Narrative:

Flying en route from plattsburg AFB to albany co airport, we received the current alb ATIS. Albany's WX was VFR with light winds, landing runway 28 and taking off on runway 01. On initial contact with alb approach we requested runway 01, we were approximately 50 mi north. After a while alb approach indicated we would be unable to land on runway 01. After handoff to the next alb approach controller, we again requested runway 01, the controller immediately snapped, 'unable runway 01.' when asked if the pattern was saturated the controller snapped if we wanted to talk about it to call him on the ground. We were cleared for a visual approach to runway 28 and switched to tower. On initial contact with tower we requested runway 01. Our position was approximately 15 mi from the airport on a right base. Tower advised us to continue and standby on the request. We configured and lined up for runway 28. Two mi out the tower cleared us to cross the airport and enter a left downwind for runway 01. Landing and taxi in were uneventful. The only other aircraft around was an small aircraft and not a factor. Ground control asked us to call the tower on the tower telephone. When the aircraft commander called, a supervisor answered and wanted to discuss the incident. He was informed that runway 01 had been requested for the following safety concerns: 1) we both were unfamiliar with alb, 2) runway 01 has precision vertical guidance while runway 28 does not (VASI 3.35 degrees), and 3) runway 01 is 7200' long while runway 28 has only 5999'. The supervisor then wanted to contact someone at our home base to 'take care of this problem!' he doesn't want people asking for the takeoff runway for landing! He was given the aircraft commander's name and our command post's telephone number. I find this method of control to be 'heavy handed' and counter-productive. Our safety concerns are valid. It would be hard to explain why we accepted the short (barely legal for us) runway, that does not have precision G/south at an unfamiliar airport when a more acceptable runway is available, to an accident investigation board (wind was not a factor). Domineering, intimidating control such as this may well be a contributing factor in a future alb incident/mishap. We complied with all far's and instructions, and have found this to be an isolated event and not a nationwide trend. Supplemental information from acn 87921: no procedures were violated in this incident, but I'm reporting it because approachs altitude was extremely uncooperative and their motives were unclear.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MIL AIR EVAC ACFT ASKED FOR RWY OTHER THAN ASSIGNED AND WAS REFUSED TWICE BY APCH CTLRS, THEN WHEN REQUEST MADE TO TWR, REQUESTED RWY WAS GIVEN. REPORTER STATED POOR ATTITUDE BY APCH CTLRS.

Narrative: FLYING ENRTE FROM PLATTSBURG AFB TO ALBANY CO ARPT, WE RECEIVED THE CURRENT ALB ATIS. ALBANY'S WX WAS VFR WITH LIGHT WINDS, LNDG RWY 28 AND TAKING OFF ON RWY 01. ON INITIAL CONTACT WITH ALB APCH WE REQUESTED RWY 01, WE WERE APPROX 50 MI N. AFTER A WHILE ALB APCH INDICATED WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO LAND ON RWY 01. AFTER HDOF TO THE NEXT ALB APCH CTLR, WE AGAIN REQUESTED RWY 01, THE CTLR IMMEDIATELY SNAPPED, 'UNABLE RWY 01.' WHEN ASKED IF THE PATTERN WAS SATURATED THE CTLR SNAPPED IF WE WANTED TO TALK ABOUT IT TO CALL HIM ON THE GND. WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 28 AND SWITCHED TO TWR. ON INITIAL CONTACT WITH TWR WE REQUESTED RWY 01. OUR POS WAS APPROX 15 MI FROM THE ARPT ON A RIGHT BASE. TWR ADVISED US TO CONTINUE AND STANDBY ON THE REQUEST. WE CONFIGURED AND LINED UP FOR RWY 28. TWO MI OUT THE TWR CLRED US TO CROSS THE ARPT AND ENTER A LEFT DOWNWIND FOR RWY 01. LNDG AND TAXI IN WERE UNEVENTFUL. THE ONLY OTHER ACFT AROUND WAS AN SMA AND NOT A FACTOR. GND CTL ASKED US TO CALL THE TWR ON THE TWR TELEPHONE. WHEN THE ACFT COMMANDER CALLED, A SUPVR ANSWERED AND WANTED TO DISCUSS THE INCIDENT. HE WAS INFORMED THAT RWY 01 HAD BEEN REQUESTED FOR THE FOLLOWING SAFETY CONCERNS: 1) WE BOTH WERE UNFAMILIAR WITH ALB, 2) RWY 01 HAS PRECISION VERT GUIDANCE WHILE RWY 28 DOES NOT (VASI 3.35 DEGS), AND 3) RWY 01 IS 7200' LONG WHILE RWY 28 HAS ONLY 5999'. THE SUPVR THEN WANTED TO CONTACT SOMEONE AT OUR HOME BASE TO 'TAKE CARE OF THIS PROB!' HE DOESN'T WANT PEOPLE ASKING FOR THE TKOF RWY FOR LNDG! HE WAS GIVEN THE ACFT COMMANDER'S NAME AND OUR COMMAND POST'S TELEPHONE NUMBER. I FIND THIS METHOD OF CONTROL TO BE 'HEAVY HANDED' AND COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. OUR SAFETY CONCERNS ARE VALID. IT WOULD BE HARD TO EXPLAIN WHY WE ACCEPTED THE SHORT (BARELY LEGAL FOR US) RWY, THAT DOES NOT HAVE PRECISION G/S AT AN UNFAMILIAR ARPT WHEN A MORE ACCEPTABLE RWY IS AVAILABLE, TO AN ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD (WIND WAS NOT A FACTOR). DOMINEERING, INTIMIDATING CTL SUCH AS THIS MAY WELL BE A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN A FUTURE ALB INCIDENT/MISHAP. WE COMPLIED WITH ALL FAR'S AND INSTRUCTIONS, AND HAVE FOUND THIS TO BE AN ISOLATED EVENT AND NOT A NATIONWIDE TREND. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 87921: NO PROCS WERE VIOLATED IN THIS INCIDENT, BUT I'M RPTING IT BECAUSE APCHS ALT WAS EXTREMELY UNCOOPERATIVE AND THEIR MOTIVES WERE UNCLEAR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.