Narrative:

Aircraft generated ECAM air engine 2 bleed fault. Crew performed ECAM actions. Next notified company dispatch (via ACARS) and reviewed aom for further guidance. After review of aom procedures to see if affected item required any special procedures. There was one which would affect our flight. Do not operate into known or forecast icing conditions. In addition; the procedures required that we descend to FL310 and avoid icing conditions. We contacted ATC and requested descent to fl 310 and contacted company to advise about the MEL. This is were the crew and company saw things differently. The captain established a phone patch to speed up communications and express our concerns regarding the inop engine 2 bleed air. Our concerns regarding MEL requirements of known icing and fl 310 required diverting to an airport with no known/forecast icing; however; the company's repeated view of the no MEL situation on the aircraft and no restrictions from the aom allowed us to continue to our ice impacted destination at fl 390. This discussion lasted while we continued northbound toward our original destination. I; being the flying pilot; handled the aircraft and communications with ATC; while the captain communicated with the company. He provided operating manual references which state: if any instrument or item of equipment required for the particular operation becomes inoperative en route; the captain shall comply with the approved procedures for such occurrence as specified elsewhere in this manual; the aom; applicable MEL's/cdl's; and any pertinent far's. The captain and I discussed the issue at length; and made the decision to divert to an airport with no known icing due to inop air engine 2 bleed fault and MEL restrictions; which we did. This maintenance diversion caused the crew to exceed eight hours within 24 hours which required 18 hours rest and removal from the next day's trip.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: After suffering the loss of an engine bleed an A320 Flight Crew encountered resistance from Maintenance and Management regarding their decision to divert to a station with no known icing as required by the company's operating manuals.

Narrative: Aircraft generated ECAM AIR ENG 2 Bleed Fault. Crew performed ECAM actions. Next notified Company Dispatch (via ACARS) and reviewed AOM for further guidance. After review of AOM procedures to see if affected item required any special procedures. There was one which would affect our flight. Do not operate into known or forecast icing conditions. In addition; the procedures required that we descend to FL310 and avoid icing conditions. We contacted ATC and requested descent to FL 310 and contacted company to advise about the MEL. This is were the crew and company saw things differently. The Captain established a phone patch to speed up communications and express our concerns regarding the inop ENG 2 Bleed Air. Our concerns regarding MEL requirements of known icing and FL 310 required diverting to an airport with no known/forecast icing; however; the company's repeated view of the no MEL situation on the aircraft and no restrictions from the AOM allowed us to continue to our ice impacted destination at FL 390. This discussion lasted while we continued northbound toward our original destination. I; being the Flying Pilot; handled the aircraft and communications with ATC; while the Captain communicated with the company. He provided operating manual references which state: If any instrument or item of equipment required for the particular operation becomes inoperative en route; the Captain shall comply with the approved procedures for such occurrence as specified elsewhere in this manual; the AOM; applicable MEL's/CDL's; and any pertinent FAR's. The Captain and I discussed the issue at length; and made the decision to divert to an airport with no known icing due to inop AIR ENG 2 Bleed Fault and MEL restrictions; which we did. This maintenance diversion caused the crew to exceed eight hours within 24 hours which required 18 hours rest and removal from the next day's trip.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.