Narrative:

While flying the published TERPZ1 departure out of bwi; incorrect programming of the FMS resulted in the aircraft turning off of the departure route. Runway 28 and the TERPZ1 departure was loaded into the FMS prior to the departure but the departure transition was not loaded into the FMS properly. Because the transition was loaded incorrectly the result was the omission of 2 fixes beyond the initial departure fix 'terpz'. After passing terpz intersection; the aircraft began a turn toward 'fluky' which was our transition fix. The bwi departure controller immediately called and asked what our heading was and we responded we were turning toward 'fluky'. He responded to turn back to the right to a heading of 330 degrees. He stated that we were supposed to proceed to the fixes 'jocco and wonce' after passing 'terpz' and that proceeding directly from 'terpz' to 'fluky' would place us in the washington dc flight restricted zone. Before we reached the heading of 330 degrees; the controller issued a heading of 280 degrees. A short time later; we were handed off to the next controller. As the initial controller gave us our frequency change he reiterated the need to fly the published departure procedure and also said 'it would have not been good if we had continued in that direction'. The departure controller did not berate the crew; seem anxious;or indicate there would be a 'phone call' required. The flight did not enter into the restricted or prohibited airspace due to the departure controllers quick action. The flight crew did perform a normal pre-takeoff briefing and also reviewed the TERPZ1 departure (the initial phase) prior to takeoff. The crew did not perform a (complete) brief of the departure beyond the initial departure fix of terpz. If a review of the (entire) departure been performed; this would have been avoided. Additionally; the FMS was checked to verify the departure only up to the initial fix. Had the crew reviewed the departure that was loaded into the FMS; and matched that information to the chart; they would have caught the omission of the transition.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A C680 flight crew failed to program the FLUKY transition when cleared via the TERPZ1 SID from BWI. ATC alerted them to their track deviation which would have taken them through the Washington DC FRZ.

Narrative: While flying the published TERPZ1 departure out of BWI; incorrect programming of the FMS resulted in the aircraft turning off of the departure route. Runway 28 and the TERPZ1 departure was loaded into the FMS prior to the departure but the departure transition was not loaded into the FMS properly. Because the transition was loaded incorrectly the result was the omission of 2 fixes beyond the initial departure fix 'TERPZ'. After passing TERPZ intersection; the aircraft began a turn toward 'FLUKY' which was our transition fix. The BWI Departure Controller immediately called and asked what our heading was and we responded we were turning toward 'FLUKY'. He responded to turn back to the right to a heading of 330 degrees. He stated that we were supposed to proceed to the fixes 'JOCCO and WONCE' after passing 'TERPZ' and that proceeding directly from 'TERPZ' to 'FLUKY' would place us in the Washington DC Flight Restricted Zone. Before we reached the heading of 330 degrees; the Controller issued a heading of 280 degrees. A short time later; we were handed off to the next Controller. As the initial Controller gave us our frequency change he reiterated the need to fly the published departure procedure and also said 'it would have not been good if we had continued in that direction'. The Departure Controller did not berate the Crew; seem anxious;or indicate there would be a 'phone call' required. The flight did not enter into the restricted or prohibited airspace due to the Departure Controllers quick action. The Flight Crew did perform a normal pre-takeoff briefing and also reviewed the TERPZ1 departure (THE INITIAL PHASE) prior to takeoff. The Crew did not perform a (COMPLETE) brief of the departure beyond the initial departure fix of TERPZ. If a review of the (ENTIRE) departure been performed; this would have been avoided. Additionally; the FMS was checked to verify the departure only up to the initial fix. Had the crew reviewed the departure that was loaded into the FMS; and matched that information to the chart; they would have caught the omission of the transition.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.