Narrative:

The captain was flying the pegasus 757 on flight to mpto while I was working the radio during our descent. The ACARS weather at mpto showed 2000 ft scattered and 9000 meters of visibility. 100 miles out panama control told us to expect the VOR to runway 21L. We set up and briefed that approach. We were then cleared direct to tbg VOR; a VOR that is eighteen miles south of the mpto airport. This meant that we would have had to fly twenty miles south of the airport; reverse course in a holding pattern; and then travel north before turning around to align with runway 21L. Not only would this have been challenging given the difficult environment with panama ATC; but it would have added seventy miles to the flight versus a clearance to join the final approach course from the north. Since we were pegasus equipped; we asked for the RNAV to 21R with a side-step to 21L. Panama control approved our request. The 737 ahead of us then asked for the RNAV approach to 21R with a side-step to the left side as well. They didn't respond to the 737; and later gave them headings for the ILS to 3R with a circle to 21R. We were then handed off to another controller who advised us we would be given the 'ILS and circle to 21L.' this made no sense so I clarified. I knew there was only one ILS at mpto but I wanted to be entirely specific. 'Confirm the ILS to 3R with a circle to land on runway 21L?' I asked. There was no response. We continued on the heading; fairly certain we were being vectored for the approach to 3R with a circle to 21L just as the 737 ahead of us. We briefed the new approach and go-around; but we both commented that since we were visual; the go-around would more than likely be given by the controller. The ATIS was only effective within fifty miles of the airport and the recording alternated in spanish and english; making it hard to get the entire ATIS in one uninterrupted listen during this busy phase of flight. Communication with ATC was extremely frustrating. The flight ahead asked multiple times what the wind speed and direction were and the controller didn't know what he was asking. We were given a 360 heading and told to descend to 1700 ft with a clearance to join the localizer to 3R. We accomplished that and put in 1200 ft in the MCP for the circling approach to 21L. The tower controller then asked us if we'd like to land on runway 3R instead. We asked the tower the winds and during his long and detailed response; I felt we weren't in position to accept the straight in to 3R. I looked to my right and saw a cloud that may have been in our way during the circling approach; so I announced to the tower that we were going around and they came back and said; 'roger; you're cleared for the circling approach to runway 21R.' the captain thought we could immediately accept the circling approach as we had planned and told me to put the gear down. I put the gear down and told him I thought we wouldn't be stable if we did that. He recognized my concern and agreed that we should go around. During the missed approach I attempted to get the new heading and altitude from the tower while the captain turned right; toward the published missed. The flaps were at five degrees; so there was no need to make any changes according to the litany. The missed approach altitude wasn't set and remained at the 1200 ft we had used for the circling approach altitude while I asked the controller what heading and altitude he wanted. I asked this question two or three times; and absolutely could not understand the controller's responses. The busy go-around environment may have made it more difficult for me to understand than it should have been. The speed was rapidly accelerating past 200 KTS; and I was concerned the captain would over speed the flaps by exceeding the 220 knot limit speed. I told the captain to watch his speed and knew it would be tough to keep under the 220 knot limit; so without command; I retracted the flaps to one and said; 'I got flaps toone.' I asked the controller again about the heading and altitude and was able to understand a clearance to 3100 ft and a heading of 130; essentially what the captain was doing. As an aside; typically in the us the heading is announced before the altitude in this situation. It was reversed by this controller; and the 3100 ft; 130 heading were rather hard to understand given the accent. At this point; I looked down and saw our airspeed was below the flaps speed for flaps one. I told the captain he was getting slow and he responded with an immediate increase in thrust and lowered the nose. He later told me that he had been thinking he was at flaps fifteen; and I explained that we started the go-around at flaps five and that I retracted the flaps to one as we came close to the flap over speed limit. Effective crew communication during this flap movement wasn't easy as the controller was speaking throughout the missed approach. We flew the remainder of the missed approach accurately. At this point; a straight in approach looked safer than the circling approach; so we requested the ILS to runway 3R with a tailwind of eight knots. The runway was 10;007 ft long and dry. We landed uneventfully on 3R. The controllers on the ground were very apologetic for the confusion and multiple approaches that we were told to expect. In hindsight; while bringing the flaps up to prevent an over speed seemed like a good idea to me at the time; it created a configuration where the captain thought he had more flaps than he did; resulting in a situation that could have been more serious than an over speed. Since go-arounds are likely to be more common with the added emphasis on stabilized approaches; I hope they'll be featured in the simulator more; and not just from the missed approach point. Doing them before the marker would be helpful. Discussing the appropriate response by the non flying pilot if a flap over speed is imminent would also be helpful..

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757 flight crew had communications difficulties with ATC during approach and missed approach at MPTO; leading to erratic airspeed control and misunderstandings between the crew.

Narrative: The Captain was flying the Pegasus 757 on flight to MPTO while I was working the radio during our descent. The ACARS weather at MPTO showed 2000 FT scattered and 9000 meters of visibility. 100 miles out Panama Control told us to expect the VOR to Runway 21L. We set up and briefed that approach. We were then cleared direct to TBG VOR; a VOR that is eighteen miles south of the MPTO airport. This meant that we would have had to fly twenty miles south of the airport; reverse course in a holding pattern; and then travel north before turning around to align with Runway 21L. Not only would this have been challenging given the difficult environment with Panama ATC; but it would have added seventy miles to the flight versus a clearance to join the final approach course from the north. Since we were Pegasus equipped; we asked for the RNAV to 21R with a side-step to 21L. Panama Control approved our request. The 737 ahead of us then asked for the RNAV approach to 21R with a side-step to the left side as well. They didn't respond to the 737; and later gave them headings for the ILS to 3R with a circle to 21R. We were then handed off to another Controller who advised us we would be given the 'ILS and circle to 21L.' This made no sense so I clarified. I knew there was only one ILS at MPTO but I wanted to be entirely specific. 'Confirm the ILS to 3R with a circle to land on Runway 21L?' I asked. There was no response. We continued on the heading; fairly certain we were being vectored for the approach to 3R with a circle to 21L just as the 737 ahead of us. We briefed the new approach and go-around; but we both commented that since we were visual; the go-around would more than likely be given by the Controller. The ATIS was only effective within fifty miles of the airport and the recording alternated in Spanish and English; making it hard to get the entire ATIS in one uninterrupted listen during this busy phase of flight. Communication with ATC was extremely frustrating. The flight ahead asked multiple times what the wind speed and direction were and the Controller didn't know what he was asking. We were given a 360 heading and told to descend to 1700 FT with a clearance to join the localizer to 3R. We accomplished that and put in 1200 FT in the MCP for the circling approach to 21L. The Tower Controller then asked us if we'd like to land on Runway 3R instead. We asked the Tower the winds and during his long and detailed response; I felt we weren't in position to accept the straight in to 3R. I looked to my right and saw a cloud that may have been in our way during the circling approach; so I announced to the Tower that we were going around and they came back and said; 'Roger; you're cleared for the circling approach to Runway 21R.' The Captain thought we could immediately accept the circling approach as we had planned and told me to put the gear down. I put the gear down and told him I thought we wouldn't be stable if we did that. He recognized my concern and agreed that we should go around. During the missed approach I attempted to get the new heading and altitude from the tower while the Captain turned right; toward the published missed. The flaps were at five degrees; so there was no need to make any changes according to the litany. The missed approach altitude wasn't set and remained at the 1200 FT we had used for the circling approach altitude while I asked the Controller what heading and altitude he wanted. I asked this question two or three times; and absolutely could not understand the Controller's responses. The busy go-around environment may have made it more difficult for me to understand than it should have been. The speed was rapidly accelerating past 200 KTS; and I was concerned the Captain would over speed the flaps by exceeding the 220 knot limit speed. I told the Captain to watch his speed and knew it would be tough to keep under the 220 knot limit; so without command; I retracted the flaps to one and said; 'I got flaps toone.' I asked the Controller again about the heading and altitude and was able to understand a clearance to 3100 FT and a heading of 130; essentially what the Captain was doing. As an aside; typically in the US the heading is announced before the altitude in this situation. It was reversed by this Controller; and the 3100 FT; 130 heading were rather hard to understand given the accent. At this point; I looked down and saw our airspeed was below the flaps speed for flaps one. I told the Captain he was getting slow and he responded with an immediate increase in thrust and lowered the nose. He later told me that he had been thinking he was at flaps fifteen; and I explained that we started the go-around at flaps five and that I retracted the flaps to one as we came close to the flap over speed limit. Effective crew communication during this flap movement wasn't easy as the Controller was speaking throughout the missed approach. We flew the remainder of the missed approach accurately. At this point; a straight in approach looked safer than the circling approach; so we requested the ILS to Runway 3R with a tailwind of eight knots. The runway was 10;007 FT long and dry. We landed uneventfully on 3R. The Controllers on the ground were very apologetic for the confusion and multiple approaches that we were told to expect. In hindsight; while bringing the flaps up to prevent an over speed seemed like a good idea to me at the time; it created a configuration where the Captain thought he had more flaps than he did; resulting in a situation that could have been more serious than an over speed. Since go-arounds are likely to be more common with the added emphasis on stabilized approaches; I hope they'll be featured in the simulator more; and not just from the missed approach point. Doing them before the marker would be helpful. Discussing the appropriate response by the non flying pilot if a flap over speed is imminent would also be helpful..

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.