Narrative:

I was working the final sector. We were in simultaneous ILS airspace. I was getting visual approaches from the downwind to runway 34L; if I could get the aircraft down to 9000' and keep them within about 12nm from the airport. The jordan sector was using ILS approaches to runway 34R. I had cleared air carrier Y for a visual approach to runway 34L to follow a preceding B738; and air carrier Y had just started about a 10nm left base-leg turn when the monitor-west sector called me and asked if I was watching air carrier X; who I then saw at about 18nm final to my runway; without any point-out or coordination to myself that he would come to my runway. I issued air carrier Y an immediate right turn to bring him back to the downwind and miss air carrier X; who was on an ILS runway 34L approach converging in his way. I believe that I was able to get him to turn quick enough that we did not lose separation between the two aircraft. However air carrier Y was at about 7200' in a 7000' MVA and by turning him back to the downwind put him just slightly into the 8000' MVA. I climbed air carrier Y to 8000' but I believe he was only at about 7400' or so climbing to 8000' along the edge and inside of the 8000' MVA. I was flustered that I had to scramble to miss an aircraft on my final approach course; and did not think fast enough to ask air carrier Y if the had the terrain in sight; which I believe he would have; and to provide their own terrain separation. I was initially just intent on getting air carrier Y turned away from the conflict without climbing them into the higher aircraft. At the time the jordan sector was training; had a newly certified controller on as their hand off; there were 2 supervisors standing behind us orchestrating the situation for the overloaded; (my opinion); jordan sector. We also had an inexperienced traffic management coordinator working who I believe might have let the jordan sector get overloaded with too many arrival aircraft at one time. It seemed like there were 'too many cooks in the kitchen'; with a trainee; a trainer; a green hand off; and 2 supervisors; all involved in sorting out the situation and it lead to some confusion on jordan's part. I had been told by one of the supervisors a few minutes before this event that I was going to get one or two offloads from jordan for my runway. In fact; I even took hand offs on 2 aircraft; one of which I believe was air carrier X. But almost immediately after that; before I got communications with either of them; one of the supervisors told me that I would not get any of them offloaded to me and to flash them back to jordan; which I did. I had just previously seen air carrier X flying very high above my final; and above another jordan aircraft; and thought he was flashing hand off to the stockton sector; which would've been who they would give him to for re sequencing to the downwind. I was very surprised to see him very shortly later down on my final approach course. My workload to get visual approaches was fairly high at the time; which is probably why I didn't see air carrier X coming down my final approach course sooner. Recommendation; I believe it would've been better to have an experienced hand off working when there was training on the radar position in a very difficult weather and traffic scenario. We had IMC; snow/rain; icing; RVR's; braking action advisories in effect; strong south winds; tailwinds; very difficult conditions along with heavy traffic. I think that the supervisors would've been better off leaving the sectors to work themselves and just monitor to ensure that things went okay; instead of them both trying to make traffic decisions. And I think that either the traffic management coordinator or a single supervisor should have been calling offloads early; and monitoring them.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: S56 controller described a MVA separation loss during simultaneous operations to Runway's 34R/L at SLC; complicated by weather; training; alleged lack of TMC oversight and too much supervisory input.

Narrative: I was working the Final Sector. We were in simultaneous ILS airspace. I was getting visual approaches from the downwind to Runway 34L; if I could get the aircraft down to 9000' and keep them within about 12nm from the airport. The Jordan Sector was using ILS approaches to Runway 34R. I had cleared Air Carrier Y for a visual approach to Runway 34L to follow a preceding B738; and Air Carrier Y had just started about a 10nm left base-leg turn when the Monitor-West Sector called me and asked if I was watching Air Carrier X; who I then saw at about 18nm final to my runway; without any point-out or coordination to myself that he would come to my runway. I issued Air Carrier Y an immediate right turn to bring him back to the downwind and miss Air Carrier X; who was on an ILS Runway 34L approach converging in his way. I believe that I was able to get him to turn quick enough that we did not lose separation between the two aircraft. However Air Carrier Y was at about 7200' in a 7000' MVA and by turning him back to the downwind put him just slightly into the 8000' MVA. I climbed Air Carrier Y to 8000' but I believe he was only at about 7400' or so climbing to 8000' along the edge and inside of the 8000' MVA. I was flustered that I had to scramble to miss an aircraft on my final approach course; and did not think fast enough to ask Air Carrier Y if the had the terrain in sight; which I believe he would have; and to provide their own terrain separation. I was initially just intent on getting Air Carrier Y turned away from the conflict without climbing them into the higher aircraft. At the time the Jordan Sector was training; had a newly certified controller on as their Hand Off; there were 2 supervisors standing behind us orchestrating the situation for the overloaded; (my opinion); Jordan Sector. We also had an inexperienced Traffic Management Coordinator working who I believe might have let the Jordan Sector get overloaded with too many arrival aircraft at one time. It seemed like there were 'too many cooks in the kitchen'; with a trainee; a trainer; a green Hand Off; and 2 Supervisors; all involved in sorting out the situation and it lead to some confusion on Jordan's part. I had been told by one of the Supervisors a few minutes before this event that I was going to get one or two offloads from Jordan for my runway. In fact; I even took hand offs on 2 aircraft; one of which I believe was Air Carrier X. But almost immediately after that; before I got communications with either of them; one of the Supervisors told me that I would not get any of them offloaded to me and to flash them back to Jordan; which I did. I had just previously seen Air Carrier X flying very high above my final; and above another Jordan aircraft; and thought he was flashing hand off to the Stockton Sector; which would've been who they would give him to for re sequencing to the downwind. I was very surprised to see him very shortly later down on my final approach course. My workload to get visual approaches was fairly high at the time; which is probably why I didn't see Air Carrier X coming down my final approach course sooner. Recommendation; I believe it would've been better to have an experienced Hand Off working when there was training on the RADAR position in a very difficult weather and traffic scenario. We had IMC; snow/rain; icing; RVR's; braking action advisories in effect; strong south winds; tailwinds; very difficult conditions along with heavy traffic. I think that the Supervisors would've been better off leaving the sectors to work themselves and just monitor to ensure that things went okay; instead of them both trying to make traffic decisions. And I think that either the Traffic Management Coordinator or a single Supervisor should have been calling offloads early; and monitoring them.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.