positive and affirmative communication with ATC and crew onboard and was prepared to divert if necessary in the event situation continued to degrade; which it did not. In addition; smoke event lasted a very brief amount of time (less than 1 to 3 minutes each); and pilot in command flew the aircraft first with safety as paramount. Landing at our first diversion airport was ill advised due to current IFR conditions and pilot in command wish to remain VFR since anomaly source could not be determined or verified and no indication of smoke; fumes or fire were noted by pilot in command nor medical crew members. Each event lasted less than 1 to 3 minutes. Pilot in command informed ATC initially of 'smoke in the cockpit' to prepare for any and all actions the pilot in command found necessary to safeguard the flight. Pilot in command did not declare an emergency nor land immediately (nor this required by afm - aircraft flight manual; the FAA - federal aviation administration; nor the company general operations manual); but did maintain constant and diligent communication and awareness of his entire flight environment and active continual communications; as well as following all required checklists and guides. Pilot in command ensured medical crew was aware and prepared for any and all potential action which might have become necessary. Decision to land at the filed destination was made due to the entire scope of events and facts encountered during the course of the flight. That airport was preferred due to field services available if pilot in command noted any form or indication that an emergency condition persisted. Per 14 crash fire rescue equipment at 135.19 (b) emergency operations; the pilot in command did not don an oxygen mask per checklist immediately due to the impeding his flying and handling of the potentially evolved emergency as a single pilot cockpit. Pilot in command was fully aware and prepared to do so but prior to being able to; event and all traces of haze and even smell were gone. Any and all other statements made previous to this by the pilot in command either written or verbal were made only in part and in synopsis form without complete specificity. The proceeding provides the factual event and actions. The problem was application of the 'don oxygen mask section of the checklist;' which although identified the prepared for; was not followed through with since the pilot in command was single pilot and was coordinating numerous factors. As the pilot in command; I should have more directly told the medical crew to don masks and also donned my own; but again was focused upon the event and its management. In the future; checklists and pilot in command response to such should be malleable to allow for discretion by the pilot in command while maintaining the highest levels of safety. This event should teach that human thought must precede action to ensure that the correct action for the scenario is applied even if contrary to specific checklists - e.g. Don mask if environment affect breathing; etc and therefore more advanced training for the pilot in command. I believe that although the checklist was not adhered to in this one point; the overall performance of the crew as a unit and team was exemplary; with the warning being checklist application without thought is dangerous.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A C90 pilot reported two cabin and cockpit smoke and fume events which cleared quickly after the Electrical Smoke or Fire Checklist was completed.

Narrative: Medical flight. During climb out and while enroute at approximately 16;500 FT MSL on way to cruise altitude of 17;000 FT; pilot in command and medical crew identified strong smoke odor and dense haze/smoke appearance in the cabin environment. Pilot in command in addition viewed 'curling' motion to haze/smoke in cockpit (curling smoke). Pilot in command responded with the following actions: Notified ATC that he had 'smoke in cockpit' and requested lower altitude and potential landing at a nearby airport and initiated an immediate descent while attempting to determine smoke source and run checklist (Electrical Smoke or Fire). Pulled out pilot in command oxygen mask and pull oxygen handle to FULL ON. Advised medical crew to prepare for oxygen mask use. Verified heating source were 'OFF' (Cabin Temperature mode OFF). Turned OFF Ground Heat (which was in the 'NORMAL' position). Vent Blower set to AUTO initially (per checklist). Shut off Avionic Master. Verified all electrical switches 'OFF;' smoke ended. Visually confirmed that no fire exists. Cabin and cockpit rapidly cleared of all smoke. Pilot in command leveled off at 15;000 FT MSL and followed the following actions: Re-energized Avionics Master and evaluated - no smoke; fumes; or fire noted. Turned Vent Blower 'HIGH;' then 'OFF' - no smoke; fumes; or fire noted. Reevaluated weather conditions at the diversion airport and current ground speed and ETA to our filed destination and elected to remain in VFR conditions and continue on our original destination. Advised of intent to continue on to our destination; identified several potential enroute diversion airports if any contra-indication occurred to discontinue flight between current position and our destination. Approximately 19 minutes later; smoke reappeared in same manner and at same density and appearance as initial occurrence. Pilot in command immediately responded in the following manner- run second checklist (environmental smoke or fumes). Requested another descent below 10;000 FT MSL (intending to potentially dump cabin pressurization). Prepared to don pilot in command oxygen mask and verified Oxygen handle full ON. Advised medical crew to prepare for oxygen mask use. Verified heating sources were 'OFF' (cabin temperature mode). Turned Cabin Vent Blower to 'HIGH.' During closing of bleed valves left; then right alternating per checklist; smoke ended. Note- position of valves had no effect of smoke clearing. Upon reaching 9;000 FT MSL; smoke/haze again completely cleared with aircraft approximately 11 to 14 minutes out. Pilot in command did not dump cabin pressurization as a result of the discontinuation of smoke; pilot in command then: Reevaluated weather conditions a nearby airport and at our current ground speed and ETA and elected to remain in VFR conditions and continue on. Advised ATC that all was fine - no issues noted and of intent to continue on. Pilot in command advised ATC that he was not declaring an emergency and that all was fine followed by an uneventful landing and taxi to company location. During event pilot maintained positive and affirmative communication with ATC and crew onboard and was prepared to divert if necessary in the event situation continued to degrade; which it did not. In addition; smoke event lasted a very brief amount of time (less than 1 to 3 minutes each); and pilot in command flew the aircraft first with safety as paramount. Landing at our first diversion airport was ill advised due to current IFR conditions and pilot in command wish to remain VFR since anomaly source could not be determined or verified and no indication of smoke; fumes or fire were noted by pilot in command nor medical crew members. Each event lasted less than 1 to 3 minutes. Pilot in command informed ATC initially of 'smoke in the cockpit' to prepare for any and all actions the pilot in command found necessary to safeguard the flight. Pilot in command did not declare an emergency nor land immediately (nor this required by AFM - Aircraft Flight Manual; the FAA - Federal Aviation Administration; nor the Company General Operations Manual); but did maintain constant and diligent communication and awareness of his entire flight environment and active continual communications; as well as following all required checklists and guides. Pilot in command ensured medical crew was aware and prepared for any and all potential action which might have become necessary. Decision to land at the filed destination was made due to the entire scope of events and facts encountered during the course of the flight. That airport was preferred due to field services available if pilot in command noted any form or indication that an emergency condition persisted. Per 14 CFR at 135.19 (b) emergency operations; the pilot in command did not don an oxygen mask per checklist immediately due to the impeding his flying and handling of the potentially evolved emergency as a single pilot cockpit. Pilot in command was fully aware and prepared to do so but prior to being able to; event and all traces of haze and even smell were gone. Any and all other statements made previous to this by the pilot in command either written or verbal were made only in part and in synopsis form without complete specificity. The proceeding provides the factual event and actions. The problem was application of the 'don oxygen mask section of the checklist;' which although identified the prepared for; was not followed through with since the pilot in command was single pilot and was coordinating numerous factors. As the pilot in command; I should have more directly told the medical crew to don masks and also donned my own; but again was focused upon the event and its management. In the future; checklists and pilot in command response to such should be malleable to allow for discretion by the pilot in command while maintaining the highest levels of safety. This event should teach that human thought must precede action to ensure that the correct action for the scenario is applied even if contrary to specific checklists - e.g. don mask if environment affect breathing; etc and therefore more advanced training for the pilot in command. I believe that although the checklist was not adhered to in this one point; the overall performance of the crew as a unit and team was exemplary; with the warning being checklist application without thought is dangerous.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.