Narrative:

Due to use of engine anti-ice and a heavy aircraft that precluded use of D2; we performed a max takeoff off 32R at ZZZZ. Takeoff roll and lift off were normal. At 1500 feet; I called for VNAV and then the center autopilot per SOP. I sensed the aircraft was climbing rapidly due to the max takeoff and called for climb 2. I remember altitude cap on the FMA [flight mode annunciator] occurred fairly early; and at some point they indicated speed and altitude cap. At some point it went to alpha and a line through altitude cap. At approximately 2000 ft; the aircraft abruptly continued to nearly 30 degrees nose high with airspeed decaying rapidly. I did not catch this immediately as I had turned my focus to the sensitive departure. As I returned my scan to the ADI; I saw almost 30 degrees nose high; and disconnected the autopilot; lowered the nose; and fire walled the thrust. At some point during the event we lost both flight directors. Stick shaker activation occurred twice. At the peak of the nose up attitude; and again when I lowered the nose to 10 degrees. Once the aircraft was recovered and stable; we reselected the center autopilot and the flight continued uneventfully. I am very comfortable saying that I am absolutely sure we used the correct procedures for the departure. I am 100% sure I called for VNAV and then the autopilot in that sequence; and I know my first officer did exactly as I commanded. I feel I was slow to get the autopilot off due to glancing to the departure page after I thought the fmas were correct. I was not prepared for the aircraft to respond the way it did; and when I came back to the instruments; it was rapidly heading toward an unusual attitude and I was not sure whether I had a pitot-static issue due to deicing and the aircraft sitting over the weekend; some kind of ADI problem; or some other issue. I finally determined the standby ADI was correct; and flew the recovery on that instrument. I also probably should have used a different autopilot after the aircraft had stabilized; but it took us a long time just to determine what put us into that situation due to the sheer rapidity of the event. That morning; after I rested; I called system operations back; and they informed me that the center FCC had failed a check and been deferred. We flew the aircraft back to cgn uneventfully the next evening.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A center FCC failure during a high performance climb to an initial level off altitude contributed to a momentary loss of control for a B757-200 flight crew.

Narrative: Due to use of engine anti-ice and a heavy aircraft that precluded use of D2; we performed a max takeoff off 32R at ZZZZ. Takeoff roll and lift off were normal. At 1500 feet; I called for VNAV and then the center autopilot per SOP. I sensed the aircraft was climbing rapidly due to the max takeoff and called for CLB 2. I remember ALT CAP on the FMA [Flight Mode Annunciator] occurred fairly early; and at some point they indicated SPD and ALT CAP. At some point it went to ALPHA and a line through ALT CAP. At approximately 2000 FT; the aircraft abruptly continued to nearly 30 degrees nose high with airspeed decaying rapidly. I did not catch this immediately as I had turned my focus to the sensitive departure. As I returned my scan to the ADI; I saw almost 30 degrees nose high; and disconnected the autopilot; lowered the nose; and fire walled the thrust. At some point during the event we lost both flight directors. Stick shaker activation occurred twice. At the peak of the nose up attitude; and again when I lowered the nose to 10 degrees. Once the aircraft was recovered and stable; we reselected the center autopilot and the flight continued uneventfully. I am very comfortable saying that I am absolutely sure we used the correct procedures for the departure. I am 100% sure I called for VNAV and then the autopilot in that sequence; and I know my First Officer did exactly as I commanded. I feel I was slow to get the autopilot off due to glancing to the departure page after I thought the FMAs were correct. I was not prepared for the aircraft to respond the way it did; and when I came back to the instruments; it was rapidly heading toward an unusual attitude and I was not sure whether I had a pitot-static issue due to deicing and the aircraft sitting over the weekend; some kind of ADI problem; or some other issue. I finally determined the standby ADI was correct; and flew the recovery on that instrument. I also probably should have used a different autopilot after the aircraft had stabilized; but it took us a long time just to determine what put us into that situation due to the sheer rapidity of the event. That morning; after I rested; I called System Operations back; and they informed me that the center FCC had failed a check and been deferred. We flew the aircraft back to CGN uneventfully the next evening.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.