Narrative:

During a visual approach; we were asked to report over a designated geographical point for that runway. Following this clearance; there was confusion in the cockpit as this was not a point displayed on our mfd. At this time we were somewhat blindly flying a visual approach; which had a prescribed track but it would not have been prudent to look again for it in our database; as we were already on downwind for landing on runway 17. The tower stated that we must fly the prescribed track. We then proceeded to turn base leg for the runway and then turned final. The landing was uneventful and all checklists were followed. After the landing; the ground control stated that next time we must have the proper procedure available. She stated that we were 1/2 mile inside the procedure route for the visual to runway 17. Once we got to the ramp and our passengers were off; we looked for the procedure and found it after a more thorough search. The flight lasted for 2 hours and 19 minutes. There was plenty of time enroute to study this procedure and be more prepared. The flying pilot had stated at the beginning of the flight that he was familiar with the procedures into this airport. I have very little experience with the electronic charts and no experience flying into this airport. I let my guard down by allowing him to convince me he was familiar and that he had stored all of the needed procedures to conduct the approach. Had I looked through all the available approaches; I would have found this second part to the visual for runway 17. Among other factors leading up to this oversight is fatigue. I learned of this trip very late in the night and had less than 3 hours of rest before the trip. The other factor is an overly confident captain who was the flying pilot. I am trying to learn how to deal with his ego. Even after the event; I was looking for the procedure while he was saying that it's no big deal. It was a big deal to me because I knew that there was a procedure out there that we were expected to follow but did not have it in front of us. I am a highly experienced pilot with an air carrier back ground. He is younger; with extensive experience in business aviation. He likes to teach me things and is not a very good CRM pilot. Perhaps the worst that happened from this situation was extra noise over the neighboring community. Any time an aircraft is expected to be somewhere that it is not; there is a reason.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CL30 First Officer reported that the Captain did not follow the prescribed ground track into a foreign airport; even after being reminded by ATC that a precise track was required. CRM and fatigue were issues.

Narrative: During a visual approach; we were asked to report over a designated geographical point for that runway. Following this clearance; there was confusion in the cockpit as this was not a point displayed on our MFD. At this time we were somewhat blindly flying a visual approach; which had a prescribed track but it would not have been prudent to look again for it in our database; as we were already on downwind for landing on Runway 17. The Tower stated that we must fly the prescribed track. We then proceeded to turn base leg for the runway and then turned final. The landing was uneventful and all checklists were followed. After the landing; the Ground Control stated that next time we must have the proper procedure available. She stated that we were 1/2 mile inside the procedure route for the visual to Runway 17. Once we got to the ramp and our passengers were off; we looked for the procedure and found it after a more thorough search. The flight lasted for 2 hours and 19 minutes. There was plenty of time enroute to study this procedure and be more prepared. The flying pilot had stated at the beginning of the flight that he was familiar with the procedures into this airport. I have very little experience with the electronic charts and no experience flying into this airport. I let my guard down by allowing him to convince me he was familiar and that he had stored all of the needed procedures to conduct the approach. Had I looked through all the available approaches; I would have found this second part to the visual for Runway 17. Among other factors leading up to this oversight is fatigue. I learned of this trip very late in the night and had less than 3 hours of rest before the trip. The other factor is an overly confident Captain who was the flying pilot. I am trying to learn how to deal with his ego. Even after the event; I was looking for the procedure while he was saying that it's no big deal. It was a big deal to me because I knew that there was a procedure out there that we were expected to follow but did not have it in front of us. I am a highly experienced pilot with an air carrier back ground. He is younger; with extensive experience in business aviation. He likes to teach me things and is not a very good CRM pilot. Perhaps the worst that happened from this situation was extra noise over the neighboring community. Any time an aircraft is expected to be somewhere that it is not; there is a reason.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.